The following can be viewed as positive outcomes of devolution and support the arguments of those in favour

DO ELECTIONS CHANGE ANYTHING?

What are the main arguments in favour of maintaining the single-member plurality (‘first-past-the-post’) electoral system?

Note that the following arguments could be adapted to answer a question relating to the disadvantages of proportional electoral systems

• Many traditionalists would argue ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’. First-past-the-post (FPTP) is simple, familiar, quick to count, and produces a clear and decisive result. Many of the alternatives are seen as complicated. The Single Transferable Vote (STV), for example, can use one of a series of complex formulae to calculate the winning candidates. This could confuse voters, and the result can take a long time. This contrasts sharply with our present system whereby voters usually know by the small hours of election night who their new MP is to be, and which party will form the government. The clarity of the result means that the removal vans can be sent round to Downing Street fairly quickly.

• There is no need for coalitions since the natural mechanics of the system produces single party governments with (in recent times often large) overall majorities. This avoids the need for wrangling amongst coalition partners over what policies are to be introduced – usually behind closed doors, and in smoke-filled rooms. Often the composition of the government is decided by a ‘kingmaker’, i.e. a small party that holds the balance of power and could join with either of the two large parties. Voters in countries where this happens think it is unfair that small parties can wield such power.

• Single rather than multi-party government fosters stability within the political system. Coalitions are prone to breakdown when one of the partners becomes dissatisfied with the government’s direction. Italy is the archetypal example of instability, with over fifty different governments in the postwar period.

• FPTP allows voters to decide who their representatives are. Some alternative systems have lists determined by party headquarters and this leaves voters disenchanted. European elections for instance are conducted on the British mainland (STV for Northern Ireland) under a closed Party List system whereby a voter only votes for a party and if a party wins 4 seats then the top 4 candidates on the list are chosen.

• We need to appreciate also the special link between an individual MP and his or her constituency. Much of an MP’s time is spent dealing with constituency business, and they build up a very good local knowledge as a result. Voters of all parties can identify with the Member for their area and this link can be lost with different systems which use much larger geographic areas for constituencies and/or are multi-member.

• Hybrid electoral systems that contain a top-up element can cause confusion and tension. An unfortunate by-product of the use of the top-up element in elections under the Additional Member System in Scotland and Wales is the tension that has arisen between the constituency and list members: the first-past-the-post members in the devolved assemblies feel the need to jealously guard constituency business from the regional representatives.

• Under some PR systems, a representative can get elected on very small percentages of the vote after the electorate rejected them in constituency contests. There are accusations that Cardiff Bay is a losers’ assembly since members can get elected for the top-up element after being rejected in local constituencies: in 2003 three from four of the MWAs elected in the regional/list ballot in Clwyd West were rejected by voters in the first past the post element (one of which polled only 7.9%).

• One of the key arguments in favour of proportional electoral systems, that it would boost turnout, has not been supported by figures from the elections where different systems have been used. Indeed, participation has been a disappointment. In Scotland turnout for the 2003 election was only 49%, compared to over 60% for area in the 2005 General Election. For Wales it was even worse, with only 38% turning out to vote. The introduction of the Party List system for European Parliament elections did little for turnout, with the percentage of the electorate voting falling by a third between 1994 and 1999.

What are the main arguments in favour of reforming the Westminster electoral system?

Note that the following arguments could be adapted to answer a question relating to either the disadvantages of first past the post or advantages of proportional electoral systems

• No government has been elected since 1970 with more that 45% of the vote. In 2005 Labour were awarded an overall majority of 66 seats (55.1% of the 646 available) with only 35.2% of the national vote. Concerns are that there is very little consent for the government. Since turnout was just 61.3% it means that only 21.6% of the entire electorate voted for the government. Of comparable democracies only Turkey has a government with a majority on a lower share of the vote.

• The single member simple plurality system does not convert the share of the vote into seats for parties on an equal basis. If seats were allocated on a purely proportional basis then Labour would have won 227 seats as opposed to 355. Clearly they are over-represented. The Liberal Democrats would have been awarded 142 seats for their 22% share of the vote rather than the 62 they actually won. For the Conservatives, a proportional distribution would have seen them get 208 seats, which is more than the 197 secured by FPTP. Unfairness in representation is illustrated by the fact that Labour required an average of approx. 27,000 votes per MP, against 44,500 per Conservative MP elected, and 96,500 per Lib Dem MP.

• Traditionally FPTP benefited the winning party and a small swing towards either Labour or the Tories saw them rewarded with quite a large increase in the number of seats. However, the system is now biased in favour of the Labour party. There are many reasons why Labour benefit so greatly, but the main reason is that they are very efficient at picking up seats, i.e. they win a lot of constituencies where turnout is low. What this means is that if the Conservatives and Labour each polled an equal share of the vote at 33.8%, Labour would still have 116 more seats than the Conservatives.

• Turnout revived somewhat in the 2005 election, but the figure of 61.3% remains the second worst since the ‘khaki election’ of 1918. One of the key reasons given for the low turnout in 2001, that the election was a forgone conclusion, did not apply and many expected the figure to be higher. Opponents of the FPTP system would argue that the inherent faults within the system depress turnout.

• Supporters of proportional electoral systems argue that fewer votes are wasted than under the current system. Under FPTP many of the votes cast do not matter since they go towards a candidate other than the winner, or they are surplus to the number needed to elect the winner. In 2005 only 29% of the votes cast contributed to the election of a candidate, with 52% wasted (i.e. cast for losing candidates), and 18% were surplus votes for winning candidates.

• In 2005 only just over one third of all MPs elected achieved a majority of the votes cast in their constituency. This was a new lowest ever, and some way down on 2001 when around 50% of MPs could claim they had received a majority of the votes. The lowest share of the vote was polled by Gordon Banks in Perthshire with just 31% of the vote. The MP with the lowest share of the whole electorate was George Galloway in Bethnal Green who managed to poll only 18% of the potential vote.

• ‘Safe seat syndrome’ means that turnout is likely to be lowest in the safest seats, and highest where the votes is likely to be close. This is borne out by evidence from the 2005 election where the turnout in the 10 most marginal seats was 17% higher than in the 10 safest seats. The safest seats tend to be in inner city areas. The turnout in Liverpool Riverside was again the lowest in the country at just over 41%. Some seats are deemed so ‘safe’ by election campaign managers that political parties tend to devote little of their time or resources to such areas and this compounds the problem of low turnout, and leads to voters feeling further disengaged from party politics. A proportional electoral system, it is argued, would reduce or eliminate the problem of safe seats.

• The current system for Westminster elections is said to lead to the under-representation of women. Currently only 20% of MPs in the House of Commons are women, and although this is a slight increase on 2001 (18%) the UK still lags behind many other Western European parliaments where proportional electoral systems are used. There is strong evidence to suggest that systems that are proportional lead to a fairer representation of women within a UK framework. In the 1999 Scottish Parliament elections, women secured 37% of the seats, i.e. more than double the figure for the House of Commons. In the Welsh Assembly, women won 41% of the seats. These figures increased after the 2003 round of elections so that women now make up 40% of MSPs and 50% of MWAs. The UK elected women in 24% of the seats in the 2004 European Parliament elections, again exceeding that for the House of Commons in 2005.

• Single member simple plurality is also said to under-represent black and ethnic minority groups. In 2005 there was an increase in the number of black and ethnic minority MPs, from 13 to 15, but the figure is still low when compared to the percentage of the black and ethnic population in the UK: if the numbers were proportional there would be 51 MPs form minority ethnic backgrounds.

What impact would proportional representation for Westminster elections have on British politics?

It is possible to construct an answer to this question largely on the basis of the points we have covered above. The following points should therefore be supplemented with detail from the previous sections on elections in Unit 1 and Unit 3

• The use of a proportional electoral system would boost the representation of smaller parties. Reference could be made to the outcomes of the elections to devolved assemblies and the European Parliament. We could safely presume that parties such as the Greens would build on 0.26m votes they received at the last election if voters felt that their vote would count. It could also result in smaller parties growing beyond their current membership as their profile rises as a consequence of obtaining seats at Westminster.

• It is likely that no party would win a majority of the seats and coalition government would result as happened (briefly) in Wales and in the first and second terms at Holyrood. Opponents would argue that this would lead to instability and more frequent elections. Supporters would point to the smooth running of the Scottish Parliament.

• Supporters of PR systems would argue that since safe seats and wasted votes would not be as significant then turnout would increase. However, opponents would argue that this may not happen and would point to the disappointing turnouts in elections conducted using PR systems.

• The introduction of a proportional electoral system for Westminster would boost the numbers of women and black and ethnic minority MPs. Reference here could be made to the percentages of female legislators in the devolved assemblies and the European Parliament relative to the House of Commons.

• If the Additional Member System was used as it is in Scotland and Wales, there could be confusion about the roles of the constituency and top-up members or confusion between the two classes of MPs. Experience from the workings of AMS in Scotland suggests this is a possibility.

• A point not related to the points in earlier sections is the potential disintegration of the existing parties. All three of Britain’s main parties are broad churches, encompassing a wide range of views within their existing structures. The introduction of proportional representation may encourage certain factions to break away and form a new party, for example some Labour rebels may form a party that is similar to old Labour.

• Lastly, some sections of the electorate may become dissatisfied with the new system and campaign for a change back to the old system, as happened in New Zealand when it moved to a proportional based system in 1996 following a referendum. Some critics point to the high levels of disapproval expressed about the coalition government that formed after the election. Supporters of FPTP within the Labour and Conservative parties in this country have put it to their members whether they would be happy with the Liberal Democrats being in permanent coalition with either of the main two parties, as they expect would happen if PR were to be introduced. IS THERE A NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM?

Little progress has been made by the government on the second chamber in fulfilling its 1997 manifesto pledges to end the hereditary principle, and making it more democratic and representative. The number of hereditaries was cut to 92 in 1999, but further progress collapsed in 2003 when MPs failed to find common agreement in a series of free votes on the issue. One of the reasons why it has taken so long is due to the fact that the intricate details of proposals to alter the powers and composition of the upper house have thus far failed to excite the Prime Minister's interest. Tony Blair is not a constitutional reform zealot. There is a paradox here in that Blair's first term we witnessed a raft of reforms to the UK's constitutional architecture. But there is an argument that policies on Scottish devolution and such like were merely inherited from his predecessor as Labour leader, John Smith, and that implementation allowed Blair to look radical without breaking from his pledge to stick to Tory spending plans for the first two years of his government. It was, therefore, reform 'on the cheap'.

Arguments for a fully elected second chamber

• To add legitimacy to the political process: currently questions have to be asked about whether legislation has the consent of the people: when there is a clash between the Commons and the Lords people question the legitimacy of the second chamber.

• A fully elected second chamber would be more willing to challenge the Commons since it would have a democratic mandate from the people. This can only be a good thing in a country that has a lower house elected by first past the post that almost guarantees the government an inbuilt majority.

• If it was elected using a system of proportional representation it could be said to more accurately represent the wishes of the people and would allow small parties to have more influence on the legislative process. The Greens have benefited from the use of the additional member system for the Scottish Parliament and UKIP from the use of party list for the European Parliament. Neither party receives any representation in our national legislature.

• A fully elected second chamber would give greater representation to the regions. Federal Union, a constitutional reform pressure group, argues, for example, that there is no political forum where the Mayor of London can debate the future of London transport with the UK government.

• A fully elected second chamber would promote greater levels of political participation since people would have more faith in the political process.

• Anachronism argument: Lesotho is the only other country in the world where a hereditary element has an influence on the legislative process. For a country that claims to be a modern democracy this is out of sync – particularly given the recent constitutional reforms undertaken by the recent Labour government. As Tom Paine argued as long ago as 1791: "The idea of hereditary legislators is as inconsistent as that of hereditary judges, as hereditary

juries; and as absurd as an hereditary mathematician, or an hereditary wise man; as absurd as an hereditary Poet Laureate."

• A fully elected chamber sits happily with the government’s decision (in the Constitutional Reform Act 2005) to take the judicial function out of the Lords and thus create a clearer separation of powers.

• The public are overwhelmingly in favour: opinion polls consistently show that public back the right to vote for who sits in the second chamber.

• ‘Cash for honours’ proves that party leaders should be stripped of their powers to nominate members of the Lords. Only a fully elected chamber will ensure that what Billy Bragg terms the ‘stench of impropriety’ can be cleared from the air.

Arguments against further reform of the House of Lords

• The most recent reforms have gone far enough. The balance of composition in the 2^nd chamber is about right: most of the hereditaries have now gone and these were the biggest bone of contention as far as the reformists were concerned.

• Replacing the current format with an elected second chamber would result in gridlock, with newly elected legislators eager to flex their muscles. A second chamber via elections would mean the replacement of the temporary veto with a permanent one.

• Alternatively, the introduction of an elected element may take place alongside a neutering of the chamber’s power. The constitutional scholar Vernon Bogdanor, writing in a letter to The Times, highlighted the inconsistency of the Labour approach since the introduction of elected members is likely to take place alongside a limit on its powers. This idea is echoed in a leader in The Guardian: 'In recent decades, under both Conservative and Labour governments, the House of Lords has often played a vital role both as a traditional revising chamber and as a block against overhasty and oppressive bills. Given the volume of legislation now issuing from Whitehall, these roles have never been more needed. It is thus essential that reform should safeguard that independent and effective but subordinate function. It also follows that it would be unacceptable to use the Parliament Act to push through a bill creating an insufficiently robust upper house.'

• What would the quality of intake be? Who would be willing to stand for election to the second house from the current crop? Would this result in second class legislators? Similar to the argument suggested about the regional MSPs in Scotland. We would lose all the experience of the ex-ministers and Prime Ministers we have currently. Would ex-Chancellor Lord Howe have stood for election?

• Further reform would mean breaking with tradition that has served the country well. Why indulge in further constitutional tinkering when the country has successfully managed to surpass France and Germany in terms of GDP per head under the current arrangements?

• The current chamber works well. It is the most active chamber in the world. It sits for longer and meets more frequently than any other.

• The work of its committees is highly respected. The European Committee’s reports are read all throughout Europe and their suggestions are often debated in the European Parliament.

• What would replace it? Who would decide? How would it be decided? On this last question, a referendum on the issue could well see less than half the electorate participate, thereby undermining the process.

• There have already been too many constitutional changes for some. We should wait to see how these bed down before making any more.

• There is no public appetite for reform: polls suggest that it is low on the list of the public’s priorities and they would much rather the government of the day focused on schools, hospitals, etc.

• Turnout for elections to the Lords is unlikely to exceed 50% on the basis of the participation rates for other elections than those to the Commons. If the elections are concurrent with Euro elections then this is almost certain. It would be difficult to see how members of the second chamber could then claim a clear mandate.

Arguments that constitutional reform post-1997 was necessary to strengthen democracy in the UK

• House of Lords Reform: The Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs, Lord Falconer, points out that an entirely appointed upper house like that of Lesotho is not appropriate for a twenty-first century democracy.

• The 2005 Constitutional Reform Act makes provision for a Supreme Court – this is the natural extension of the role the Law Lords now play in deciding if UK law is in keeping with HRA and EU law.

• The Act also places the appointment of senior judges in the hands of the Lord Chief Justice rather than the Lord Chancellor, thus lessening the potential for ‘political’ or ‘crony’ appointments or accusations thereof.

• Arguments from the section on devolution are relevant here: Devolution makes government much more region sensitive: the new arenas deliver different policy to that produced by Westminster. In Scotland there is free long term care for the elderly, a repeal of the ban on promoting homosexuality in schools, and a Freedom of Information Act that has fewer restrictions. In Wales, there have been fewer differences, but this has begun to change since Morgan took over from Michael as First Minister and aimed to put ‘clear red water’ between Cardiff and Westminster. Witness the abolition of school league tables, free bus travel for pensioners, and free school milk for infants. And despite the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, there have been differences such as the Single Equality Act.

Arguments that further constitutional reform is necessary

• Further reform of the House of Lords: this is unfinished business.

Only a fully-elected chamber can guarantee accountability. Even a partially-elected chamber would be more democratic—since 2001 a raft of proposals ranging from 0-100% elected members have been put forward.

• While proposals for electing the Lords are on the table, it would make sense to look at reform of the election of MPs, too. As is mentioned in the section on elections, the current FPTP system is criticised on a number of counts: governments are rarely elected on a majority of the vote; it under-represents parties with evenly spread support; it is biased in favour of the Labour Party; it depresses turnout.

• Devolution: Although Prescott’s plan for a regional assembly in the North East was defeated, this was a result of opposition to Labour on other issues. Greater representation of England is still desirable, either as a single unit or regionally. There are currently no plans for Scottish and Welsh MPs to be denied the vote on England-only issues at Westminster — an obvious and simple remedy.

Arguments that constitutional reform post-1997 was unnecessary or weakened democracy in the UK

• If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. The British system of government may have certain faults, but no political system is perfect. Overall it has served the people well, and many question whether the upheaval of further reform is worth it.

• These reforms are ill-conceived meddling, and often for narrow party political advantage. For example, the abolition of the Office of Lord Chancellor was announced out of the blue in 2003, i.e. with insufficient consultation.

• Devolution can be viewed as a way of consolidating Labour support in the Celtic fringe, rather than having been driven by a deep New Labour desire to democratise Britain.

• Devolution. The negative impact of devolution is relevant here: it has been expensive, for example the Scottish Parliament building at Holyrood came in at ten times over budget, with the estimated cost at £431m; it has created regional unfairness, with Welsh under-25 receiving free prescriptions while the English under-25s do not; turnout for the Scottish Parliament and Welsh assembly elections has been low; in Scotland turnout for the 2003 election was only 49%, compared to over 60% for the region in the 2005 General Election. For Wales it was even worse, with only 38% turning out to vote.

• Passing the Human Rights Act further undermines British sovereignty in relation to Europe (but not the EU), and necessitates reform of the judiciary, thereby creating more problems/issues than it solves. Arguments that further constitutional reform is unnecessary or undesirable

• Since Britain does not have a written, codified, constitution, fundamentally altering the balance between the two chambers in Parliament is dangerous. If the Lords were entirely elected, what would prevent it from eclipsing the Commons in importance?

• Who would decide these questions? Who would write the constitution? Consensus would be almost impossible. For instance, left-wing campaigners would argue for the entrenchment of workers’ rights and against protection of property rights whilst right-wing campaigners would demand the opposite. Whilst politicians attempted to extricate themselves from this cul-de-sac there would be less progress on more important matters like health and education

• Would further elections, especially ones at mid-term, induce electoral fatigue? Would this exacerbate the problem of falling turnout at the existing elections?

• The proposed Supreme Court might well have the opposite effect from what is intended: it might make judges more politicised. In the US, Supreme Court judges are relatively well-known figures, whereas few people (with the exception of Politics students, of course!) can name a single Law Lord.

HOW UNITED IS THE UK?

What has been the impact of devolution?

When looking at the topic of devolution, it is important to bear in mind that we have already had nearly eight years of devolved government in both Scotland and Wales. We are approaching the third cycle of elections to both assemblies, due for 3 May 2007. In London, Livingstone has spent nearly seven years as Mayor. And although the Northern Ireland Assembly has had long periods of suspension, the first set of elections to that body took place over eight years ago.

Thus devolution in the UK is no longer the theoretical abstract it was for students of Politics as recently as the mid 1990s.

Consequently we need to examine the impact of devolution in order to get a full picture of this part of the syllabus. Outcomes can be considered either as positive or negative, and can be used to support arguments for or against devolution.

The following can be viewed as positive outcomes of devolution and support the arguments of those in favour

• Democracy has been enhanced within the UK since government is much more region sensitive: the new arenas deliver different policy to that produced by Westminster. In Scotland there is free long term care for the elderly, a repeal of the ban on promoting homosexuality in schools, and a Freedom of Information Act that has fewer restrictions. In Wales, there have been fewer differences, but this has begun to change since Morgan took over from Michael as First Minister and aimed to put ‘clear red water’ between Cardiff and

Westminster. Witness the abolition of school league tables, free bus travel for pensioners, and free school milk for infants. And despite the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, there have been differences such as the Single Equality Act. In the past 12 months different policy has continued to emerge from the new arenas:

• The Scottish Parliament continues to plough its own tartan furrow: a working group under the aegis of the Scottish Executive recently recommended that the smoking age should be raised from 16 to 18.

• The London Mayor, Ken Livingstone, remains at the vanguard of new transport policy. Following his earlier success with the congestion charge (introduced February 2003), Livingstone announced in November plans to introduce CO2 busting emissions based charging to the existing congestion charge scheme.

• On a separate but related note, the new legislatures act as policy laboratories. The argument here is that if the policies outlined above are not successful then this is not as expensive a mistake as if they were UK wide. Also, successes can be copied in different regions. Scrapping up-front tuitions fees was first introduced in Scotland and now applies south of the border. Northern Ireland has followed Wales in appointing a Children’s Commissioner. Since the publication of the 2006 edition of this guide, regions continue to learn from successful experiments elsewhere: officials responsible for introducing the smoking ban in England in July 2007 have been monitoring the effects north of the border, where the ban was introduced much earlier (March 2006). Clearly one part of the Union can learn from the experience of another.

• The electorates within the devolved regions accept devolution and express the view that it is the preferred system of government. In Wales support for government solely from Westminster has halved since 1997, whilst support for Scottish style powers has doubled. A similar pattern is evident in Northern Ireland, where, despite the problems in the region, voters would like an assembly with primary legislative and tax varying powers.

• There has been no discernible upsurge in nationalism within the devolved regions as some fierce anti-devolutionists argued. Support for independence in Scotland rose slightly in the early devolution years then fell below the 1999 peak, with roughly a quarter of the population remaining in favour. Much has been made of recent opinion polls that indicate a majority of support for Scottish independence but when the Scottish people are asked if they want Scotland to exit the Union, only a quarter express support. It is one thing for a teenager to demand more freedom from their parents, but leaving home is quite another.

• Within England the vast majority want Scotland and Wales to remain in the Union, thus there has been no English ‘backlash’. Further evidence that devolution does not appear to be leading to the break up of Britain that some predicted comes from surveys which show that voters in England still feel a very strong attachment to the Union post devolution, despite an apparent increasing desire for an English parliament.

• The use of proportional electoral systems in the new assemblies has resulted in UK politics becoming much more pluralistic. Nowhere is this more evident than in Scotland where the success of the Greens (7 seats), Scottish Socialists (6 seats) and Independents (4 seats) has created a ‘rainbow parliament’.

• There is increased party consensus regarding devolution and it is now accepted as part of the constitutional landscape. The Conservatives have dropped their opposition and the nationalists in Scotland and Wales saw their support drop at the 2003 elections.

• Devolution has boosted the representation of women in comparison with Westminster. In the 1999 Scottish Parliament elections, women secured 37% of the seats, roughly double the figure for the House of Commons (20%). In the Welsh Assembly, women won 41% of the seats. These figures increased after the 2003 round of elections so that women now make up 40% of MSPs and 50% of MWAs. These figures compare favourably with the highest in Europe (The Swedish Riksdag, with 45%, has the highest proportion of women in its legislative assembly amongst EU member states).

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