Soviet Partisans in Ukraine

Soon after German invasion, Communist party officials began to organize partisan units behind enemy lines. The Soviet Union organized many partisan bases in the 1920s and early 1930s in case of possible war. Then, at the end of the 1930s a new military doctrine was adopted. According to that doctrine the USSR was supposed to wage only offensive wars and thus did not need partisan bases anymore. As a result, practically all the partisan bases were destroyed. Consequently, partisans could not play important role in 1941. They were badly organized and the population did not support them much. An official German report stated, for example, in August 1941: “Brought by air, Russian partisans do not have any influence on local population. Ukrainians catch them and hand over to us.” As the war continued and Nazi brutalities in occupied areas became widespread, the partisan movement started to grow. In June 1942, in Moscow, the Ukrainian Partisan Command (UPC) was established, led by Tymofii Strokach, General of NKVD. The UPC trained various partisan cadres, reconnaissance and diversion groups for working in German rears. It also coordinated the activity of partisan units, supplied them with weapon and medicines, and sent specially trained officers. The leaders of partisan units had Soviet military ranks and received officers’ salaries as if they were fighting in regular troops. The largest Soviet partisan units numbered several thousand people and made long raids in German rears. Partisans were quite active and efficient. In 1943, for example, they blew up 3688 military trains and destroyed 1469 railway bridges. Germany had to keep numerous garrisons and troops in Ukraine to repulse partisan attacks and protect communications.

Compared to Belorussia with its swampy regions, much of the open Ukrainian countryside was unsuited for partisan warfare. Thus, in Ukraine, Soviet partisans never became as significant as they were in Belorussia. In Galicia, where the OUN was well established, Soviet partisans had no popular base for their activity. Consequently, most of their operations in Ukraine were confined to parts of Volhynia and Polissia. In 1944 there were approximately 40,000 Soviet partisans in Ukraine.[10]

The Soviet partisan movement often complicated the position of peasantry. Many peasants found themselves pressed from both sides (Soviet partisans and Germans). If peasants helped partisans they were punished by Germans. If they refused to help the partisans they could be punished by them. (The help usually included food, shelter, and clothes). Soviet partisans completely or partially burnt 30 Ukrainian villages. Many Ukrainian villages were burnt by Germans as well.

Ukrainians did not play a major role in Soviet partisan movement in Ukraine. They constituted only about one-third of Soviet partisans. Russians, consequently, were overrepresented. The vast majority of Ukraine’s population during the war remained politically neutral and thought more not about resistance but survival.

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (УПА)

It was in Polissia and Volhynia that the first Ukrainian nationalist partisan units appeared and, surprisingly, at the outset they were not associated with OUN. As soon as the Nazi-Soviet war broke out, Taras Bulba-Borovets, a local Ukrainian activist, formed an irregular unit called “Polissian Sich”, later renamed the UPA (Ukrainska Povstanska Armiia – Ukrainian Insurgent Army), for the purpose of cleansing his region of the remnants of the Red Army. He proclaimed himself the major otaman of Ukraine. When the Germans tried to disband his unit in late 1941, he started to fight both the Germans and the Soviets. In 1942, members of both OUN-M and OUN-B also established small units in Volhynia.

In early 1943 almost all units of OUN-M, OUN-B, and Borovets were united into the UPA under leadership of OUN-B. D. Kliachkovsky (Klym Savur), a member of the OUN-B leadership, was elected commander-in-chief of the UPA. The UPA quickly grew into a large, well-organized partisan army, which took control of large parts of Volhynia, Polissia, and, later, Galicia. Its numbers reached close to 40,000 fighters.[11] Compared to other underground movements in Nazi-occupied Europe, the UPA was unique in that it had practically no foreign support. Its growth and strength were, therefore, an indication of the very considerable popular support it enjoyed among the Ukrainians.

Compared to Soviet partisans, the UPA tried to avoid direct anti-German actions. The UPA units fought against the Germans only when being attacked or when it was necessary. They tried to spare local population from Nazi’s retaliating actions. More than 250 villages in Ukraine were burned with their inhabitants as punishments for Soviet partisan actions (the so-called collective responsibility practice). Moreover, in many regions of Volhynia and Polissia the UPA managed to protect German communications from diversions of Soviet partisans. By protecting German communications they protected Ukrainian civilians from retaliating actions. On the other hand the UPA did not want to help the Soviet army by attacking the German army and thus loosing their men. Regular fighting between the UPA and Germans started only from February 1943 and was not large-scale. The major enemies of the UPA were Soviet and Polish partisans.

In the course of war the OUN changed its totalitarian ideology to get broader support. At its major large meetings in August 1943 and July 1944 the organization proclaimed democratization of the national movement. The OUN allowed the existence of several political parties instead of one, and gave up their slogan “Ukraine for Ukrainians!” Such democratic freedoms as those of speech, meetings, the press, consciousness, etc were also proclaimed, mostly to attract attention of the old western democracies (USA and Great Britain). The OUN hoped to get their help in the ‘fight against both dictators’: Hitler and Stalin. In general, the number 1 enemy of the UPA was the Soviet Union, the number 2 – Poland, and the number 3 – Germany.

When Soviet troops came to Western Ukraine in 1944 the UPA concluded an armisticewith the Germans to spare its men for the fight against the Soviets. The retreating Germans even left military supplies for the UPA and continued to supply the nationalists by air. Some Russian historians and pro-Russian politicians from Eastern Ukraine (N.Vitrenko, P.Simonenko) stress these facts as signs of collaboration between the Nazis and the UPA. Most Ukrainian historians, however, say that it was practical decision on both sides as the Germans and the UPA had now a very powerful common enemy.

The Ukrainian-Polish Massacres (1943-44)

The Ukrainian-Polish relations had been complicated for centuries. One of the most tragic pages in these relations was the conflict between two partisan armies – UPA and Armija Krajowa (AK), the Polish nationalist underground army. Ukrainian nationalists wanted to drive the Poles out of the areas where Ukrainians were a majority. For its part, the Poles wanted to retain control of the lands that had been part of the Polish state. The bloody events started in April 1943 in Volhynia when UPA units massacred several Polish villages in Rivne oblast. Everybody, including women and children were “slaughtered,” according to Soviet partisan reports to their headquarters in Moscow. D. Kliachkovsky, the UPA’s commander-in-chief, gave Polish settlers in Volhynia an ultimatum – “either you cross the Sian or Buh rivers within 48 hours or you will be killed.” The AK leadership sent its own order: “remain on your places or Poland will lose Volhynia.” On 11 July 1943, the OUN-B simultaneously attacked 167 Polish settlements and massacred their entire population. R. Shukhevych,[12] who replaced D. Kliachkovsky as commander-in-chief of the UPA at the end of 1943, gave orders to entirely annihilate the Poles („дощенту знищити поляків”). According to the Polish sources, in 1943-44 about 60,000 Polish men, women, and children were massacred in Volhynia by Ukrainians, especially the SB, the security service of the OUN.[13] On 4 August 1943, General T. Komorowski, the leader of the AK, issued an order for “retaliating actions” against Ukrainians in predominantly Polish regions (Kholm and other areas). By June 1944 about 150 Ukrainian villages had been burnt in Khrubeshuvsky and Tomashivsky regions. More than 15,000 Ukrainian peasants perished in these events.

The Germans as well as Soviet partisans did not involve into the Polish-Ukrainian conflict but encouraged and provoked it by any means. These bloody events were caused by Polish and Ukrainian chauvinism that devaluated human lives. Both Ukrainian and Polish extremists covered their cruel and sadistic actions with patriotic slogans. The Ukrainian-Polish massacres can be called the acts of genocide.

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