Text 6 the presidential veto

The Constitutional Convention initially gave the executive a qualified veto with the proportion of the legislature needed to override established at three-fourths (this provided greater independence from the legislature, which was still empowered to select the president). When the mode of presidential selection was shifted outside Congress, the convention returned to the present two-thirds override.

The intent of the framers concerning the veto is widely debated. Most delegates envisioned the veto as a “negative” by which an executive could be defended against legislative excesses, which is precisely why supporters of a line-item veto refer to reinstating the intent of the Framers. The veto represented one of the most basic elements in how the Framers sought to separate and check power.

Did the Framers intend the executive to use the veto only against legislative encroachment, or would the veto also apply to bad legislation? And what criteria would a president employ in determining what was a poor law? Hamilton argued that the veto was necessary to protect executive independence (“ He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote”) and that the veto “ not only serves as a shield to the executive, it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated to guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a majority of that body.”

The veto may have once served as a weapon of last resort, but several presidents have used a veto strategy to implement their legislative goals. For example, the first six American presidents vetoed a total of 9 bills. Taylor, Fillmore, and Garfield vetoed no bills, Polk vetoed 3, and Franklin Roosevelt vetoed 635 – reflecting both his conception of the presidency and his influence over the legislative process. The veto also serves as a persuasive lever when the branches are in conflict. Presidents frequently find the mere threat of a veto sufficient. In 1985, for example, president Reagan (who used the veto less frequently than his predecessors) dared Congress to try raising taxes. Borrowing from Clint Eastwood, he said such action would “ make my day” and be met by a quick veto. The use of the veto by a president of one party against a Congress controlled by another is something the framers did not anticipate.

THE POCKET VETO. The pocket veto is one subject to current controversy. Congress passes a bill; it arrives at a White House. The president can sign the bill if he approves it. Or veto the bill and return it to the Congress, which can override the veto by a two-thirds vote in each house. The president can also decide to take no action, in which case the bill becomes a law in ten working days. When Congress is not in session the president can not return a bill; therefore, according to the Constitution, “ It shall not be a law.” The term used to describe this action is pocket veto – the president pockets the legislation and denies Congress a chance to override the veto.

Can a president pocket a bill when Congress merely adjourns for a Christmas holiday? In1984 a U.S. Court of Appeals panel ruled that President Reagan acted illegally when he pocket vetoed legislation linking military aid to El Salvador with human rights progress. Reagan decided to break what had been a political accommodation under Presidents Ford and Carter, who restricted the pocket veto to final adjournment of Congress at the end of the second session. Reagan exercised the pocket veto between the first and the second sessions of the 98^th Congress. In 1984 the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that a president may use the pocket veto only between the adjournment of one Congress and the Convening of a newly elected one. Thus Reagan should have returned the human rights bill for a possible override vote in the second session of the 98^th Congress. The Supreme Court will hear an appeal from the Reagan administration to decide whether a president can stop a bill from becoming a law during recesses between sessions of the same Congress.

Дата добавления: 2015-10-30