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The "single undertaking" principle
The Doha Declaration stipulates that Тthe conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertakingУ. [39] This means that all issues are negotiated simultaneously and that all members have to accept and implement all the results of the negotiations that become an indivisible final package.
The Single Undertaking principle shapes the outcome of the negotiations through the possibility of linking different negotiating issues. Members, in particular developing country members, hoped to have better leverage over the overall outcome of the negotiations by negotiating in a Single Undertaking setting. By linking the different negotiating issues, commitments and concessions in one particular area can be made against concessions in other areas. This way, members optimize their benefits from the negotiations.
Issue linkage is, however, complex to manage and the single undertaking formula has been, and is still, criticized on various points. It is believed that countries are more likely to adopt defensive negotiating approaches if they do not feel in control of all the negotiating issues and foresee undesirable outcomes in some issues. The Single Undertaking furthermore slows down the negotiating process, as countries have to wait for all issues to be settled. Members recognized this risk and included in the Doha Declaration the possibility that negotiating outcomes reached prior to agreements on all issues of the Doha Round can be implemented on a provisional basis.[40] This early implementation is also referred to as Тearly harvestУ [41]. Nevertheless, the Single Undertaking increases the risk of having the entire negotiations ТpoisonedУ or blocked by a single issue. Conflict and stalemate in one particular area then precludes progress and adoption of a negotiated outcome in other areas.
Transparency
Developing countries have repeatedly raised concerns about their possibility to participate effectively in the decision-making and negotiating processes at the WTO if they are conducted on the basis of informal small group meetings consultations. Transparency and participation have particularly been an issue of dispute during and following the Seattle Ministerial Conference in 1999. With regard to the Doha Round, members stressed that negotiations are to be conducted in a transparent manner to ensure the participation of all members.[42] The chairman of the GC pointed out, during the first meeting of the TNC in February 2002, that the TNC and the negotiating bodies are to be guided by the practices established by the GC regarding internal transparency. These practices were developed in July 2002 following special meetings of the GC on the issue of internal transparency and are contained in the document (WT/GC/M/57).
Consequently, open-ended interactive informal consultations meetings have to be open to participation from all members. Small group meetings, which are consultations with individual members or groups of members, can be held under the conditions that all members are informed about the conduct of these small group deliberations; that all members having an interest in the topic under discussion could participate in them; and that the results of these consultations are reported back to full membership.
The chairmanХs statement also pointed out that meeting reports should be made available in all three working languages at the same time, and effective channels of communications with members not having a representation in Geneva and the WTO Secretariat should be established. It was furthermore agreed that only one negotiating body should meet at the same time to allow small delegations to participate in them.
Special and Differential Treatment
The Doha Declaration explicitly acknowledges the need to address implementation concerns of developing countries and stipulates that special and differential treatment (SDT) provisions are a fundamental principle of the Doha negotiations. The SDT refers to various provisions in WTO agreements that give developing countries special rights and exceptions from the application of commitments and which give developed countries the possibility to treat developing countries more favourably than other WTO Members. These provisions include among others:[43]
Behind the use of SDT provisions in WTO law is the understanding that developing countries face the highest adaptation costs to international trade agreements, and that they often lack financial and human resources and expertise to implement the commitments resulting from trade negotiations. SDT provisions offer a legalistic approach to address these implementation concerns by, for instance, allowing the non-application of provisions for a certain period of time.
With their commitment to the SDT principle in the Doha Declaration, Ministers recognized that implementation concerns should be addressed and that the implementation mechanism of the negotiated agreements shall be adapted to developing country membersХ needs. Negotiations should take into account an appropriate implementation framework that provides flexibility to developing country members. The SDT principle may influence developing countriesХ negotiating strategy. It may encourage developing country members to take up commitments, knowing that they can benefit from certain safeguards when it comes to implementation. The use of SDT provisions does not impact the legal nature of the agreement. One example of a negotiating mandate in the context of the Doha Development Agenda that extends the scope and depth of SDT beyond the traditional longer transitional periods can be found in the mandate contained in Annex D of the July 2004 package. This mandate directs negotiators to extend the traditional scope of SDT to link the provision of technical assistance to the implementation of obligations assumed by developing and least developed country members.
The rules are binding and their non-application is limited to certain countries under certain circumstances that are clearly set out in the respective agreements. From the point of view of a commitment to international agreements, sometimes the developing countries insist on exercising the option of using the best endeavour language. The latter reduces the legal nature of the rules to non-binding and hence limits their implementation impact.
Like every other provision in any agreement, the SDT provisions can benefit the DCs only if they are implemented in letter and spirit. As many of the SDT provisions in existing WTO agreements are not operationalized or are not respected, the strengthening of the existing SDT provisions has become a negotiating issue of the Doha Round in its own right.
The Most-Favoured Nation principle
The Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) Treatment is a basic principle established by WTO agreements. The MFN clause states that each member treats all the other members equally as Тmost-favouredУ trading partners. If a country improves the benefits that it gives to one trading partner, it has to give the same ТbestУ treatment to all the other WTO members so that they all remain Тmost-favouredУ. MFN clauses are incorporated into the GATT, GATS, and TRIPS. Exceptions from these clauses are allowed under strict conditions, such as the economic integration process. It should be noted that the requirements needed for derogation from the MFN principle remain unclear. Negotiators within the negotiating group on Rules continue to grapple with establishing an approach that would better define the parameters for exemption from the MFN principle.
Negotiations are bound by this MFN principle. As a result, concessions - tariff, non-tariff or market access concessions - negotiated with one party will automatically extend to all members. This, theoretically, limits the number of parties one enters into negotiation with (usually only the main trading partners). On the other hand, however, the MFN principle also increases opportunities for free-riding: countries benefit from the concessions but do not have to make individual concessions themselves.
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