Conclusion: the lessons of populism

So, where does this leave our awkward guest? There are three major lessons to be learnt here. The first is that paying lip-service to democratic principles is problematic: as we have seen, the gulf between democratic ideals and representative democratic practice is wide, and the continual repression of the democratic promise can only lead to the ‘return of the repressed’ in the form of stronger and more vitriolic manifestations of populism - a result with dubious desirability. The second is that despite the fact that we should ultimately avoid replicating the actions of our awkward guest, there are things that progressive politics can learn from populism. The most important is the way in which populism remains able to tap into a strong emotional and passionate dimension of politics that sometimes seems absent in our age of dry ‘post-politics’. The future analysis of populism must thus develop an affective theory of the phenomenon that can account for this aspect, while at the same time avoiding “the banality of emotionology gradually engulfing the social sciences” (Stavrakakis 2004: 264). A possible way forward in capturing what Canovan (1999: 6) has called “the populist mood”, which is the “extra emotional ingredient” that separates populism from everyday politics, is by extending the psychoanalytical dimensions of our discussion of populism: concepts such as affect, passion, disavowal, the symptom, the fetishisation of the enemy, and the libidinal order of populism may all hold answers for unlocking the methods by which populism is able to inspire and ‘hold’ the passions of ‘the people’ in such a strong way.

The third and final lesson is that ‘the people’ don’t seem to be going away in the near future. While it is easy to dismiss populism for its fundamental misreading of the complex forms of democracy in our globalised world - we know very well that rule by the people, of the people, isn’t quite how things work in practice, and that it is unlikely that we can ever return to an idealized Athenian democratic age - there is no denying that the position of ‘the people’ in democratic politics still remains far more than a matter of rhetorical evocation. No matter how ‘enlightened’ we are about the fictional existence of the category of ‘the people’, as long as there are those who genuinely feel left behind, forgotten and unrepresented within the political space, the signifier ‘the people’ will act as a conduit for their frustrations, concerns, fears and despondence. Populism will keep coming back to the dinner table and continue interrupting the formal conversations of the other guests. The first aim therefore would be to carry on in investigating this important but much-maligned political force. The second aim would be to explore ways in which people are more integrated into the political community, or alternatively, and perhaps more radically, to explore how a post­representative politics might work - a direction proposed recently by Tormey and Robinson (Robinson and Tormey 2007, 2009; Tormey 2006) in which the category of ‘the people’ ceases to be of central importance to politics as ordinary people take autonomous control of the everyday aspects of their political existence. Ultimately however, ‘the people’ are not going to be wished away through increased technocratic improvements or some kind of political enlightenment. The wave of new populisms we have seen arise over the past decade or so is not a matter of strange coincidence or mistake, but rather signals that there is something amiss in the way in which we are doing politics today. Populism must be taken seriously.a As such, the awkward guest lingers, and the dinner table, for now, shall remain uncleared.

XIX.WHAT DO WE TALK ABOUT WHEN WE TALK ABOUT POPULISM? “MAS POPULISTA SERA TU ABUELA!”

FRANCISCO PANIZZA

The title of this article alludes to seemingly never ending debates about the definition of populism and to the strong negative connotations associated with the term. I am neither ignoring different views on populism or seeking to settle the debate but I would like to suggest that there is a considerable corpus of work that argues that populism is primarily characterized by the discursive constitution of a relation of political antagonism between “the people” and some kind of oppressive power structure or collective actor. Margaret Canovan (1999, 2) stresses the systemic nature of the enemies of the people when she defines populism as “an appeal to “the people” against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values,” while Carlos de la Torre (2009, 24) highlights the actors in conflict when he defines it as the construction of a Manichean and moral discourse that positions the “pueblo” in antagonistic opposition to the ‘'oligarchy’ in the pursuit of greater political participation and inclusion (see also Laclau 1977, 2005a, 2005b; Panizza 2005, Peruzzotti 2008). Crucial for this notion of populism is its linguistic or discursive nature (Laclau 1997, 2005a). In his book “The Populist Persuasion. An American history” Michael Kazin (1995, 5) defines it “as persistent yet mutable style of political rhetoric.” He traces the history of populism throughout America’s political life, as its changes the mutually constructed identity of the people and of their oppressors and morphs its political colors by being hegemonized by progressive radicals and right wing conservatives at different points in time. There are of course other definitions of populism and many questions left unsettled by this minimalist definition, including whether populism refers to leaders, movements or political regimes, about the links between leaders and followers and above all, about its democratic or anti-democratic effects (For definitions of populism that while stressing its political nature take into consideration other elements, see Freidenberg 2008; Knight 1998; Roberts 2005, 2007; Weyland 2001. For a discussion of the relations between populism and democracy see Abts and Rummens 2007, Arditi 2004, Panizza 2005; Panizza and Miorelli 2009). In this paper I take the discursive notion of populism as my starting point and deconstruct it in order to argue that: 1) An understanding of populism needs to take into account its rhetorical, representational, political and normative dimensions and the relations between them. 2) If populism is a political discourse or, as Kazin (1995, 3) puts it, “a flexible mode of persuasion”, it makes more sense to talk about “populist interventions” rather than about populist actors or regimes 3) The stress placed by some studies of populism on the antagonistic nature of its political appeal underscores its normative elements, or what Margaret Canovan (1999) calls its “redemptive” dimension. 4) While normative judgments about populism are inevitable, the relationship between populism and democracy cannot be established in abstract terms but should be assessed in relation to the political context in which they emerge.

In the following sections I look at each of the above dimensions of populism and conclude by suggesting that different varieties of populist intervention have context- dependent relations with democratic institutions and that it important to make explicit their normative implications.

Talking and looking “like the people”

I start this section with a political story that encapsulates many of the issues as well as the ambiguities that we face when studying populism. A full appreciation of the relevance of the story would require a long contextual setting but I would try to be as concise as possible. The story refers to José “Pepe” Mujica, a former Tupamaro guerrilla leader, that has a very good chance of becoming the next president of Uruguay. In a well argued article published in May 2009, a free market economist, Ernesto Talvi (2009), claimed that deep structural changes in Uruguayan society had set up the socio-economic conditions for the emergence of “populist tendencies” in the country. He argues that a decline in educational standards and the migration of hundred of thousands of highly qualified citizens have led to the shrinking of the traditional middle classes and to the expansion of a poorly educated, poorly qualified social sector for which the chances of social mobility are extremely limited and have become dependent on social assistance from the state. Talvi argues that given the increasing size of this social group it should not be surprising the emergence and political success of what he describes as “atypical candidates whose language, ways of dressing and attitude are in contrast with the more formal “suit and tie” candidates characteristic of the country’s political class.”

In all but name Talvi was talking about Pepe Mujica, the presidential candidate of the left of centre Frente Amplio (FA) (more on his language and ways of dressing below). Mujica’s answer, published in his blog, was as swift as it is peerless. “Mâs populista serâ tu abuela” retorted Mujica (2009 a). The colloquial and “un-political” tone of Mujica’s reply appears to give credence to Talvi’s claim that, at least judging by his use of language, Mujica is, indeed, a populist. However, wrapped in the everyday language that is part of his political trademark, Muijica’s reply shows not only a shrewd understanding of the political implications of Talvi’s claim but also of the arguments about populism. It is worth quoting a rather lengthy excerpt of his reply in Spanish to appreciate its true flavour:

“Parece que una nueva y terrible amenaza se cierne sobre el Uruguay: se llama José Mujica y es portador de un virus tenebroso, el ‘populismo.’ No exagero; lean los diarios y se van a encontrar con el resumen de la teoria formulada por el economista Talvi, del instituto CERES. Se van a enterar de que en nuestro pobre pais hay un tercio de la poblacion que por falta de education no sirve para nada, solo aspira a que el Estado les dé todo y por definition votan a quien tiene pinta de ser bueno para hacer llover dinero publico sobre sus cabezas. Un saltito mâs en la teoria y nos enteramos de que esa manga de inutiles reconocen a sus lideres por lo mal que se visten, lo toscos que son para hablar y la falta de alfombras en sus viviendas. No nombraron a nadie faltaba mâs. Probablemente se referian a Ignacio de Posadas o a Pedro Bordaberry [two upper class, centre-right politicians]. Pero como yo tengo mania de persecution y ademâs me gusta hacerme la victima, se me ha metido en la cabeza que se referian a mi. Por lo que me apuro a contestarle, al economista Talvi, que mâs populista serâ tu abuela” (Mujica 2009 a).

There is more to the answer than just the use of a distinctively popular language to make a political point. Mujica acknowledges that the term “populism” has multiple meanings and that within certain contexts, it can be taken as a compliment. He is well aware, however, that this is not the meaning in which Talvi has used the term. Quoting Mujica (2009 a) again: “Estoy enterado que en el mundo del anâlisis politico se usa la palabra “populismo” en mâs de un sentido y que en algun contexto puede considerarse hasta un elogio. No es esa la version a la que se refirio Talvi ni menos los diarios. Dijeron “populismo” en el sentido de todos los dias el que esta asociado a politicos mas bien baratos, que consiguen votos prometiendole el paraiso a los pobres, y una vez en el poder, usan al Estado par regalarles un tiempito de prosperidad mentirosa, hasta que todo revienta.”

I don’t know if Mujica has ever read Dornbusch and Edwards’ (1991) economic definition of populism, as the short-term pursuit of growth and income distribution at the cost of higher inflation and large fiscal deficits but linguistic differences apart, the similarities of the two definitions are remarkable. Mujica (2009a) strongly denies being a populist in the economic sense of the term used by Dornbusch and Edwards but also in the political common sense used by some political analysts, which makes it synonymous of demagogy and of the manipulation of the lower sectors of the population. As he put it: “Nosotros no usamos a los pobres. Si los expresamos politicamente, es porque sienten que nos importan y vamos a hacer todo lo posible, de buena fe para que mejoren. Tal como sucedio en Brasil con Lula.”

There are several points worth noting from this exchange. Mujica is right in rejecting that he is a populist in the Dornbusch and Edwards’ economic meaning of the term or in the normatively- charged political equivalent of the demagogue. As a politician of the left he has been critical of neoliberalism and advocates more state intervention in the economy but he has never advocated fiscally irresponsibility or other policies commonly associated to economic populism. Politically, he establishes a distinction between manipulating the poor, an accusation often levied against populist politicians, and “expressing them politically,” which he vindicates. He compares himself to President Lula in a hint to ongoing arguments about “the populist” and the “moderate” left in Latin America and sides himself with the later. And yet, his acknowledgement that within certain contexts “populism” can be used as a term of praise raises the question whether he could be what I will call here “ a good populist”, a term which I further explore below.

In what sense can then be said that in spite of his protestations to the contrary Mujica is indeed a populist, possibly a “good one”? The first level in which this could be argued is that of some of the traditional markers of identity alluded by Talvi. It refers the use of a distinctive style of political rhetoric that sets him apart from the political establishment and draws him closer to the popular sectors. Because of populism’s personalist and anti- institutional traits, symbols, rhetoric and political style have weighted heavily in analyses of populism. Populist identification is strengthened by the leader’s adoption of cultural elements that are considered as markers of inferiority by the dominant culture. I don’t have the space to make a rhetoric analysis of Mujica’s speeches but his discourse permanently transgresses the rhetorical rules of political discourse, particularly the highly conventional rules of public speech followed by mainstream Uruguayan politicians. He uses a vulgar language both in the sense of the plebeian language of the popular sectors (the “plebs”) and even in his occasional use coarse terms in public (Gatto 2009). His attire is also an integral part of his political appeal. Famously he has never used a suit and tie until recently and when he had his first suit made to order in occasion to a visit to President Lula in Brazil it became headlines news. His personal appearance is rather unkempt. He leaves a notable austere life in a smallholding in the rural outskirts of Montevideo where he often receives visitors in a barn. There is a strong ethical element in Mujica’s simple lifestyle. He is a strong critic of consumerism and, rare for a politician, he follows what he preaches (Nogueira 2009). But he is also a seasoned politician that is well aware that rhetoric and appearances are powerful drivers of political identification. I am not arguing here that rhetoric and clothes alone make a politician a populist but I am claiming that one cannot understand politics without being aware of the centrality of symbols in political life. Using a non-political rhetoric (i.e. a rhetoric that does not fit with the rules of political discourse) marks the enuciator as an outsider to the political establishment. Moreover, when this language incorporates expressions, forms of speech, musical styles and clothing characteristic of the popular sectors it does not just convey an anti-elitist message but it turns social hierarchies upside down by introducing into the public realm cultural elements that are considered as characteristic of socially inferior or uneducated people. Examples abound in Latin America and elsewhere of this kind of symbolic game. In Ecuador, Abdala Bucaram lack of manners and unorthodox campaigning style that incorporated profanities and verbal improprieties, was presented by the media as an embarrassment to the country’s civility, and proof that he was unfit for high office. However, as Carlos de la Torre (2000) notes, by consciously embodying the dress, language and mannerisms of the common people, who were despised by the elites and their middle class imitators, Bucaram attracted the vote of those who saw in him a mirror of their own popular selves and the elevation of their own culture to the public realm. In the US, George Wallace, purposed mispronounced words to create an image of an uneducated hillbilly, a trait that highlighted both his distance from the centres of power and his proximity to the people (Kazin 1995, Lowndes 2005). And of course Hugo Chavez has a masterful command of rhetorical codes that allow him to swift within the same speech from statesmanlike quotation of economic figures to the colloquial and personal and from the quasi religious language of the visionary prophet to nationalist, anti-imperialist, rhetoric mixed with a coarse “que se vaya al carajo” injunction against the US ambassador (Zuquete 2008).

An analysis of the politics of dressing under populism, from Peron’s celebration of the “descamisados” (the shirtless) to Evo Morales’ iconic jumpers, would reinforce the argument that while symbols are important aspects of any political game they are particularly crucial in the populist mode of identification. Socio-economic background, race, ethnic origins and other markers of exclusion have also been important symbolic elements that have helped politicians such as Evo Morales, Lula da Silva and even Barrack Obama to be perceived by their followers as “one of us” in contrast to their countries’ traditional political and economic elites. I am not arguing here that politicians that speak, dress and look “like the people” are necessarily populists or that, conversely, all populist politicians speak, dress and look “like the people”. What I am arguing is that if populism is a mode of identification, we need to be aware of the full symbolic repertoire of markers of identity that make identification with discriminated and subordinated social sectors more likely.

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