Evaluating the possibilities for acquiring and employing nuclear weapons in phase 1

PCCTS, Knights Templar “franchise” operations, lead by autonomous/ independent cells, will continue to emerge around Europe in the coming decades.

There are cells that are already in the process of attempting to acquire chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials although it will be literally impossible to create a small nuclear bomb (0,1-0,2 kt) in phase 1 of the European civil war.

Efforts to clandestinely build a nuclear device require a coherent and consistent investment measuring in the billions (if not tens of billions) of dollars over a period likely spanning a decade or more. We would require large, fixed, well-powered and vulnerable installations for a variety of aspects of the effort. These installations represent an enormous risk and opportunity cost for PCCTS, Knights Templar. The cultural Marxist hegemony (USASSR/EUSSR) closely monitors some of the equipment we will need to acquire and they will concentrate an enormous investment of intellectual, financial and material resources into just the sort of target that they can bring their air power to bear upon.

Though the history of the use of advanced chemical, biological or nuclear weapons in guerilla warfare is limited, the fact of the matter is that in most cases where groups have considered pursuing these capabilities have ultimately led to them being abandoned in favor of more obtainable and efficient tactics. They simply fall well short of the destruction wrought by simpler and more conventional explosive devices. Pound for pound, euro for euro and hour for hour of effort, high explosives are far more effective at inflicting massive category A and B casualties.

The innovation of using certain civilian infrastructure as destructive devices is far more in line with a guerilla organisations operational thinking than concepts of concentrating resources on building vulnerable secret facilities. Doing so runs in the face of basic operational security considerations for any liberation movement. However, it should be noted that essential components can be acquired from surprising locations. F example fissle material can be stolen from any major hospital (at least enough to create a nasty little dirty bomb) and other components may be acquired from the Russian mafia. Furthermore, there may open up windows of opportunities such as that of Russia in the 90s.

But what about acquiring a nuclear weapon that has already been built? The security of nuclear weapons is and has long been an important concern for the cultural Marxist hegemony.

However, the effort involved in actually trying to steal a British or French nuclear warhead would entail a significant dedication of resources and an immense intelligence effort beyond the reach of almost any liberation organisation. Indeed, the odds of a failure are high, no matter how careful and meticulous the planning. The nuclear weapons facilities in the UK, France and Germany (owned by the US) are obviously not as hardened as others, but taken as a whole, they are some of the hardest targets on the planet, and the personnel better vetted than almost any other institution. As of now, we do not have enough insiders working in the French, British and German facilities although we might have enough in phase 2.

Even the lightest attempt for a Justiciar Knight cell to begin probing runs the risk of not only failing to acquire a bomb, but setting off a series of alarms and red flags that brings such an aggressive investigative and law enforcement/military response down on the that particular cell that it could be completely wiped out before it ever attempted to target its true objectives.

And even if one could be stolen or otherwise acquired, modern nuclear weapons have been designed to include a series of highly sophisticated safety features. Though all nuclear weapons are not created equal, these range from permissive action links without which the device cannot be armed (a feature even Pakistani warheads are now thought to employ) to configurations that will actually render the fissile core(s) useless if improperly accessed. Furthermore, the theft would be difficult to carry off without setting off the same alarms and red flags that would leave little opportunity for the device to be smuggled particularly far.

Nuclear weapons are complex devices that require considerable care and maintenance — especially the small, modern and easily transportable variety. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, fears arose of a series of Soviet suitcases containing sophisticated nuclear devices were somehow lost. These fears persisted into the 21st century, well after the fissile and radioisotope materials in the design would have decayed significantly enough to effect the performance of the weapon, in addition to the diminished functionality of its other components after being handled roughly over the years.

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