References

Anania, G., (2009), How would a WTO agreement on bananas affect exporting and importing countries?, Issue paper nЎ21, ICTSD, Geneva, published online at:

http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/07/web_bananas.pdf

Bridges newsletter. Vol. 14 nЎ2, 7th May 2010, ICTSD, Geneva, published online at: http://ictsd.org/downloads/bridges/bridges14-2.pdf

Crystal, J., (2003), ТBargaining in the negotiations over liberalising trade in services: power, reciprocity and learningУ, Review of International Political Economy

Elsig, M., (2006), ТDifferent facets of power in decision-making in the WTOУ, Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, published online at:

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1090146

Fisher, R., and Ury, W., (1981), Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without Giving In, Penguin, New York

Girvan, N., (2009), "Some lessons of the CARIFORUM-European Union EPA", Trade Negotiations Insight. Vol. 8, Number 8, ICTSD, Geneva, published online at: http://ictsd.org/i/news/tni/57509

Goldberg, R., Lawrence, R., and Milligan, K., (2004), ТBrazilХs WTO cotton case: negotiation through litigationУ, Harvard Business School

Hoekman, B., and Kostecki, M., (2001), The political economy of the World Trading System, 2^nd edition, Oxford University Press

Narlikar, A., (2003), International Trade and Developing Countries: Coalitions in the GATT and WTO, London, Routledge

Narlikar, A., and Tussie, D., (2004), The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: developing countries and their evolving coalitions in the WTO, Blackwell Publishing

Narlikar, A., (2005), ТBargaining over the Doha Development Agenda: coalitions in the World Trade OrganizationУ, Research works series LATN n.34, Centre of International Studies, University of Cambridge, published online on the VI Library

Narlikar, A., (2009), ТReforming the Multilateral Trading System: The Lessons of the Doha NegotiationsУ, in Frank Trentmann ed., Free Trade, Fair Trade?, Smith Institute

Nordstrљm, H., (2004), ТParticipation of developing countries in the WTO: new evidence based on 2003 official recordsУ, National Board of Trade, Stockholm, Sweden

Odell, J., (2003), ТMaking and breaking impasses in international regimes. The WTO, Seattle and DohaУ, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. European University Institute Working papers, published online at: http://www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/03_01.pdf

Odell, J., (2005), "Chairing a WTO negotiation", Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford, published online at:

http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/8/2/425?ijkey=LJsoRYshVdYU8t3&keytype=ref

Odell, J., (2009), З Breaking deadlocks in international institutional negotiations. The WTO, Seattle and Doha И, working paper, International Studies Quarterly, published online at:

http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~enn/text/breaking%20deadlock.pdf

Putnam, (1988), ТDiplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of the two-level gamesУ, International Organization Volume 42 number 3, MIT Press.

Downloadable from http://hpeb08.files.wordpress.com/2008/08/putnam.pdf

Raiffa, H., Richardson, J., Metcalfe, D., (2002), Negotiation analysis: the science and art of collaborative decision-making, Harvard University Press

Schelling, T., (1960), The strategy of conflict, Cambridge, Harvard University Press

Steinberg, R., (2002), ТIn the shadow of law or power? Consensus based bargaining in the GATT/WTOУ, International Organization, Vol.56, nЎ2

Tortora, M., (2003), ТSpecial and Differential Treatment and development issues in the multilateral trade negotiations. The skeleton in the closetУ, working paper, Geneva, published online at:

www.atdforum.org/IMG/doc/S_Dmt-Feb03.doc

Tortora, M., (2007), ТWhat does it take to be an international economic negotiator?У, working paper, Medell’n

UNCTADХs ТCommercial diplomacyУ training modules downloadable at: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2028&lang=1

VanGrasstek, C., (2008), ТThe challenges of trade policy-making: analysis, communication and representationУ, Policy issues in international trade and commodities. Study series number 36, UNCTAD, Geneva

VanGrasstek, C., (2009), ТThe architecture of the World Trade Organization. A review of the major issues and the proposals for renovationУ, Unpublished paper

Watkins, M., (2002), Breakthrough business negotiation. A tool book for managers, Jossey-Bass

Williams, A., Lawrence, R., and Devereaux, C., (2002), ТInternational trade meets intellectual property: the making of the TRIPS agreementУ, working paper, Harvard Kennedy School of Government

Zartman, W., (1985), Ripe for Resolution, New York, Oxford University Press

[1] Which will be understood in this module as a synonym of WTO negotiations

[2] In Watkins, M., (2002), Breakthrough business negotiation. A tool book for managers, Jossey-Bass

[3] This is, however, different from Dispute Settlement in the WTO which is a quasi judicial process under WTO Agreement "Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes".

[4] In Odell, J., (2003), ТMaking and breaking impasses in international regimes. The WTO, Seattle and DohaУ, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. European University Institute Working papers

[5] Level under which no more concession would be accepted because vital objectives and needs would not be met.

[6] Normally, mediators/conciliators/arbitrators are not frequently used in the multilateral trade negotiations. The role of chairs of negotiating bodies remains primarily that of facilitators of negotiations.

^[7] See chapter III

[8] See page 14

[9] In Schelling, T., (1960), The strategy of conflict, Harvard University Press, Cambridge

[10] In Fisher, R., and Ury, W., (1981), Getting to Yes: Negotiating Without Giving In, Penguin

[11] In Elsig, M., (2006), ТDifferent facets of power in decision-making in the WTOУ, Annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. August 30th-September 3rd 2006

[12] In Crystal, J., (2003), ТBargaining in the negotiations over liberalizing trade in services: power, reciprocity and learningУ, Review of International Political Economy

[13] In Zartman, W., (1985), Ripe for Resolution, New York and Oxford

[14] See glossary

[15] Acronym of the General Agreement on Services (GATS) implemented in 1995

[16] In Odell, J., (2005), "Chairing a WTO negotiation", Journal of International Economic Law, Oxford

[17] Informal talks between the major players of the negotiations

[18] In Odell, J., (2009), "Breaking deadlocks in international institutional negotiations. The WTO, Seattle and Doha", International Studies Quarterly

[19] In Putnam, (1988), ТDiplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of the two-level gamesУ, International Organization, Volume 42, number 3, MIT Press

[20] Concept developed by Schelling in ТThe strategy of conflictУ, op. cit.

[21] These are all agreements and arrangements concluded under the GATT and the complete results of the Uruguay Round annexed to the Marrakesh agreement concluded in 1994, as well as decisions and arrangements adopted since 1994.

[22] Other functions of the WTO include the review of trade policies, cooperation with international organizations, technical assistance, and research.

[23] The official title of the agreement is ТAgreement establishing the World Trade OrganizationУ. It was signed on 15 April 1994 in Marrakech, Morocco, and entered into force on 1 January 1995. The agreement is also referred to as the WTO agreement.

[24] The Rules of procedures for the MC were adopted by the GC during its meeting on 31 January 1995 and are contained in WT/L/128. They were subsequently amended on 25 July 1996. The amended version can be found in WT/L/161.

[25] See statement of the Chairperson in (TN/C/1), 4 February 2002.

[26] Decision Adopted by the General Council on 1 August 2004 (WT/L/579), 2 August 2004

[27] Statement made by Mr. Lamy during an information meeting of the TNC on 30 November 2010.

[28] Figures based on Nordstrљm, H., (2004), ТParticipation of developing countries in the WTO - new evidence based on 2003 official recordsУ, National Board of Trade, Stockholm, Sweden

[29] Small vulnerable economies

[30] In Manfred Essig. op.cit.

[31] US, Paraguay, EU, Australia, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Switzerland, Singapore, Korea, Norway, Hong Kong China, Morocco, New Zealand, Hungary and Japan

[32] Bangladesh, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Venezuela, Zambia, Zimbabwe

[33] The membership of the group varied over time. This was reflected in its name - G-20, G-21 or G-22. See glossary.

[34] In Narlikar, A., and Tussie, D., (2004), The G20 at the Cancun Ministerial: Developing Countries and their evolving coalitions in the WTO, Blackwell Publishing.

[35] See under Principles on p. 21.

[36] Statement made at the first meeting of the TNC and contained in TN/C/1, 4 February 2002.

[37] The European Union and previously the European Communities is a WTO member since 1 January 1995. The 27 member States of the EU are also WTO members in their own right. The European Commission speaks for all EU member States at almost all WTO meetings.

[38] p. 57 in Hoekman, B., and Kostecki, M.M., (2001), The political economy of the World Trading System, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press.

[39] ¤47 WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001

[40] ¤ 47 of WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 20 November 2001

[41] Advanced provisional implementation of agreements reached in a trade round, when parties to an agreement agree that some of the targets they have set themselves should be implemented earlier than had originally been expected, without expecting the formal conclusion of the overall negotiations.

[42] ¤ 49

[43] See the document for a list and a study of all SDT provisions WT/COMTD/W/77/Rev.1/Add.4, 7 February 2002.

[44] See the article http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/action-forcing/

[45] The Fast Track procedure in the US is the best known in this context. It is a mechanism under which the US Congress can only approve or disapprove a regional or multilateral trade package negotiated by USTR in its entirety. The Fast Track procedure (now replaced by the Trade Promotion Authority) was voted by the American Congress for a determined period of time, specifying the mandate given to the negotiators. It was meant to shorten the ratification process by preventing the Congress from amending specific provisions of the agreements.

[46] Across-the-board reductions represent an x percent reduction in average tariffs, or a y percent reduction in dispersion of tariffs. Item-by-item approach relates to a tariff reduction on one product line exchanged against a tariff reduction on another product line. See Hoekmann, op. cit., p. 123

[47] For example, the Swiss formula that is intended to reduce higher tariffs much more than lower tariffs while a linear formula applies tariff cuts of equal magnitude across the whole range of products.

[48] Downloadable from http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_commitments_e.htm. The design of the table has been slightly changed for layout purposes.

[49] The complete list of services sectors is downloadable at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/serv_e/serv_e.htm

[50] Direct government payments or other financial contributions by governments provided to domestic producers or exporters if they export their goods or services. They are prohibited under the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Article 3) and, in the agricultural sector, have been subject to reduction commitments under the Agreement on Agriculture (Part V).

[51] Government measures of assistance provided to the agricultural sector, excluding export support. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture classifies domestic support into three categories: amber box, blue box and green box. Those in the amber box are regarded as trade-distorting and were subject to reduction commitments in the Uruguay Round. Direct payments under production-limiting programmes (blue box) were not subject to reduction commitments, nor were those in the green box which are regarded as non-trade distorting.

[52] Group of developing WTO members - most of them competitive agricultural exporters - that works to secure an ambitious result on farm trade in the Doha negotiations; generally led by Brazil. See glossary.

[53] In November 2009, it consisted of 8 countries, namely Republic of Korea, Iceland, Japan, Mauritius, Norway, Liechtenstein, Taipei Province of China, and Switzerland. Please note that this G-10 is distinct from the G-10 group of industrialized nations that meet on an annual basis to consult and cooperate on international financial matters.

[54] Concept stressing the multitude of functions served by a sector or industry aside from production. In the context of WTO negotiations in the agricultural sector, certain countries stress the role of agriculture in environmental protection, landscape preservation, animal rights, rural development and employment, food security, traditional habits, etc., pointing therefore out its ТmultifunctionalityУ, which explains why they oppose trade liberalization in the sector.

[55] Gains that cannot be questioned once they are enforced

[56] Expression used to qualify a country that does not make any trading concession, but takes advantage of the tariff reductions and concessions granted by other countries.

[57] In VanGrasstek, C., (2009 unpublished), ТThe architecture of the World Trade Organization. A review of the major issues and the proposals for renovationУ.

[58] http://www.acici.org/

[59] http://ictsd.org/

[60] http://www.southcentre.org/

[61] Statistics about the number of civil servants at the Directorate-General available at http://ec.europa.eu/civil_service/docs/bs_dg_category_en.pdf

[62] See http://www.ustr.gov/about-us

[63] Outcome of the Tokyo Round (1973-1979) of the GATT, it allows developed countries, members of the WTO, to take action favouring DCs without according the same treatment to other members. Its main measures include the GSP (see glossary) and SDT (see glossary).

[64] These are custom duties which a government has undertaken not to raise above the levels it has committed itself to in the WTO, in its schedules of concessions. Their purpose is to provide greater commercial certainty through a ceiling on tariffs which cannot be exceeded without an offer of compensation to affected trading partners. These ceilings are often higher than the applied tariffs (tariffs effectively imposed).

[65] See http://www.unctad.org/

[66] See http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/teccop_e/tct_e.htm

[67] See glossary and http://www.integratedframework.org/enhanced_if.htm

[68] In Tortora, M., (2007), "What does it take to be an international economic negotiator?", Medell’n, Colombia

[69] See glossary

[70] See glossary

[71] In VanGrasstek, C., op. cit.

[72] In Goldberg, R., Lawrence, R., and Milligan, K., op cit

[73] In Williams, A., Lawrence, R., and Devereaux, C., (2002), ТInternational trade meets intellectual property: the making of the TRIPS agreementУ, Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge

[74] In its study (see bibliography), N. Girvan summarizes this double syndrome of the EPA negotiations with the expression Зsweetification and technificationИ

[75] Bridges newsletter. Vol.14, nЎ2. ICTSD. 7th May 2010

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