Introduction and plan of the work. 54 страница

still be regulated by its own assembly. Though the colonies should, in

this case, have no representatives in the British parliament, yet, if

we may judge by experience, there is no probability that the

parliamentary requisition would be unreasonable. The parliament of

England has not, upon any occasion, shewn the smallest disposition to

overburden those parts of the empire which are not represented in

parliament. The islands of Guernsey and Jersey, without any means of

resisting the authority of parliament, are more lightly taxed than any

part of Great Britain. Parliament, in attempting to exercise its

supposed right, whether well or ill grounded, of taxing the colonies,

has never hitherto demanded of them anything which even approached to

a just proportion to what was paid by their fellow subjects at home.

If the contribution of the colonies, besides, was to rise or fall in

proportion to the rise or fall of the land-tax, parliament could not

tax them without taxing, at the same time, its own constituents, and

the colonies might, in this case, be considered as virtually

represented in parliament.

Examples are not wanting of empires in which all the different

provinces are not taxed, if I may be allowed the expression, in one

mass; but in which the sovereign regulates the sum which each province

ought to pay, and in some provinces assesses and levies it as he

thinks proper; while in others he leaves it to be assessed and levied

as the respective states of each province shall determine. In some

provinces of France, the king not only imposes what taxes he thinks

proper, but assesses and levies them in the way he thinks proper. From

others he demands a certain sum, but leaves it to the states of each

province to assess and levy that sum as they think proper. According

to the scheme of taxing by requisition, the parliament of Great

Britain would stand nearly in the same situation towards the colony

assemblies, as the king of France does towards the states of those

provinces which still enjoy the privilege of having states of their

own, the provinces of France which are supposed to be the best

governed.

But though, according to this scheme, the colonies could have no just

reason to fear that their share of the public burdens should ever

exceed the proper proportion to that of their fellow-citizens at home,

Great Britain might have just reason to fear that it never would

amount to that proper proportion. The parliament of Great Britain has

not, for some time past, had the same established authority in the

colonies, which the French king has in those provinces of France which

still enjoy the privilege of having states of their own. The colony

assemblies, if they were not very favourably disposed (and unless more

skilfully managed than they ever have been hitherto, they are not very

likely to be so), might still find many pretences for evading or

rejecting the most reasonable requisitions of parliament. A French war

breaks out, we shall suppose; ten millions must immediately be raised,

in order to defend the seat of the empire. This sum must be borrowed

upon the credit of some parliamentary fund mortgaged for paying the

interest. Part of this fund parliament proposes to raise by a tax to

be levied in Great Britain; and part of it by a requisition to all the

different colony assemblies of America and the West Indies. Would

people readily advance their money upon the credit of a fund which

partly depended upon the good humour of all those assemblies, far

distant from the seat of the war, and sometimes, perhaps, thinking

themselves not much concerned in the event of it? Upon such a fund, no

more money would probably be advanced than what the tax to be levied

in Great Britain might be supposed to answer for. The whole burden of

the debt contracted on account of the war would in this manner fall,

as it always has done hitherto, upon Great Britain; upon a part of the

empire, and not upon the whole empire. Great Britain is, perhaps,

since the world began, the only state which, as it has extended its

empire, has only increased its expense, without once augmenting its

resources. Other states have generally disburdened themselves, upon

their subject and subordinate provinces, of the most considerable part

of the expense of defending the empire. Great Britain has hitherto

suffered her subject and subordinate provinces to disburden themselves

upon her of almost this whole expense. In order to put Great Britain

upon a footing of equality with her own colonies, which the law has

hitherto supposed to be subject and subordinate, it seems necessary,

upon the scheme of taxing them by parliamentary requisition, that

parliament should have some means of rendering its requisitions

immediately effectual, in case the colony assemblies should attempt to

evade or reject them; and what those means are, it is not very easy to

conceive, and it has not yet been explained.

Should the parliament of Great Britain, at the same time, be ever

fully established in the right of taxing the colonies, even

independent of the consent of their own assemblies, the importance of

those assemblies would, from that moment, be at an end, and with it,

that of all the leading men of British America. Men desire to have

some share in the management of public affairs, chiefly on account of

the importance which it gives them. Upon the power which the greater

part of the leading men, the natural aristocracy of every country,

have of preserving or defending their respective importance, depends

the stability and duration of every system of free government. In the

attacks which those leading men are continually making upon the

importance of one another, and in the defence of their own, consists

the whole play of domestic faction and ambition. The leading men of

America, like those of all other countries, desire to preserve their

own importance. They feel, or imagine, that if their assemblies, which

they are fond of calling parliaments, and of considering as equal in

authority to the parliament of Great Britain, should be so far

degraded as to become the humble ministers and executive officers of

that parliament, the greater part of their own importance would be at

an end. They have rejected, therefore, the proposal of being taxed by

parliamentary requisition, and, like other ambitious and high-spirited

men, have rather chosen to draw the sword in defence of their own

importance.

Towards the declension of the Roman republic, the allies of Rome, who

had borne the principal burden of defending the state and extending

the empire, demanded to be admitted to all the privileges of Roman

citizens. Upon being refused, the social war broke out. During the

course of that war, Rome granted those privileges to the greater part

of them, one by one, and in proportion as they detached themselves

from the general confederacy. The parliament of Great Britain insists

upon taxing the colonies; and they refuse to be taxed by a parliament

in which they are not represented. If to each colony which should

detach itself from the general confederacy, Great Britain should allow

such a number of representatives as suited the proportion of what it

contributed to the public revenue of the empire, in consequence of its

being subjected to the same taxes, and in compensation admitted to the

same freedom of trade with its fellow-subjects at home; the number of

its representatives to be augmented as the proportion of its

contribution might afterwards augment; a new method of acquiring

importance, a new and more dazzling object of ambition, would be

presented to the leading men of each colony. Instead of piddling for

the little prizes which are to be found in what may be called the

paltry raffle of colony faction, they might then hope, from the

presumption which men naturally have in their own ability and good

fortune, to draw some of the great prizes which sometimes come from

the wheel of the great state lottery of British politics. Unless this

or some other method is fallen upon, and there seems to be none more

obvious than this, of preserving the importance and of gratifying the

ambition of the leading men of America, it is not very probable that

they will ever voluntarily submit to us; and we ought to consider,

that the blood which must be shed in forcing them to do so, is, every

drop of it, the blood either of those who are, or of those whom we

wish to have for our fellow citizens. They are very weak who flatter

themselves that, in the state to which things have come, our colonies

will be easily conquered by force alone. The persons who now govern

the resolutions of what they call their continental congress, feel in

themselves at this moment a degree of importance which, perhaps, the

greatest subjects in Europe scarce feel. From shopkeepers, trades men,

and attorneys, they are become statesmen and legislators, and are

employed in contriving a new form of government for an extensive

empire, which, they flatter themselves, will become, and which,

indeed, seems very likely to become, one of the greatest and most

formidable that ever was in the world. Five hundred different people,

perhaps, who, in different ways, act immediately under the continental

congress, and five hundred thousand, perhaps, who act under those five

hundred, all feel, in the same manner, a proportionable rise in their

own importance. Almost every individual of the governing party in

America fills, at present, in his own fancy, a station superior, not

only to what he had ever filled before, but to what he had ever

expected to fill; and unless some new object of ambition is presented

either to him or to his leaders, if he has the ordinary spirit of a

man, he will die in defence of that station.

It is a remark of the President Heynaut, that we now read with

pleasure the account of many little transactions of the Ligue, which,

when they happened, were not, perhaps, considered as very important

pieces of news. But everyman then, says he, fancied himself of some

importance; and the innumerable memoirs which have come down to us

from those times, were the greater part of them written by people who

took pleasure in recording and magnifying events, in which they

flattered themselves they had been considerable actors. How

obstinately the city of Paris, upon that occasion, defended itself,

what a dreadful famine it supported, rather than submit to the best,

and afterwards the most beloved of all the French kings, is well

known. The greater part of the citizens, or those who governed the

greater part of them, fought in defence of their own importance,

which, they foresaw, was to be at an end whenever the ancient

government should be re-established. Our colonies, unless they can be

induced to consent to a union, are very likely to defend themselves,

against the best of all mother countries, as obstinately as the city

of Paris did against one of the best of kings.

The idea of representation was unknown in ancient times. When the

people of one state were admitted to the right of citizenship in

another, they had no other means of exercising that right, but by

coming in a body to vote and deliberate with the people of that other

state. The admission of the greater part of the inhabitants of Italy

to the privileges of Roman citizens, completely ruined the Roman

republic. It was no longer possible to distinguish between who was,

and who was not, a Roman citizen. No tribe could know its own members.

A rabble of any kind could be introduced into the assemblies of the

people, could drive out the real citizens, and decide upon the affairs

of the republic, as if they themselves had been such. But though

America were to send fifty or sixty new representatives to parliament,

the door-keeper of the house of commons could not find any great

difficulty in distinguishing between who was and who was not a member.

Though the Roman constitution, therefore, was necessarily ruined by

the union of Rome with the allied states of Italy, there is not the

least probability that the British constitution would be hurt by the

union of Great Britain with her colonies. That constitution, on the

contrary, would be completed by it, and seems to be imperfect without

it. The assembly which deliberates and decides concerning the affairs

of every part of the empire, in order to be properly informed, ought

certainly to have representatives from every part of it. That this

union, however, could be easily effectuated, or that difficulties, and

great difficulties, might not occur in the execution, I do not

pretend. I have yet heard of none, however, which appear

insurmountable. The principal, perhaps, arise, not from the nature of

things, but from the prejudices and opinions of the people, both on

this and on the other side of the Atlantic.

We on this side the water are afraid lest the multitude of American

representatives should overturn the balance of the constitution, and

increase too much either the influence of the crown on the one hand,

or the force of the democracy on the other. But if the number of

American representatives were to be in proportion to the produce of

American taxation, the number of people to be managed would increase

exactly in proportion to the means of managing them, and the means of

managing to the number of people to be managed. The monarchical and

democratical parts of the constitution would, after the union, stand

exactly in the same degree of relative force with regard to one

another as they had done before.

The people on the other side of the water are afraid lest their

distance from the seat of government might expose them to many

oppressions; but their representatives in parliament, of which the

number ought from the first to be considerable, would easily be able

to protect them from all oppression. The distance could not much

weaken the dependency of the representative upon the constituent, and

the former would still feel that he owed his seat in parliament, and

all the consequence which he derived from it, to the good-will of the

latter. It would be the interest of the former, therefore, to

cultivate that good-will, by complaining, with all the authority of a

member of the legislature, of every outrage which any civil or

military officer might be guilty of in those remote parts of the

empire. The distance of America from the seat of government, besides,

the natives of that country might flatter themselves, with some

appearance of reason too, would not be of very long continuance. Such

has hitherto been the rapid progress of that country in wealth,

population, and improvement, that in the course of little more than a

century, perhaps, the produce of the American might exceed that of the

British taxation. The seat of the empire would then naturally remove

itself to that part of the empire which contributed most to the

general defence and support of the whole.

The discovery of America, and that of a passage to the East Indies by

the Cape of Good Hope, are the two greatest and most important events

recorded in the history of mankind. Their consequences have already

been great; but, in the short period of between two and three

centuries which has elapsed since these discoveries were made, it is

impossible that the whole extent of their consequences can have been

seen. What benefits or what misfortunes to mankind may hereafter

result from those great events, no human wisdom can foresee. By

uniting in some measure the most distant parts of the world, by

enabling them to relieve one another's wants, to increase one

another's enjoyments, and to encourage one another's industry, their

general tendency would seem to be beneficial. To the natives, however,

both of the East and West Indies, all the commercial benefits which

can have resulted from those events have been sunk and lost in the

dreadful misfortunes which they have occasioned. These misfortunes,

however, seem to have arisen rather from accident than from any thing

in the nature of those events themselves. At the particular time when

these discoveries were made, the superiority of force happened to be

so great on the side of the Europeans, that they were enabled to

commit with impunity every sort of injustice in those remote

countries. Hereafter, perhaps, the natives of those countries may grow

stronger, or those of Europe may grow weaker; and the inhabitants of

all the different quarters of the world may arrive at that equality of

courage and force which, by inspiring mutual fear, can alone overawe

the injustice of independent nations into some sort of respect for the

rights of one another. But nothing seems more likely to establish this

equality of force, than that mutual communication of knowledge, and of

all sorts of improvements, which an extensive commerce from all

countries to all countries naturally, or rather necessarily, carries

along with it.

In the mean time, one of the principal effects of those discoveries

has been, to raise the mercantile system to a degree of splendour and

glory which it could never otherwise have attained to. It is the

object of that system to enrich a great nation, rather by trade and

manufactures than by the improvement and cultivation of land, rather

by the industry of the towns than by that of the country. But in

consequence of those discoveries, the commercial towns of Europe,

instead of being the manufacturers and carriers for but a very small

part of the world (that part of Europe which is washed by the Atlantic

ocean, and the countries which lie round the Baltic and Mediterranean

seas), have now become the manufacturers for the numerous and thriving

cultivators of America, and the carriers, and in some respects the

manufacturers too, for almost all the different nations of Asia,

Africa, and America. Two new worlds have been opened to their

industry, each of them much greater and more extensive than the old

one, and the market of one of them growing still greater and greater

every day.

The countries which possess the colonies of America, and which trade

directly to the East Indies, enjoy indeed the whole show and splendour

of this great commerce. Other countries, however, notwithstanding all

the invidious restraints by which it is meant to exclude them,

frequently enjoy a greater share of the real benefit of it. The

colonies of Spain and. Portugal, for example, give more real

encouragement to the industry of other countries than to that of Spain

and Portugal. In the single article of linen alone, the consumption of

those colonies amounts, it is said (but I do not pretend to warrant

the quantity), to more than three millions sterling a-year. But this

great consumption is almost entirely supplied by France, Flanders,

Holland, and Germany. Spain and Portugal furnish but a small part of

it. The capital which supplies the colonies with this great quantity

of linen, is annually distributed among, and furnishes a revenue to,

the inhabitants of those other countries. The profits of it only are

spent in Spain and Portugal, where they help to support the sumptuous

profusion of the merchants of Cadiz and Lisbon.

Even the regulations by which each nation endeavours to secure to

itself the exclusive trade of its own colonies, are frequently more

hurtful to the countries in favour of which they are established, than

to those against which they are established. The unjust oppression of

the industry of other countries falls back, if I may say so, upon the

heads of the oppressors, and crushes their industry more than it does

that of those other countries. By those regulations, for example, the

merchant of Hamburg must send the linen which he destines for the

American market to London, and he must bring back from thence the

tobacco which he destines for the German market; because he can

neither send the one directly to America, nor bring the other directly

from thence. By this restraint he is probably obliged to sell the one

somewhat cheaper, and to buy the other somewhat dearer, than he

otherwise might have done; and his profits are probably somewhat

abridged by means of it. In this trade, however, between Hamburg and

London, he certainly receives the returns of his capital much more

quickly than he could possibly have done in the direct trade to

America, even though we should suppose, what is by no means the case,

that the payments of America were as punctual as those of London. In

the trade, therefore, to which those regulations confine the merchant

of Hamburg, his capital can keep in constant employment a much greater

quantity of German industry than he possibly could have done in the

trade from which he is excluded. Though the one employment, therefore,

may to him perhaps be less profitable than the other, it cannot be

less advantageous to his country. It is quite otherwise with the

employment into which the monopoly naturally attracts, if I may say so,

the capital of the London merchant. That employment may, perhaps, be

more profitable to him than the greater part of other employments; but

on account of the slowness of the returns, it cannot be more

advantageous to his country.

After all the unjust attempts, therefore, of every country in Europe

to engross to itself the whole advantage of the trade of its own

colonies, no country has yet been able to engross to itself any thing

but the expense of supporting in time of peace, and of defending in

time of war, the oppressive authority which it assumes over them. The

inconveniencies resulting from the possession of its colonies, every

country has engrossed to itself completely. The advantages resulting

from their trade, it has been obliged to share with many other

countries.

At first sight, no doubt, the monopoly of the great commerce of

America naturally seems to be an acquisition of the highest value. To

the undiscerning eye of giddy ambition it naturally presents itself,

amidst the confused scramble of politics and war, as a very dazzling

object to fight for. The dazzling splendour of the object, however,

the immense greatness of the commerce, is the very quality which

renders the monopoly of it hurtful, or which makes one employment, in

its own nature necessarily less advantageous to the country than the

greater part of other employments, absorb a much greater proportion of

the capital of the country than what would otherwise have gone to it.

The mercantile stock of every country, it has been shown in the second

book, naturally seeks, if one may say so, the employment most

advantageous to that country. If it is employed in the carrying trade,

the country to which it belongs becomes the emporium of the goods of

all the countries whose trade that stock carries on. But the owner of

that stock necessarily wishes to dispose of as great a part of those

goods as he can at home. He thereby saves himself the trouble, risk,

and expense of exportation; and he will upon that account be glad to

sell them at home, not only for a much smaller price, but with

somewhat a smaller profit, than he might expect to make by sending

them abroad. He naturally, therefore, endeavours as much as he can to

turn his carrying trade into a foreign trade of consumption, If his

stock, again, is employed in a foreign trade of consumption, he will,

for the same reason, be glad to dispose of, at home, as great a part

as he can of the home goods which he collects in order to export to

some foreign market, and he will thus endeavour, as much as he can, to

turn his foreign trade of consumption into a home trade. The

mercantile stock of every country naturally courts in this manner the

near, and shuns the distant employment: naturally courts the

employment in which the returns are frequent, and shuns that in which

they are distant and slow; naturally courts the employment in which it

can maintain the greatest quantity of productive labour in the country

to which it belongs, or in which its owner resides, and shuns that in

which it can maintain there the smallest quantity. It naturally courts

the employment which in ordinary cases is most advantageous, and shuns

that which in ordinary cases is least advantageous to that country.

But if, in any one of those distant employments, which in ordinary

cases are less advantageous to the country, the profit should happen

to rise somewhat higher than what is sufficient to balance the natural

preference which is given to nearer employments, this superiority of

profit will draw stock from those nearer employments, till the profits

of all return to their proper level. This superiority of profit,

however, is a proof that, in the actual circumstances of the society,

those distant employments are somewhat understocked in proportion to

other employments, and that the stock of the society is not

distributed in the properest manner among all the different

employments carried on in it. It is a proof that something is either

bought cheaper or sold dearer than it ought to be, and that some

particular class of citizens is more or less oppressed, either by

paying more, or by getting less than what is suitable to that equality

which ought to take place, and which naturally does take place, among

all the different classes of them. Though the same capital never will

maintain the same quantity of productive labour in a distant as in a

near employment, yet a distant employment maybe as necessary for the

welfare of the society as a near one; the goods which the distant

employment deals in being necessary, perhaps, for carrying on many of

the nearer employments. But if the profits of those who deal in such

goods are above their proper level, those goods will be sold dearer

than they ought to be, or somewhat above their natural price, and all

those engaged in the nearer employments will be more or less oppressed

by this high price. Their interest, therefore, in this case, requires,

that some stock should be withdrawn from those nearer employments, and

turned towards that distant one, in order to reduce its profits to

their proper level, and the price of the goods which it deals in to

their natural price. In this extraordinary case, the public interest

requires that some stock should be withdrawn from those employments

which, in ordinary cases, are more advantageous, and turned towards

one which, in ordinary cases, is less advantageous to the public; and,

in this extraordinary case, the natural interests and inclinations of

men coincide as exactly with the public interests as in all other

ordinary cases, and lead them to withdraw stock from the near, and to

turn it towards the distant employments.

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