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Populism and Democracy

Читайте также:
  1. A Populist Democracy: Three Previously Neglected Characteristics
  2. Analytical Core of Populism
  3. CONCEPTUALIZING POPULISM
  4. CONCLUSION: THE LESSONS OF POPULISM
  5. Constitutional Versus Populist Democracy
  6. CONTEMPORARY POPULISM
  7. Defining Populism

In short (and with a level of simplification acceptable for our purpose, though probably not for academic debate as such], we should understand populism as the defense of (all] the people against (all] the elites, whose activity is viewed as detrimental to the interests of the people.

There is a rather common assumption that almost every political party, movement and political actor uses populism from time to time. This might be true to a certain degree, but populism is not as common as is sometimes suggested. While parties, especially in the opposition, frequently claim to defend the people and criticize their opponents for “going against the interests of the people”, this critique is usually aimed at specific political actors, e.g. the incumbent government. Populism requires a critique of the elite as a whole (including both government and opposition], which in turn requires that the player using populism sees itself as being outside of the elite. While this strategy is advantageous for new actors (e.g. the so called new challenger parties], it is much harder (though still far from impossible] to employ for those with long term political experience. This is also the most likely reason why many populist parties, especially in the region of East-Central Europe, have what can be called a flash performance (see Havlik, Pinkova 2012]: They quickly achieve their best electoral results, often become a part of the governmental coalition, and just as quickly meet their demise or at least lose their relevance. Examples of such parties include the National Movement for Stability and Progress (NDSV] in Bulgaria, the Labour Party DP in Lithuania, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIEP] or Public Affairs (VV] in the Czech Republic.

The short lifespan combined with the relative success of some of the populist parties in the region can be seen as one of the problems associated with populism. Indeed, if a party is able to gain over 40% of the vote, such as the NDSV in Bulgaria, and within one electoral term lose voter support to the extent of actually losing representation in parliament, it indicates two things: first, a significant number of voters are dissatisfied with the political situation in their country to the extent that they are willing to support a brand new political entity whose electoral appeal is based primarily on the critique of the current establishment; second, the unfulfilled promise of such a party (not in the sense of demagogic policies/promises, but the promise of a new, better marshal of the people’s interests] is bound to further strengthen voter dissatisfaction and lower confidence in the political system and possibly the regime as such. Even though populist parties criticize the elite (or establishment] rather than challenge the democratic system or regime as such (in the way anti­system parties do], they can actually in some instances be seen as undermining it. At this point we do not have the data to ascertain the extent to which this problem is actually directly connected with populism itself. The fact that these parties use populism as part of their political appeal does not necessarily mean that populism is the reason for their rapid decline. To say so would require a thorough analysis of voter motivations; it would be necessary to find out if the loss of support was caused by the inherent difficulties faced by a populist party which itself becomes a part of the elite (in the ECE region in many cases even part of the government] or by other factors (e.g. the party resorting to demagoguery and unrealistic promises it was consequently unable to fulfill]. In any case, the appearance of successful flash parties - populist or not - collecting protest votes is a result of overall dissatisfaction with the country’s political situation. There is little to do to remedy the situation short of cultivating the political culture, eliminating wide-spread political corruption, and strengthening the relations between the political establishment and society.

This brings us to the question of the relationship between populism and democracy. There is a wide debate on this topic within political science and political philosophy. The issue can be approached in two ways. The first reflects empirical findings and the fact that populism in politicians and political parties often occurs, especially in Europe, alongside nationalism and/or extremism. This issue was recently addressed in the key note speech given by prof. Anton Pelinka at the conference Populist Political Parties in East Central Europe conducted in Brno in December, 2012. After a thorough discussion, prof. Pelinka identified voter education as the best solution to this problem. Again, we should bear in mind that, in this case, we are not seeking solutions to problems caused by the occurrence of populism, but rather to problems caused by other phenomena, which simply often (but certainly not always] occur together with populism. The second approach focuses on the character of populism as such. Canovan (2002] in this context describes the so-called democratic paradox: the inclusion of an increasing number of people in the decision-making process can in itself hardly be seen as detrimental do democracy. On the other hand, it leads to increasing levels of opaqueness as to who rules whom and how. It becomes less and less clear who bears political responsibility for policies, which become the result of “interactions and adjustments between many actors” (Deiwiks 2009: 4]. In the same way, a politician claiming to act in the name of the people or defending the interests of the people actually has to interpret/formulate what the interests of the people are (since there is rarely a universal consensus in society on which policies and decisions are the best] without bearing full political responsibility for them (since they are what the people want]. If a populist is not able to deliver, they can - especially in parliamentary systems with proportional electoral systems - blame the failure on the other political actors, who were (once again] promoting their own interests over the interests of the people.


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Читайте в этой же книге: FROM MOVEMENT TO IDEOLOGY TO POLITICAL LOGIC | DEMOCRACY ON THE COUCH | POPULISM AT THE DINNER TABLE | POPULISM AND THE LEFT: THE POPULIST TEMPTATION | CONCLUSION: THE LESSONS OF POPULISM | Representing the people | Populist antagonisms and populist interventions. | Conclusions | XX. POPULISM AND DEMOCRACY | Ideological conditions |
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