Crime, Drugs, and the Privatization of Security—and Terror.

Transnational crime, much of it related to drug trafficking, has

emerged as a leading source of violence within both developed and

developing societies. The weight of this criminal activity in many

economies encourages the spillover of criminal violence into the political

realm. States in Latin America and elsewhere are becoming

destabilized through narco-terrorism. In Italy, the war between organized

crime (the Mafia, Ndraghetta, and Camora) and the state has

at times spilled over into acts of outright terrorism. In Turkey,

proceeds from the drug trade have been used to support PKK terrorism

as well as the counterterrorist activities of right-wing nationalist

groups.

Colombia provides the most striking contemporary example of this

problem and its bearing on U.S. interests. There, private paramilitary

armies exist alongside the Colombian military, violent drug cartels,

and left-wing insurgents. Terrorist tactics have become the

norm in relations among these groups, and Colombia now faces the

dismal prospect of deterioration into a narco-state or outright disintegration.

Colombian terrorism is also beginning to undermine

regional stability, with particular effect on the border with

Venezuela. One consequence of this situation has been Colombia’s

emergence as a leading source of international and specifically anti-

U.S. terrorism—Colombia led the global tally of anti-U.S. incidents

with 56 in 1995 and 53 in 1996.

As the United States becomes more heavily involved in counternarcotics

cooperation with Mexico, Peru, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador,

and Brazil—and possibly, Colombia—the potential for narcoterrorism

against U.S. targets, civilian and military, will likely increase.

Any proposals for expanded assistance, including air interdiction,

will raise new force protection problems for U.S. forces

deployed to the region. In an era of transnational terrorist

networks (and drug cartels have been at the forefront of such

networking), it is possible for narco-terrorists to strike for practical or

symbolic reasons at U.S. targets far from the area of operations in

Latin America and the Caribbean.

The spread of transnational violence associated with international

criminal activity is also one of the elements fueling rapid growth in

the private security field worldwide. Multinational corporations,

nongovernmental aid organizations, and others exposed to criminal

and politically motivated terrorism are increasingly reliant on the

services of security firms, which now must be considered antiterrorism

actors in their own right, alongside states and international organizations.

This trend is particularly pronounced in Latin America,

Africa, and the former Soviet Union, where crime and terrorism—

often the two are difficult to distinguish—have become leading challenges

for foreign businesses and investors. Yet this privatization of

security also raises the prospect of growing security information and

expertise on the international market and thus potentially at the service

of terrorist networks.

The interaction between transnational criminal organizations and

political terrorism raises special concerns. This interaction is in no

sense new, and terrorist organizations as diverse as Shining Path in

Peru and the PKK in Turkey derive substantial revenue from drugrelated

commerce. But the enormous sums of money involved, as

well as numerous points of contact between leading mafias and legitimate

institutions, can facilitate acts that would be difficult for politically

motivated terrorist groups to undertake—and pay for—on their

own. This is a particular risk in relation to nuclear terrorism.

Although details remain murky, Russian mafias are already reported

to be involved in obtaining and smuggling nuclear materials, and in

the most extreme case, perhaps even small nuclear weapons.

Further turmoil in Russia could worsen the outlook for control of

nuclear materials and technology. As the conflict between transnational

mafias and concerned states becomes more direct, it raises

the possibility that mafias themselves will threaten nuclear or other

forms of unconventional terrorism.

As the experience with Osama bin Laden, a rogue Saudi businessman

with extreme Islamist and anti-American views, suggests, the future

environment may see more international terrorism financed by private

means. Private sponsors of terrorist movements, not necessarily

limited to Islamic radicalism and with full access to information

technologies and techniques, may find it convenient to operate

against regimes, rival movements, or the United States from far-flung

bases. And as the bin Laden experience shows, targets will include

the relatively “hard” U.S. overseas military presence as well as softer

diplomatic and civilian targets. Bin Laden established himself in

Afghanistan, along with other Arab Afghans, and Sudan offers another

congenial environment. In the future, bases for privately sponsored

terrorism might as easily be found in unstable regions elsewhere—

in the Balkans or the Caucasus, or where wealthy elites exist

against a background of strong anti-Western resentment, such as

Malaysia. Arguably, the decline in overt state sponsorship may

stimulate the rise of privately sponsored terrorism—the dark side of

global philanthropy.

Дата добавления: 2015-10-21