APPENDIX TO BOOK IV 4 страница

consideration of the manner in which the expense of those different

sorts of public works and institutions may be most properly defrayed

will divide this third part of the present chapter into three

different articles.

ARTICLE I. -- Of the public Works and Institutions for facilitating the

Commerce of the Society.

And, first, of those which are necessary for facilitating Commerce in

general.

That the erection and maintenance of the public works which facilitate

the commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable

canals, harbours, etc. must require very different degrees of expense

in the different periods of society, is evident without any proof. The

expense of making and maintaining the public roads of any country must

evidently increase with the annual produce of the land and labour of

that country, or with the quantity and weight of the goods which it

becomes necessary to fetch and carry upon those roads. The strength of

a bridge must be suited to the number and weight of the carriages

which are likely to pass over it. The depth and the supply of water

for a navigable canal must be proportioned to the number and tonnage

of the lighters which are likely to carry goods upon it; the extent of

a harbour, to the number of the shipping which are likely to take

shelter in it.

It does not seem necessary that the expense of those public works

should be defrayed from that public revenue, as it is commonly called,

of which the collection and application are in most countries,

assigned to the executive power. The greater part of such public works

may easily be so managed, as to afford a particular revenue,

sufficient for defraying their own expense without bringing any burden

upon the general revenue of the society.

A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may, in most

cases, be both made add maintained by a small toll upon the carriages

which make use of them; a harbour, by a moderate port-duty upon the

tonnage of the shipping which load or unload in it. The coinage,

another institution for facilitating commerce, in many countries, not

only defrays its own expense, but affords a small revenue or a

seignorage to the sovereign. The post-office, another institution for

the same purpose, over and above defraying its own expense, affords,

in almost all countries, a very considerable revenue to the sovereign.

When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the

lighters which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to

their weight or their tonnage, they pay for the maintenance of those

public works exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they

occasion of them. It seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable

way of maintaining such works. This tax or toll, too, though it is

advanced by the carrier, is finally paid by the consumer, to whom it

must always be charged in the price of the goods. As the expense of

carriage, however, is very much reduced by means of such public works,

the goods, notwithstanding the toll, come cheaper to the consumer than

they could otherwise have done, their price not being so much raised

by the toll, as it is lowered by the cheapness of the carriage. The

person who finally pays this tax, therefore, gains by the application

more than he loses by the payment of it. His payment is exactly in

proportion to his gain. It is, in reality, no more than a part of that

gain which he is obliged to give up, in order to get the rest. It

seems impossible to imagine a more equitable method of raising a tax.

When the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon coaches, post-chaises,

etc. is made somewhat higher in proportion to their weight, than upon

carriages of necessary use, such as carts, waggons, etc. the indolence

and vanity of the rich is made to contribute, in a very easy manner,

to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation of

heavy goods to all the different parts of the country.

When high-roads, bridges, canals, etc. are in this manner made and

supported by the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they

can be made only where that commerce requires them, and, consequently,

where it is proper to make them. Their expense, too, their grandeur

and magnificence, must be suited to what that commerce can afford to

pay. They must be made, consequently, as it is proper to make them. A

magnificent high-road cannot be made through a desert country, where

there is little or no commerce, or merely because it happens to lead

to the country villa of the intendant of the province, or to that of

some great lord, to whom the intendant finds it convenient to make his

court. A great bridge cannot be thrown over a river at a place where

nobody passes, or merely to embellish the view from the windows of a

neighbouring palace; things which sometimes happen in countries, where

works of this kind are carried on by any other revenue than that which

they themselves are capable of affording.

In several different parts of Europe, the toll or lock-duty upon a

canal is the property of private persons, whose private interest

obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is not kept in tolerable

order, the navigation necessarily ceases altogether, and, along with

it, the whole profit which they can make by the tolls. If those tolls

were put under the management of commissioners, who had themselves no

interest in them, they might be less attentive to the maintenance of

the works which produced them. The canal of Languedoc cost the king of

France and the province upwards of thirteen millions of livres, which

(at twenty-eight livres the mark of silver, the value of French money

in the end of the last century) amounted to upwards of nine hundred

thousand pounds sterling. When that great work was finished, the most

likely method, it was found, of keeping it in constant repair, was to

make a present of the tolls to Riquet, the engineer who planned and

conducted the work. Those tolls constitute, at present, a very large

estate to the different branches of the family of that gentleman, who

have, therefore, a great interest to keep the work in constant repair.

But had those tolls been put under the management of commissioners,

who had no such interest, they might perhaps, have been dissipated in

ornamental and unnecessary expenses, while the most essential parts of

the works were allowed to go to ruin.

The tolls for the maintenance of a highroad cannot, with any safety,

be made the property of private persons. A high-road, though entirely

neglected, does not become altogether impassable, though a canal does.

The proprietors of the tolls upon a high-road, therefore, might

neglect altogether the repair of the road, and yet continue to levy

very nearly the same tolls. It is proper, therefore, that the tolls

for the maintenance of such a work should be put under the management

of commissioners or trustees.

In Great Britain, the abuses which the trustees have committed in the

management of those tolls, have, in many cases, been very justly

complained of. At many turnpikes, it has been said, the money levied

is more than double of what is necessary for executing, in the

completest manner, the work, which is often executed in a very

slovenly manner, and sometimes not executed at all. The system of

repairing the high-roads by tolls of this kind, it must be observed,

is not of very long standing. We should not wonder, therefore, if it

has not yet been brought to that degree of perfection of which it

seems capable. If mean and improper persons are frequently appointed

trustees; and if proper courts of inspection and account have not yet

been established for controlling their conduct, and for reducing the

tolls to what is barely sufficient for executing the work to be done

by them; the recency of the institution both accounts and apologizes

for those defects, of which, by the wisdom of parliament, the greater

part may, in due time, be gradually remedied.

The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain, is

supposed to exceed so much what is necessary for repairing the roads,

that the savings which, with proper economy, might be made from it,

have been considered, even by some ministers, as a very great

resource, which might, at some time or another, be applied to the

exigencies of the state. Government, it has been said, by taking the

management of the turnpikes into its own hands, and by employing the

soldiers, who would work for a very small addition to their pay, could

keep the roads in good order, at a much less expense than it can be

done by trustees, who have no other workmen to employ, but such as

derive their whole subsistence from their wages. A great revenue, half

a million, perhaps {Since publishing the two first editions of this

book, I have got good reasons to believe that all the turnpike tolls

levied in Great Britain do not produce a neat revenue that amounts to

half a million; a sum which, under the management of government, would

not be sufficient to keep, in repair five of the principal roads in

the kingdom}, it has been pretended, might in this manner be gained,

without laying any new burden upon the people; and the turnpike roads

might be made to contribute to the general expense of the state, in

the same manner as the post-office does at present.

That a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner, I have no

doubt, though probably not near so much as the projectors of this plan

have supposed. The plan itself, however, seems liable to several very

important objections.

First, If the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should ever be

considered as one of the resources for supplying the exigencies of the

state, they would certainly be augmented as those exigencies were

supposed to require. According to the policy of Great Britain,

therefore, they would probably he augmented very fast. The facility

with which a great revenue could be drawn from them, would probably

encourage administration to recur very frequently te this resource.

Though it may, perhaps, be more than doubtful whether half a million

could by any economy be saved out of the present tolls, it can

scarcely be doubted, but that a million might be saved out of them, if

they were doubled; and perhaps two millions, if they were tripled {I

have now good reason to believe that all these conjectural sums are by

much too large.}. This great revenue, too, might be levied without the

appointment of a single new officer to collect and receive it. But the

turnpike tolls, being continually augmented in this manner, instead of

facilitating the inland commerce of the country, as at present, would

soon become a very great incumbrance upon it. The expense of

transporting all heavy goods from one part of the country to another,

would soon be so much increased, the market for all such goods,

consequently, would soon be so much narrowed, that their production

would be in a great measure discouraged, and the most important

branches of the domestic industry of the country annihilated

altogether.

Secondly, A tax upon carriages, in proportion to their weight, though

a very equal tax when applied to the sole purpose of repairing the

roads, is a very unequal one when applied to any other purpose, or to

supply the common exigencies of the state. When it is applied to the

sole purpose above mentioned, each carriage is supposed to pay exactly

for the wear and tear which that carriage occasions of the roads. But

when it is applied to any other purpose, each carriage is supposed to

pay for more than that wear and tear, and contributes to the supply of

some other exigency of the state. But as the turnpike toll raises the

price of goods in proportion to their weight and not to their value,

it is chiefly paid by the consumers of coarse and bulky, not by those

of precious and light commodities. Whatever exigency of the state,

therefore, this tax might be intended to supply, that exigency would

be chiefly supplied at the expense of the poor, not of the rich; at

the expense of those who are least able to supply it, not of those who

are most able.

Thirdly, If government should at any time neglect the reparation of

the high-roads, it would be still more difficult, than it is at

present, to compel the proper application of any part of the turnpike

tolls. A large revenue might thus be levied upon the people, without

any part of it being applied to the only purpose to which a revenue

levied in this manner ought ever to be applied. If the meanness and

poverty of the trustees of turnpike roads render it sometimes

difficult, at present, to oblige them to repair their wrong; their

wealth and greatness would render it ten times more so in the case

which is here supposed.

In France, the funds destined for the reparation of the high-roads are

under the immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds

consist, partly in a certain number of days labour, which the country

people are in most parts of Europe obliged to give to the reparation

of the highways; and partly in such a portion of the general revenue

of the state as the king chooses to spare from his other expenses.

By the ancient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts

of Europe, the labour of the country people was under the direction of

a local or provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependency

upon the king's council. But, by the present practice, both the labour

of the country people, and whatever other fund the king may choose to

assign for the reparation of the high-roads in any particular province

or generality, are entirely under the management of the intendant; an

officer who is appointed and removed by the king's council who

receives his orders from it, and is in constant correspondence with

it. In the progress of despotism, the authority of the executive power

gradually absorbs that of every other power in the state, and assumes

to itself the management of every branch of revenue which is destined

for any public purpose. In France, however, the great post-roads, the

roads which make the communication between the principal towns of the

kingdom, are in general kept in good order; and, in some provinces,

are even a good deal superior to the greater part of the turnpike

roads of England. But what we call the cross roads, that is, the far

greater part of the roads in the country, are entirely neglected, and

are in many places absolutely impassable for any heavy carriage. In

some places it is even dangerous to travel on horseback, and mules are

the only conveyance which can safely be trusted. The proud minister of

an ostentatious court, may frequently take pleasure in executing a

work of splendour and magnificence, such as a great highway, which is

frequently seen by the principal nobility, whose applauses not only

flatter his vanity, but even contribute to support his interest at

court. But to execute a great number of little works, in which nothing

that can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the smallest

degree of admiration in any traveller, and which, in short, have

nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a business

which appears, in every respect, too mean and paltry to merit the

attention of so great a magistrate. Under such an administration

therefore, such works are almost always entirely neglected.

In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive

power charges itself both with the reparation of the high-roads, and

with the maintenance of the navigable canals. In the instructions

which are given to the governor of each province, those objects, it is

said, are constantly recommended to him, and the judgment which the

court forms of his conduct is very much regulated by the attention

which he appears to have paid to this part of his instructions. This

branch of public police, accordingly, is said to be very much attended

to in all those countries, but particularly in China, where the

high-roads, and still more the navigable canals, it is pretended,

exceed very much every thing of the same kind which is known in

Europe. The accounts of those works, however, which have been

transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by weak and

wondering travellers; frequently by stupid and lying missionaries. If

they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if the accounts

of them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they would not,

perhaps, appear to be so wonderful. The account which Bernier gives of

some works of this kind in Indostan, falls very short of what had been

reported of them by other travellers, more disposed to the marvellous

than he was. It may too, perhaps, be in those countries, as it is in

France, where the great roads, the great communications, which are

likely to be the subjects of conversation at the court and in the

capital, are attended to, and all the rest neglected. In China,

besides, in Indostan, and in several other governments of Asia, the

revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether from a land tax or

land rent, which rises or falls with the rise and fall of the annual

produce of the land. The great interest of the sovereign, therefore,

his revenue, is in such countries necessarily and immediately

connected with the cultivation of the land, with the greatness of its

produce, and with the value of its produce. But in order to render

that produce both as great and as valuable as possible, it is

necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and

consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least

expensive communication between all the different parts of the

country; which can be done only by means of the best roads and the

best navigable canals. But the revenue of the sovereign does not, in

any part of Europe, arise chiefly from a land tax or land rent. In all

the great kingdoms of Europe, perhaps, the greater part of it may

ultimately depend upon the produce of the land: but that dependency is

neither so immediate nor so evident. In Europe, therefore, the

sovereign does not feel himself so directly called upon to promote the

increase, both in quantity and value of the produce of the land, or,

by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide the most extensive

market for that produce. Though it should be true, therefore, what I

apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia this

department of the public police is very properly managed by the

executive power, there is not the least probability that, during the

present state of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power

in any part of Europe.

Even those public works, which are of such a nature that they cannot

afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the

conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place or district,

are always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue, under

the management of a local and provincial administration, than by the

general revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always

have the management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and

paved at the expense of the treasury, is there any probability that

they would be so well lighted and paved as they are at present, or

even at so small an expense? The expense, besides, instead of being

raised by a local tax upon the inhabitants of each particular street,

parish, or district in London, would, in this case, be defrayed out of

the general revenue of the state, and would consequently be raised by

a tax upon all the inhabitants of the kingdom, of whom the greater

part derive no sort of benefit from the lighting and paving of the

streets of London.

The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial

administration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous soever

they may appear, are in reality, however, almost always very trifling

in comparison of those which commonly take place in the administration

and expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, besides,

much more easily corrected. Under the local or provincial

administration of the justices of the peace in Great Britain, the six

days labour which the country people are obliged to give to the

reparation of the highways, is not always, perhaps, very judiciously

applied, but it is scarce ever exacted with any circumstance of

cruelty or oppression. In France, under the administration of the

intendants, the application is not always more judicious, and the

exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive. Such corvees, as

they are called, make one of the principal instruments of tyranny by

which those officers chastise any parish or communeaute, which has had

the misfortune to fall under their displeasure.

Of the public Works and Institution which are necessary for

facilitating particular Branches of Commerce.

The object of the public works and institutions above mentioned, is to

facilitate commerce in general. But in order to facilitate some

particular branches of it, particular institutions are necessary,

which again require a particular and extraordinary expense.

Some particular branches of commerce which are carried on with

barbarous and uncivilized nations, require extraordinary protection.

An ordinary store or counting-house could give little security to the

goods of the merchants who trade to the western coast of Africa. To

defend them from the barbarous natives, it is necessary that the place

where they are deposited should be in some measure fortified. The

disorders in the government of Indostan have been supposed to render a

like precaution necessary, even among that mild and gentle people; and

it was under pretence of securing their persons and property from

violence, that both the English and French East India companies were

allowed to erect the first forts which they possessed in that country.

Among other nations, whose vigorous government will suffer no

strangers to possess any fortified place within their territory, it

may be necessary to maintain some ambassador, minister, or consul, who

may both decide, according to their own customs, the differences

arising among his own countrymen, and, in their disputes with the

natives, may by means of his public character, interfere with more

authority and afford them a more powerful protection than they could

expect from any private man. The interests of commerce have frequently

made it necessary to maintain ministers in foreign countries, where

the purposes either of war or alliance would not have required any.

The commerce of the Turkey company first occasioned the establishment

of an ordinary ambassador at Constantinople. The first English

embassies to Russia arose altogether from commercial interests. The

constant interference with those interests, necessarily occasioned

between the subjects of the different states of Europe, has probably

introduced the custom of keeping, in all neighbouring countries,

ambassadors or ministers constantly resident, even in the time of

peace. This custom, unknown to ancient times, seems not to be older

than the end of the fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century;

that is, than the time when commerce first began to extend itself to

the greater part of the nations of Europe, and when they first began

to attend to its interests.

It seems not unreasonable, that the extraordinary expense which the

protection of any particular branch of commerce may occasion, should

be defrayed by a moderate tax upon that particular branch; by a

moderate fine, for example, to be paid by the traders when they first

enter into it; or, what is more equal, by a particular duty of so much

per cent. upon the goods which they either import into, or export out

of, the particular countries with which it is carried on. The

protection of trade, in general, from pirates and freebooters, is said

to have given occasion to the first institution of the duties of

customs. But, if it was thought reasonable to lay a general tax upon

trade, in order to defray the expense of protecting trade in general,

it should seem equally reasonable to lay a particular tax upon a

particular branch of trade, in order to defray the extraordinary

expense of protecting that branch.

The protection of trade, in general, has always been considered as

essential to the defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that account,

a necessary part of the duty of the executive power. The collection

and application of the general duties of customs, therefore, have

always been left to that power. But the protection of any particular

branch of trade is a part of the general protection of trade; a part,

therefore, of the duty of that power; and if nations always acted

consistently, the particular duties levied for the purposes of such

particular protection, should always have been left equally to its

disposal. But in this respect, as well as in many others, nations have

not always acted consistently; and in the greater part of the

commercial states of Europe, particular companies of merchants have

had the address to persuade the legislature to entrust to them the

performance of this part of the duty of the sovereign, together with

all the powers which are necessarily connected with it.

These companies, though they may, perhaps, have been useful for the

first introduction of some branches of commerce, by making, at their

own expense, an experiment which the state might not think it prudent

to make, have in the long-run proved, universally, either burdensome

or useless, and have either mismanaged or confined the trade.

When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock, but are obliged

to admit any person, properly qualified, upon paying a certain fine,

and agreeing to submit to the regulations of the company, each member

trading upon his own stock, and at his own risk, they are called

regulated companies. When they trade upon a joint stock, each member

sharing in the common profit or loss, in proportion to his share in

this stock, they are called joint-stock companies. Such companies,

whether regulated or joint-stock, sometimes have, and sometimes have

not, exclusive privileges.

Regulated companies resemble, in every respect, the corporation of

trades, so common in the cities and towns of all the different

countries of Europe; and are a sort of enlarged monopolies of the same

kind. As no inhabitant of a town can exercise an incorporated trade,

Дата добавления: 2015-10-29