New Populism, a future in the Cartel?

With certainty, in political systems defined by traditional legitimacy, the characteristics of new populism presently confine it to the third layer of the cartel. If the electorally successful contingent of new populism chooses to normalise and take on board the requirement of political legitimacy, a situation will arise whereby the cartel is once again comprised only of politically legitimate parties. A number of questions pertaining to the future of new populism, traditional parties and the cartel consequently arise.

The first question therefore is three fold: is new populism likely to develop goals associated with establishment status which exceed the limitations of the third layer, would it be able to implement and sustain the necessary changes, and finally would there be a place for it in politics should it choose to do so? In short the answers to all three questions are probably no, the following paragraphs will explain why. The benefits of establishment status are desirable to any party. It is associated with goods, exclusive access, influence and power, yet it also comes at a price, a price which is fatal for the health of populism. Contingent upon the ability to elude responsibly and accountable behaviour, populism is constantly reinventing itself even as a party, with no responsibility to a faithful electorate, it has permission to permanently pursue discontent and propose itself as panacea for all ills. The constraints of responsibility would arguably prove to be too much for populism in the long-term,^[28] and its political ambivalence and intolerance of deliberation (Papadopoulos, 2002) would render it incapable of participating at the level required of parties with establishment status. Not only would it be unable to avoid the temptation of the goods which inevitably come from promising the impossible to the ever hopeful, by virtue of its organisational characteristics, it is almost certain that it would not be able to enact the changes necessary to make the transition to establishment status.

Literature generally associates successful functioning and pursuit of goals with parties which are institutionalised (Huntington, 1968; Panebianco, 1986). New populist parties have shown a predisposition for internal dispute by virtue of their poor organisational structure and concentration of power in one leadership figure (Taggart, 1996). A lack of internal democracy and coherence of goals mitigates against their functioning as an effective organisation and thus leaves them less well equipped to meet the organisational demands that accompany office, or to a lesser extent, the cartel. Populism’s inability to meet the functional requirements of the cartel highlight not only its organisational ineffectiveness, but also its failure to prepare for the demands of office, this suggests confirmation of its apparent ambivalence with the business of politics, and again, relegates it to the confines of political illegitimacy and the third layer of the cartel.

The third component of this question asked if new populism did achieve establishment status, would there be a place for it in modern day party systems? Probably not for a number of reasons. New populism is part of a protest cleavage which although from an alternative perspective seeks, like new politics to draw attention to the failures of traditional parties (Taggart, 2000), it is hard to envisage what other platforms it could successfully mobilise upon if it changed its focus.

Theoretically, normalising parties may begin the process by tempering their polarising behaviour so despite their ideology, they gain a reputation of non-confrontation and loyalty. Cappocia refers to these organisations as accommodating anti-system parties (see Cappocia 2002). In the long term however, an accommodating anti-system party would not gain establishment status unless it normalised its ideological position and policy platform, whereby it would simply cease to represent new populism and find itself with the unenviable task of competing on established issues with its traditional contemporaries within restricted boundaries. Such a scenario could well result in their exclusion from the cartel by way of its institutionalised and protectionist barriers, also creating space for another new populist party, which would still leave the legitimacy divide in the cartel and new populism in the third layer.

Most importantly, new populism has already left its mark on the political agenda, as traditional parties are the manifestation of the fault lines along which salient cleavages were formed (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967), the new populist right is inextricably linked with a controversial stance on immigration (Betz, 2002) and has influenced the agenda of the mainstream right on this issue (Kitschelt, 2000: 173). As this issue and related developments continue to dominate policy and discourse, it is hard to conceive of their normative separation. Moreover, when there is obviously so much political mileage to be gained from the topic, it is even harder to imagine the party family choosing to distance themselves from it.

If new populism is therefore not destined for a future of legitimacy and establishments status, but confined to a future of co-option, is it in the long-term destined for obscurity and eventual disappearance? Again, the probable answer to this is no. For a number of reasons both within and outside of its control, new populism is likely to remain a salient, influential but relatively unchanged factor within the cartel, predisposed, but also reliant upon the freedom to meet and mobilise new challenges. Its seeming ability to meet the protest needs of the electorate predicts the likelihood that it will continue on a sporadic basis to achieve high shares of the vote and even office but will, by virtue of its narrow remit of political skills, necessitate regular terms in opposition in order to distance itself from the failures of those it criticises, and persuade the electorate of its unique problem solving abilities. The irony of new populism is that it is its self- limiting nature which will in all probability ensure its survival. Despite electoral gain presenting it with cartel status and indeed office, the responsibilities associated with government will, more than likely, relegate it sooner or later to opposition providing an opportunity to renew old tactics.

New populism taps into a general resentment of traditional solutions within the electorate, a resentment springing from a response to the political and social post-war trajectory. Providing that these parties overcome the electoral and funding barriers which are in position to insulate the top two tiers of the cartel it seems that they are well placed to continue mobilising sizeable portions of the electorate. Furthermore, this ability to articulate and appear to respond to the disaffection of the masses is not a convenient coincidence, it is a deliberate exploitation of environmental circumstances and testimony to the continuing health of one of populism’s most defining characteristics, its ‘empty shell [like quality] which can be filled and made meaningful by whatever is poured into it’ (Meny and Surel, 2002: 6).

So are these parties a threat to the cartel and the traditional parties within it? It is suggested they are not the threat that perhaps much of the media may indicate, but they do in a lesser sense herald development and change in political practice. Familiarity breeds contempt but it can also desensitise and lead to acceptance. In an environment characterised by more than one norm of behaviour, it is likely that parties, both traditional and non-traditional, will become more experimental in their political techniques, becoming more adaptable as they routinely begin to use new methods to meet new challenges. An increasing use of populist practices has become evident in Italy (Tarchi, 2002), where it has quite uniquely become not just the norm, but the status quo (albeit in its infancy). Also in Britain, Prime Minister Blair has shown a proclivity for populist rhetoric when a situation is best met by the approach (Mair, 2002) showing that the political establishment is learning to exploit the benefits associated with making the electorate ‘the central point of reference in their rhetoric’ (Decker, 2003: 7). Moreover, the medium of television which most people rely upon for their political education, and parties depend upon for exposure, lends its self to the rhetoric of populism and so exploring its benefits seems an almost judicial move when the distance between established parties and the electorate is increasing (see Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000, also Decker, 2003: 7). If so, the spread of populism and its merging with government may lead to a tarnishing of the concept of government and a reduced expectation of its output potential within the electorate. Moreover, its inclusion in the cartel and contagation effect on traditional party agendas may also tarnish the strength and calibre of government and elite politics in the long term, whereby an overall reduction of legitimacy becomes evident in traditional politics and the distance closes between traditional and non- traditional parties. Despite this however, it is suggested that for the foreseeable future, the nature of new populism and its reliance upon opposition to the establishment will perpetuate the 'them and us' distinction, maintaining the division of establishment status.

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