Terrorism in the War Paradigm

Fourth, terrorism can take the form of an “asymmetric” strategy

employed by adversaries in conflict with the United States or its allies,

as a substitute for more conventional attacks, as a waypoint to

more direct aggression, or as an adjunct to conventional warfare.

This notion of terrorism in the “war paradigm” is most likely to

arise from the perception that the United States, and the West

(including Israel) more generally, have developed an unassailable

capacity for conventional warfare. As a result, regional competitors

wishing to change the political or territorial order must contend with

a perceived revolution in military affairs that has conferred disproportionate

advantages on the most developed military powers. The

experience of the Gulf War offers a key lesson in this regard. The Gulf

War and subsequent operations in the Gulf, Bosnia, and elsewhere

may also be seen as confirming the political will of the United States

and its allies to use force in support of regional order.

A potential aggressor reviewing this experience may well draw the

conclusion that terrorism (as well as other unconventional instruments

such as the use of weapons of mass destruction) might be

employed as a means of subverting regional competitors without

necessarily triggering a U.S. response. Terrorism might provide a

means of throwing deployed forces off balance, gaining time for the

aggressor to consolidate a cross-border operation against a U.S. ally.

Finally, it may also represent an attractive means of striking at the

United States directly, for symbolism or revenge, and as a means of

influencing U.S. public opinion when the costs and benefits of intervention

are in debate. Some of these objectives might be achieved

simply through the threat of terrorist attacks. The threat to use terrorists

as a low-tech delivery system for chemical, biological, or nuclear

weapons adds a troubling dimension.

That said, the systematic use of terrorism as a strategy by regional

powers confronting the United States can face substantial obstacles,

as the Iraqi experience during the Gulf War suggests. During the runup

to war in the Gulf, it was widely and reasonably predicted that

Saddam Hussein would mobilize sympathetic terrorist organizations

to engage in attacks on Western targets, both civilian and military.21

In the event, terrorism was a negligible feature of the crisis, and

Iraqi-sponsored terrorism certainly did not constitute anything like

the potent “fifth column” some had envisioned. A range of explanations

has been offered for the failure of Saddam Hussein’s announced

terrorism campaign, including pressure by other state

sponsors (e.g., Syria), lack of planning and effective communications

(exacerbated by the bombing campaign against Baghdad), and effective

Western antiterrorism measures. The prospect for terrorist

attacks against harder military targets in the Gulf was probably

doubly limited by the short notice and the general unpreparedness of

terrorist groups, especially those with close ties to Baghdad such as

the Palestinian Liberation Front and the Fatah Revolutionary

Council, for attacks on deployed forces. With better preparation,

both political and material, the outcome might have been quite different.

Moreover, as discussed below, it may be too soon to gauge

the longer-term effects of the Gulf War on Iraqi-sponsored terrorism.

A variation on this theme of terrorism as an asymmetric strategy goes

further to suggest that unconventional modes of conflict will stem

not just from the desire to outflank the United States but from a shift

in the nature of conflict itself. In this paradigm, unconventional terrorist

attacks on the sinews of modern, information-intensive societies

will become the norm, largely replacing conventional conflicts

over the control of territory or people. Carried to its logical conclusion,

this is a future in which terrorism of all sorts, and especially information-

related terrorism, becomes a more pervasive phenomenon,

or even the dominant mode of war. It may, by definition,

have its greatest effect on the most highly developed economies,

above all, the United States.

Terrorism in various forms may be used deliberately by an adversary

to deter certain types of attacks in war or during periods of tension in

which U.S. intervention is likely. The use of air power, in particular,

may face constraints imposed by mass hostage taking, including the

dispersal of hostages to likely target sites. This tactic has been employed

by Bosnian Serbs as a deterrent to NATO attacks, as well as by

Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War and by Chechen separatists in

their conflict with Moscow. This constraint can also be a factor in

the more general problem of the discriminate use of air power in urban

settings.

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