The competitive, or distributive, approach

Many authors think that the cooperative approach to negotiations is overrated. It fails to address convincingly the not-so-voluntary nature of negotiations and plays down the influence of asymmetrical power on the outcome of negotiations. Presenting the collaborative approach in negotiations as ТnaturalУ is also criticized.

In a competitive framework, negotiation often means Тdividing up the negotiating pieУ. The various positions are in competition with one another. There is a ТwinnerУ who gets closer to his objectives than the other(s). In the game theory, such an arrangement is also called a "zero-sum game" or "fixed-sum game". In the competitive approach, each negotiator is battling for the largest possible Тpiece of the pieУ; it might be quite appropriate to regard the other parties more as adversaries than partners and to take a somewhat harder line.

The aim of competitive bargaining is to bring the final outcome as closely as possible to the other sidesХ resistance point (bottom line), which means also that resistance points must be defined but not revealed to the other parties. On the contrary, as much as possible has to be found out on the other sidesХ positions.

A good competitive negotiator will never allow himself (or herself) to go over or under his limit for the sake of reaching an agreement. The negotiating position needs to be constantly reviewed as new factors emerge, but always keeping in mind the objective of achieving oneХs goals.

A difficult task is to estimate the other partiesХ ultimate position (bottom line), and in particular what is the minimum they are ready to accept, and at what stage does the negotiation become pointless for them. It is a major stage of your negotiationХs preparation.

By compiling information and having a view as accurate as possible of the othersХ objectives and limits, you reduce the risk of proposing too much in your first proposal. Each successive step in the negotiation provides new information on the other partiesХ reactions and therefore reduces uncertainty.

However, a good start and conduct of a negotiation does not always mean a successful outcome by oneХs personal standards. In multilateral trade negotiations, the relative economic and trading power of each player has a clear impact. LDCs may be reluctant to adopt a hard line in a sectoral negotiation with their main trading partners on whom they are highly dependent, fearing that this might create a negative atmosphere and impact on the negotiations regarding other sectors.

In addition, internal and external political and economic reasons can also impact on the outcome of a negotiation. The internal constraint has led to extensive analytical work around the notion of a Тtwo-level gameУ[8] and the influence of international outcomes on domestic factors and vice versa. As regards the external factor, if the other side believes that possible outcomes are limited because of external constraints rather than because of your uncooperativeness, it is likely to be more flexible on its resistance point. External constraints can also be consciously ТcreatedУ by one party to put pressure on the other party. One country or party can also tie its own hands in order to limit its commitments. This is what Thomas Schelling has described as the Тparadox of weaknessУ[9].

Дата добавления: 2015-07-20