The Rise of New Populism

The phenomenal success of the extreme right wing in recent years has largely been attributed to the populist element of the party family (Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1995; 1996). Part of what von Beyme (1988) refers to as the third wave of extreme right wing development - a response to a surge of unemployment and xenophobia starting at the end of the 1970s, this group has prospered in both the electoral and parliamentary arenas since the 1980s (Taggart, 2000) carving itself a position, albeit tenuous, in the cartel. According to Taggart, these parties display enough homogeneity to be classed as an ideal type (Taggart, 1996: 36), they exhibit a ‘surplus of democracy’, political ambivalence (Decker, 2003: 6) and their programmes converge in terms of their universal ‘negativity’, ‘breadth’ and lack of tolerance (Taggart, 1995: 35).

Suggesting that its exclusion of the common man from the decision making process has rendered representative democracy intrinsically corrupt (Meny and Surel, 2002: 4), they argue for the introduction of direct democracy but show a proclivity for a centralised and strong charismatic leadership (Taggart, 1996: 36) legitimised by the elevation of the position to an almost demagogic level (Taggart, 2000: 101). They display a universal commitment to anti­immigration and neo-liberal policies (Betz, 1994), and demand a reduction in the level of state intervention (Taggart, 1995: 35; 2000:75). These parties reject the ‘dominant model’ of organisation and rely upon their difference indicating a need for change (Taggart, 2000: 75). Their vote is predominantly one of protest (Betz, 1994: Taggart, 1995; 1996: 2000), white and male, but rather than being confined to the very low income and unemployed, they have extended the appeal of the extreme right wing to the low and middle educated (Taggart, 1995). They do not tend to attract a stable and committed electorate and therefore have a success which is contingent upon disaffection (Taggart, 2000).

They stand out from the rest of their party family for a number of reasons not least because they are undoubtedly the most electorally successful element within it. By virtue of this, they have increased their bargaining power at a national level in their respective party systems, and also at an international level as a political force, raising the profile of the party family. Not just confined to western Europe, their prominence has supplied new topics for debate in and out of the parliamentary and electoral arenas. They have attracted significant and largely negative media coverage and sparked an ongoing debate about their threat to democracy and its capacity to withstand their influence.

These parties, unlike their predecessors have chosen the parliamentary rather than the extra­parliamentary route to power (Taggart, 1995). ‘[C]ontingent upon a particular historical and political context. It ties itself to the collapse of many of the prevailing 'meta-narratives': the 'end' of the Cold War, the 'collapse' of communism, the 'crisis' of welfarism and the 'passing' of ‘fordism’ (Taggart, 1996: 34), they challenge the post-war settlement both in terms of its legitimacy and efficiency, highlighting the shortcomings of the political status quo (Taggart, 1996: 1-2). They are the second wave of opposition to the post-war consensus and like new politics, they defy the political norm in terms of ideology and political style (Taggart, 2000: 74).

Populism is notoriously difficult to define and understand (Taggart, 2002: 62), not least for the reason it is a ‘particularly vague’ concept (Canovan, 1981:3) and by virtue of its ‘chameleonic nature’, it can respond and mobilise within almost any environment where there is opportunity for protest (Taggart, 2000: 76). Seemingly incompatible with the liberal and pluralist ideal, it has been labelled as a ‘pathology of democracy’ because of its association with the extreme right party family, a traditional opposition to elitist politics, an advocacy of extensive direct democracy and finally an identification (and creation) of das Volk, an exclusive and false community which is at odds with the political norm (Meny and Surel, 2002: 4).

Nearly a decade on from Hans George Betz (1994: 3) stating that '...these parties are posing the most significant challenge to the stabilised structures of west European democracy today’, new populist parties have demonstrated an ability to increase their share of the vote, experience participation in government and gain prominence across most systems. The remainder of this paper will suggest an interpretation of the cartel in which new populist parties can be placed comparatively. Using this framework, it will assess their position in present day politics predicting their future relationship with the cartel in terms of experience and effect. Suggesting potential scenarios, it will be proposed that in the long term new populism and the cartel are unlikely to make a happy marriage, but it may well be a marriage that persists. Yet, while it may have significant effects on the cartel, it is likely that by virtue of its regenerative and adaptive qualities, new populism will remain relatively unchanged.

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