Negotiating Strategies and Tactics. 4. Negotiating style can be treated as а composite of two kinds of behaviors

4. Negotiating style can be treated as а composite of two kinds of behaviors. One is sheer bargaining — the exchange of proposals and counterproposals for settling particular issues — that occurs within the broad process of negotiation. The second is other interactions among negotiators. The first is negotiating techniques — the magnitude and timing of concessions, for example and the second involves developing rapport and trust and general patterns of communication. Both kinds of behavior deserve attention.

The "Probe, Push, Panic" Style. In а detailed study of Japanese bargaining with the United States and other governments, Michael Blaker has argued that the Japanese government has "the simplest sort of bargaining strategy — know what you want and push until you get it." The Japanese game plan, as he sees it, involves three stages: first, to probe carefully opposing thinking in order to gauge what is obtainable and to set manageable goals; second, to harness all available bargaining resources to force through these apparently realizable conditions; and finally, to continue to press for these demands even when their fortunes have soured and at the risk of terminating negotiations.

5. Opening Moves. The Japanese do not deliberate extensively over their bargaining tactics or plan what concessions they might make. Blaker observed that once into international bargaining, Japanese negotiators often find themselves with nо contingency or fallback plans, few officially authorized concessions, and an absence of clear policies on some questions. Even at the outset, the Japanese sometimes wait for U.S. negotiators to present а first proposal.

However, when the Japanese do present а first proposal, it is carefully drafted and reasonable. It reflects the Japanese predilection for well-informed, "best" solutions and the solidarity and obligation arising from domestic consensus-building. When the Japanese government negotiators have made their initial proposal, they are in effect not initiating bargaining but presenting its results. Internal activities have been arduous and protracted, and negotiators are held strictly accountable to their constituents.

6. Making Concessions. Americans tend to engage in systematic concession-making, starting with high initial demands and then making step -by-step concessions to converge on mutually agreeable terms." Americans always reciprocate when the other side makes а concession, no matter how small it is, even in experimental bargaining with the Japanese.

That has not held true for Japanese negotiators who do not appear to favor programmatic concessions. Instead, they са11 for consideration of their situation and reiterate their initial position. Japanese negotiators may have little leeway to do otherwise, because of the difficulty they have had in reaching а consensus within their own ranks. Japanese negotiators thus often concentrate on searching for just the right method to satisfy both parties' original objectives.

In the same vein, the Japanese are reluctant to press points via debate and other aggressive, verbal means. Because they spend more time listening than verbally assaulting or counterattacking the other side's positions, the Japanese have often appeared impervious to counterarguments, at least while at the negotiating table. By the same token, when the other side has come across too aggressively, Japanese negotiators have simply withdrawn from the negotiations.

When the Japanese do make concessions, they often jump to an appropriate position rather than inch toward it. They also often make the concession before а public impression is created that their government relented to foreign pressure. In any event, the concessions can be made only after а new consensus is reached.

7. End Game. Most bargaining reaches а point when the parties must either agree or break off, what Blaker called the "panic" stage. Generally, Japanese negotiators respond by continuing to press for understanding of their situation and by attributing the failure to reach an agreement to misunderstanding.

They cannot appeal to their own public by charging the other nation's negotiators with intransigence; Japanese political mores require the Japanese negotiators to be far-thinking and clever enough to come up with solutions acceptable to both parties. Japanese negotiators will often give way on а minor matter, even to promise something impossible to carry out, to maintain an amiable parting. Blaker offers many pre-war instances in which Japanese negotiators made unsanctioned commitments, initiated unauthorized conversations, and interposed themselves between their government and the opposing negotiators. There have been fewer instances since the war. In no instance has the Japanese government fulfilled the independent commitments of its negotiators.

8. On several occasions, American negotiators have found ways to have the negotiations taken away from the Japanese negotiators and elevated to the political level: to the prime minister's level. Sometimes the prime minister has resolved the issue tо the American negotiators' satisfaction. Sometimes, he has written tо the President, and the issue has been restudied in the United States tо the American negotiators' detriment. Most often, the prime minister has extended а promise which lower Japanese officials have implemented most perfunctorily.

Both Japanese and American negotiators have found it advantageous tо work against self-imposed deadlines — an impending passage of damaging legislation, а summit meeting of industrial democracies, а head of government visit. These deadlines can often speed up the processes of government and result in the early resolution of а problem.

EXERCISE 5. Train your skills in rendering.

Read the guidelines and make a concise translation of the items, then report them in English.

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