Box 3: The Тthree levelsХ gameУ in multilateral trade

The most obvious case is the complex process by which the European Commissioner for Trade obtains negotiating guidelines for multilateral rounds of negotiations.

In a first stage, each individual EU country will consult and ТnegotiateУ with its own national stakeholders interested in trade issues (among them business representatives, trade unions, various ministries, parliamentarians, etc). These stakeholders bring forward the priorities that will serve as the basis for the negotiating strategy and objectives of the country.

In a second stage, all the EU member countries meet in the European Council to negotiate among themselves what will be the common EU negotiating strategy. After complex discussions where the asymmetry of bargaining power between European countries also plays a significant role, the mandate of the EU Trade Commissioner is defined in fairly strict terms.

In a third stage, the EU Commissioner can engage in multilateral negotiations with other countries. However, member states request him to come back to the Council after each phase of the negotiation in order to check whether the concessions made, in the spirit of a collaborative negotiation, are in line with the initial mandate. Only after securing a renewed mandate can an EU Commissioner continue to play an active role in the negotiating process.

On several occasions, EU trade Commissioners have been put under intense pressure from EU member states during WTO Ministerial Conferences for not respecting the mandate and the bottom line that had been set, in particular for negotiations on agriculture.

However, this series of constraints imposed on the EU Commissioner might also be used in the context of a Тparadox of weaknessУ[20], where one ties its own hands to avoid making commitments. In this case, the EU Commissioner would be using the pressure coming from EU member states to refuse making any further commitment.

Source: Author

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