Mobilization of the labor force on the occupied territory: successes and failures.

Struggle for the labor force: Ostebeiter issue in the Nazi policy in Belarus

Executed by Yuliya Barycheuskaya

Professor Andreas killen

Introduction

If World War I was the war for colonies then World War II was the war for calories and labor sources. The concept of “lightning war” made it inevitable for the fascist state enforcement of foreign civilian workers and prisoners of war to work in industry, agriculture and crafts in the Third Reich and also in other occupied countries. At the height of all-country mobilization in the fascist state every third industrial worker was a foreigner and in the agriculture prisoners of war and foreign workers made up half of the workforce. If Germany did not use foreign labor at the time, the agricultural and industrial production of the country would have collapsed by 1942.[1] It turned out that by the end of the war around 10 million foreigners from 20 countries worked in Germany.[2]

The discussion suggests that the Nazis were increasingly dependent on foreign labor and there were millions of foreigners who worked in Germany but Osterbeiters in Nazi hierarchy were the under ones. Millions of people from the Soviet Union who were forcefully deported to Germany became victims of political regimes as they were forced to produce military equipment and take part in activities directed against their own country. After returning to home countries they remained outcasts for a long time suspected in serving as accomplices of the Nazi regime.

This study examines Nazi plans and actions concerning mobilization of the labor force on the occupied territory of Belarus as their successes and failures and the resistance that they encountered. The key question addressed is what shaped the German labor mobilization policy on the occupied territories during the war. In this study Belarus was used as a model illustrating the struggle for labor sources between the invaders and defenders.

Historiographical review.

In order to sustain the economy during the war Germany employed millions of forced laborers from Eastern territories. Historians have traced a large circle of questions connected if Osterbeiters. However, there are still some themes remained silenced or ignored.

In post-Soviet times we see a strong interest of Belarusian scientists to the unknown facts of the World War II. Military events are revised; new documents are developed and that becomes part of the scientific life. Belarusian and foreign scientists write interesting monographs which give a new covering of the war events based on critical analysis and new methodological approaches. Ostarbeiters. Historical and analytical research (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books published in 1996-1997 by the employees of the National Archive of the Republic of Belarus on the basis of the collected documents was the most useful secondary source for this paper. This is a very detailed study of the Osterbeiter issue and Nazi policy that was applied to Belarusian population in terms of labor mobilization. The main issue that existing Belarussian historiography experiences that it analyses the war events and processes one-sidedly and traces a narrow circle of themes.

An interesting study that provides a profound examination of the Nazi policies is Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann’s The racial state: Germany, 1933-1945 published in 1991. This work was useful in part of the analysis of Nazi racial policy and its implementation and how it affected Ostebeiters in various aspects.

Second World War. Discussion. Main tendencies. Research results is a collection of articles on World War II of different prominent contemporary historians that was issued in Germany in 1990-s and translated into Russian in 1996 and now widely cited by Belarusian, Russian and Ukrainian historians in their works. This collection of articles is useful for the Russian speaking historians since it provides excess to the research results of German and English speaking authors that are not available in Russian language in other secondary sources. This paper cites the article of K. Streit Soviet prisoners of war - mass deportations forced laborers that examines the scale of the deportation of Soviet people, Nazi policy against Osterbeiters and moral and ethical aspects in the evaluation of it.

The actual study largely used museum materials and collections of documents in addition to the historic and monographic works that complemented considerably the information available on the mobilization of the population for the labor market of the Third Reich. They became the core of this study. Crimes of Nazi invaders in Belarus. 1941 – 1944 is an important collection of primary and secondary sources that presents rare documents dated 1941-1945 and articles published in the first couple of decades after World War II that are not easy to find now. The most unique part of this collection is a selection of articles from the newspapers issued by Nazi authorities and collaboration organizations on the territory of Belarus. The collections of documents Belarusian Ostarbaiters: Deportation of the Belarusian population to the forceful work in Germany, 1941-1944: Documents and Materials: In 2 books contains significant materials on the partisans’ and undergrounders’ combat against population deportation to the territory of the Reich and also about plans and calculations of Nazi authorities. The study considered personal mails sent from Germany to the homeland with the entire complex of documentary sources on Eastern workers. Since the postcards had addresses of work camps and employers, we can judge of the places where the Belarusians were and determine specific industrial enterprises that exploited their workforce. Evidences in these letters despite their limited value provide additional factual material. The comparison of the information in these letters with already known facts complements to existing explanations and results in a more detailed reconstruction of all aspects of life of the population during the Nazi occupation and provides an evidence of the living and working conditions of the Belarusian Osterbeiters in Germany. Unfortunately, the Belarusian State Museum of the Great Patriotic War has only a small portion of these documents but they appeared to be very useful for this research.

Mobilization of the labor force on the occupied territory: successes and failures.

A key issue for the German war economy and for the entire occupational policy of the fascist state was the task of recruitment and forceful deportation of the workforce to Germany. During that time the deportation of physically healthy population from the Soviet occupied territories to work in Germany became an integral part of the occupational regime; it was properly planned and was gaining huge scope. The invaders used the most ruthless measures of workforce capture on the occupied Soviet territories, which resulted in mass crimes against the civilian population, the scope and specific forms of which were violating all possible laws of war and laws of humanity and human rights.

The development of deportation measures of the population to the Third Reich was done in Berlin under the direct supervision of the occupational administration and depended heavily on the situation at World War II fronts. On the basis of monthly economic reports of economic headquarters German researchers estimated that around 2.8 million Soviet men and women as Eastern workers were deported to the territory of the Third Reich from the USSR.[3] The Eastern workers in the Third Reich were people who belonged to the occupied territories of the Soviet Union except Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Bialystok (Poland) and Lvov (Ukraine) regions. Most of the Ostarbeiters were Ukrainians, Belarusians and Russians. The Nazis were completely indifferent to the nationality of the so-called “ostovs”, since all the territories to the east of Germany were inhabited in their understanding by “Untermenschen” or “sub-humans” – human beings who were below the “nation of landlords”.[4] Eastern workers were required to wear distinctive badges with the word “Ost” (East) on the chest at the right side from the white and blue rectangular piece of cloth. Wearing of this sign at work and during rare weekend was a must. In mid-1944 it was decided to replace the sign “OST” with 3 different signs corresponding to the workers’ nationality: Belarusians – spike, Russians - St. Andrew's cross, Ukrainians - St. Vladimir's trident. National symbols were required to be worn on the left sleeve.[5] The Germans might have thought that the new signs would not be perceived as humiliating as the previous ones.

In order to evaluate the possibility to use Belarus as a model illustrating the struggle for labor resources between the invaders and defenders we have to, first of all, answer the question of what place Belarus took in the economic calculations of the enemy. The analysis of archive materials and scientific publications show that from the first days of military occupation of Belarus, the Nazis intended to fully adopt the economy of the republic to the needs of their war machine. With this objective they seized land and material resources, on the one hand, and intensively evacuated the loot to Germany and, on the other hand, they implanted and set slavery labor conditions for the workers and peasants, forcefully deported civilians to Reich, violently seized the agricultural products and raw materials. The economic interest of the Nazis about Belarus as an economic region was determined primarily by its real potential to produce a variety of agricultural products as the provisions played a crucial role in the economic calculations of the enemy. Its value was equal to the value of oil. No wonder that the World War II is also called a war for calories. The German generals assessed Belarus as one of the major sources of food supply of the Army Group “Center”.

Additionally, the Nazis played special attention to the precious stock of valuable wood and peat which attracted a lot of German industrialists, especially those who performed military orders of Wehrmacht. Hitler's Gauleiter Wilhelm von Kube defined the interests of the Reich in Belarus as follows: “ We arrived at the country with the general directive to run the country and adjust the country's economy for the war needs... To pull out of the country all that we can get from its economic power... “.[6] The implementation of these predatory intentions was to prepare the conversion of Belarus into a source of agriculture and raw materials, a source of cheap workforce and into the internal colony of the German Empire. However, wartime framed the priorities of Nazi regime and shortage of workers at industrial enterprises in Germany demanded the influx of workforce from the East. That made deportation of the laborforce from Belarus a principle issue. Thus the examination of Nazi policy in this concern is the main theme of this study.

In November 1941 Hermann Goering issued a directive on the use of workforce locally and attracting Soviet workers to perform low skilled work in the Third Reich.[7] Initially the recruiting process of people to work in Germany was of a voluntary nature. Nazis created numerous recruiting points as well as job markets in the occupied Belarus. A wide-ranging propaganda campaign was launched to persuade people to go to Germany. Fascist authorities demonstrated newsreel about the happy life of the workers in Germany, arranged speeches of advocates, distributed posters, leaflets and newspapers in cities, towns and villages. Nazi organized excursions to Germany and offered drivers’, mechanics’, fitters’, turners’ courses to young people with further return to their homeland. Despite the fact that the recruitment for work in Germany was initially voluntary the occupational authorities received specific orders regarding the number of people each region should supply.[8] No wonder that at first the German recruiting campaign had some success. It was due to propaganda and unawareness of people about Nazi racial theory and as a result what treatment they would receive in Germany. There was also another factor that is ignored in the existed historiography. Belarusians through the several decades preceded World War II experienced World War I, Russian Revolution, Russian-Polish war (1919-1920) and Western Belarus was joined to the BSSR only in 1939 after occupation of Poland by Nazis. Merry-go-round of the authorities made locals more adjustable to new regimes. Those who remembered World War I believed that Germans were not barbarians. At first people didn’t realized and existing occupational media sources of course didn’t inform them that as allies of Judeo-Bolshevism they are considered sub-humans[9] and that the war supposed to be the war of extermination.

The illusions of the young men and women who were recruited on a voluntary basis vanished when they arrived to Germany and realized that they were deceived by false promises regarding the salary, housing and personal benefits. One can find similar expressions in many letters of Osterbeiters. For example, the girl from the village Polivanovo Kormyansky district of the Gomel region Maria Melnikova who was held in a camp for Eastern workers in Bielefeld wrote to her sister: “... I’m alive and fine but my life is not very good, as it is said that in a bad head and foot give a lot of ache. I work at a military factory and get 300 grams of bread per day and 2 times a day I eat soup that I’ve never seen at home in the poorest houses but had to eat here. We’re not allowed to buy here anything, so everything that I brought from home is worn out and if I get a chance to go home I’d have to return naked as was born. The Germany will teach us how to live in the world... "[10] The resident of station Bogushevskoe of Sennensky district Vladimir Osipov who worked in a copper mine and had lived in Germany for seven months already expressed similar sad attitude: “... I had bad luck and was forced to part with you. I’m the only one who was sent somewhere in a foreign country. This all happened, mom, because of our burgomaster. If I did not rely on him, I might have stayed as the others. But now it is too late to think about this. I wish for the war to end as soon as possible and if I remain alive, I’d return to my homeland...” [11] Another girl, a resident of the village Rudnya of Kormyansky district Pashkova Maria wrote to a friend: “... I'd better had my head beaten off than stay here. We’re not allowed to write letters but it is almost impossible to put everything down. The work is not hard, but it is hard to force oneself. Everything is disgusting, even to see the light. I dream to have a chance to see my loved ones and homeland before the death. There are many Russian, Ukrainian women and other nations here. We had a great grief – dear Petka died. Maybe we all would face such a fate...” [12]

Nazis used racial profiling of the workers who were recruited from other countries. The Osterbeiters encountered miserable discrimination in Nazi Germany. Despite the dependence on foreign labor the Germans implemented their racial policy against the Osterbeiters. It turned out that initially recruited as ‘guests’ they appeared in the working camps.[13] Every day Ostarbeiters worked physically to the extreme. They suffered from heavy-duty and primarily from lack of food. All the forces were focused on surviving. Thanks to the letters, news about real conditions of foreign workers in the Third Reich spread quickly back home and remained people didn’t want to go to Germany.

Werner Mansfeld, the general commissioner for the use of labor, was replaced in spring of 1942. This was due to the fact that he was unable to meet the objectives that were raised before him. Fritz Sauckel was appointed as the general commissioner in March 21, 1942 according to the signed resolution for the appointment.[14] During his career he developed four programs for the securing of the German economy with the foreign workforce. The first two programs were held in 1942, the third in 1943 and the fourth in 1944.[15]

The second recruitment campaign developed by Sauckel envisaged recruitment of young women to the Reich for the work in households. For this reason he issued two orders on September 8, 1942 and on September 10, 1942 “ The guidelines of Reichsführer SS and Chief of Police [Heinrich Himmler] regarding the use of female staff (Eastern workers) in the households of Germany ”. According to these orders, from 250 000 to 400 000 young women were to be supplied to Germany from the territory of the Reich Commissariat Ostland and Ukraine.[16] It was obvious that this was a part of the social program for German families especially for those whose members fought at war. For this purpose the targeted recruitment and use of girls from the occupied territories of the USSR in German households started in the fall of 1942. The program covered the girls of 15-35 years old, capable of work in urban and rural households. At the same time it was noted that their appearance in terms of race had to be as close as possible to the German people. The mark “suitable for the household” was put in transport sheets next to female names and information about them.[17]

Special articles that dealt primarily with recruiting of girls and women for the work in German households were placed in newspapers to achieve these objectives.[18] However, in some cases these ads were a trick. For example, the Commandant Field of Vitebsk ordered all the girls of the age 14-25 years to gather for the distribution to work locally and to be send as “au pair” to Germany. The youngest and most attractive were selected and forcefully sent to local brothels to serve the German troops.[19] In general the recruitment campaign in 1942 of household workers did not show the results which were expected. Reportedly only 100 people were mobilized from Belarus from expected 30 000 household workers by the end of November 1942.[20] In many cases this situation was the result of measures undertaken by partisans to prevent the deportation of the population to the territory of the Reich. The paper will return to these measures later on. Another factor that contributed to the failure of the recruiting campaign of “au pair” was abuse that young women experienced in German households. However, generally household workers had much better living conditions, nutrition and easier work than those in the factories and in working camps but still “the reminiscences of women ‘foreign workers’ are littered with memoires of humiliation and maltreatment at the hands of petty male and female German tyrants”[21] in the households and in the factories. Nazi propaganda in Germany contributed to the violent and humiliating attitude toward Eastern workers, both male and female. Goebbels in the article “The So-Called Russian Soul” dated 19 July 1942 for Das Reich says about Soviet citizens “peoples joined together in this monster of a nation are not a people [ Volk ] in our sense of the word” and later he argues that Soviet people used to be slaves of their own regime.[22] So logically if they used to be slaves of Judeo-Bolshevism why then Germans have to treat them better than slaves.

Worsening situation on the fronts led to the decision of the German leaders to increase the capacities and speed of production and at the same time to mobilize part of the population to the army employed in different areas of the German economy. In 1943 the deportation of the population to the Reich became more intensive. With the intention to provide the German economy with new workforce, Sauckel developed his third program. As a part of this program the population census was made regarding all the regions on the territory of Belarus General Okrug.[23]

To increase the number of deported people the Berlin authorities decided to transfer several functions to local police forces. According to the post No.38 of the Security Police and SD in the occupied Eastern territories starting from January 22, 1943 the mobilization and medical examination was at the disposal of the local police because the “joint activities carried out by administrative order did not show any success”.[24]Nazis used coercive methods more often and most effectively in rural areas and forests during punitive operations against the partisans and civilians. During these operations under the guise of fighting against partisans the Nazis seized village people who were in the area of a military ​​operation with the intention to deport them for work to the Third Reich.[25] At the same time Nazis actively kept on using propaganda for labor mobilization on the occupied territories. In February 1943 Goebbels published a classified instruction on propaganda work in the occupied regions. It suggested to avoid mentioning of Germanization and eviction of peoples and Germanization of the Eastern territories in the press and speeches. It categorically forbid to write about the mass repressions committed over civilians.[26]

Beginning from 1942 occupational authorities and local collaborationist organizations started to publish Belarusian newspapers with articles on the origin of the Belarusian nation, the historical relationship between the Belarusians and the Germans, materials about the past of the Belarusian people and the data on Belarusian revival. The idea emerged that it was during the German occupation that the opportunity for economic and spiritual revival of the Belarusian nation appeared within the new Europe. Some materials were devoted to the fight against the partisans but of course there was no a single publication with massacres and slaughters of civilians. However, propaganda didn’t legitimate expectations of the authorities this time.

People who were forcefully deported from the familiar surroundings and their families and enforced to work hard felt humiliated, endlessly yearned for the homeland and suffered from not knowing the fate of their loved ones. Moreover as the war progressed the exploitation of Osterbeiters in the Third Reich increased and their living conditions worsen. People kept on informing their relatives about what they felt and what they experienced. However, Nazis censored the letters more carefully than before. Opchom Paul, a young man deported from the village Gorno Logoisk district to Gervast-Dorsten, wrote to his parents: “... Mom, why you did not drown while bathing when and I was a baby? I appeared to be so far away, so you’d better forget that you once had me, forget my height and pace. I will not get back home. There a lot to write about but no how to write... ”[27] The letters to the relatives were short with no big explanations and detailed descriptions of life in the work camps. Taught by bitter experience, people knew that their letters were censored and wrote about their situation sparingly and with hints using a primitive conspiracy. So, Repich Ivan from the village Sogolev of Rechitsk district wrote to his father: “... I work as barrel maker at the factory along with other villagers, get 10 marks per week, they feed us good [and put the points to be understood as “crumbs”]. I live as almost in Minsk as of 22 to 25 June when I was walking home. It often hails, almost every day and night, the same as was in Minsk. We’re all with itchy feet expecting “Holy Meting”...” [28]

In their turn the Soviet leaders took measures to prevent deportation of the population to the Third Reich. They published a series of directives and decisions addressed to the partisans and underground fighters. For example, the directive letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on strengthening of partisans’ attacks at the German rear lines and rescue of the population from the extermination and deportation to Germany stated on September 21, 1943 “ to save civilians from the extermination and deportation to the German slavery by all means. Partisans should help people to arm themselves, to call people to hide their assets with the advent of Germans, hide in woods and revive the cattle ”.[29]It is important to understand that the execution of these directives became possible only when partisan movement acquired national-wide scope. And by 1943 in Belarus it actually did.

It was physical and ideological struggle of the regimes for human resources that both of them needed more and more. Partisans as well as Nazis widely used propaganda. The leaflets that partisans spread urged not to go to work to Germany and explained that Nazis were forcefully deporting the population and by deception were recruiting the Belarusians to replace enrolled German soldiers. They explained that people who went to Germany should have hard times and that Osterbeiters should make the shells for the German army with which the Germans would kill the Soviet people. The leaflets called to resist the deportation to Germany: to run away, to avoid the registration, to escape into the woods and to join the struggle against the occupation.[30]

The report of the secretary of Luninetsk Komsomol underground regional committee of Pinsk region in the Luninets district “ On massive political work, combat activity of Komsomol regional organizations and disruption of the enemy's actions on the deportation of the population to Germany and the recruitment of young people to the police in June-July 1943” says about several groups of Komsomol partisans that were sent to the areas where the influence of the partisans was not significant with the aim at disrupting Nazi activities on deportation of the population for forceful work in Germany. These groups carried out propaganda work among the local people and combined it with military activities. A large number of Soviet newspapers and leaflets sent from the front was distributed among young people as well as leaflets printed by partisans. Young partisans “told people about the purpose of the deportation to Germany, about the situation on the fronts and the ways that people and especially youth should choose in that situation”.[31] An activist Kononov held a rally at the Kozhan Gorodok mill that dozens of peasants attended. He read a letter from a girl who worked in Germany. The measures taken by the young partisans resulted in the fact that people of Drebsk and Kozhan Gorodok, where propaganda work was carried out, during Nazis’ attempts to capture the youngsters for deportation to Germany fled and some young people came to partisans.[32]

These activities which were aimed at disrupting the deportation of the population to the Third Reich arroused a severe reaction from Nazi leaders. According to the directive on measures to combat with the partisans dated February 26, 1943 “ the final elimination of bandits [partisans] was still among supreme laws of the fight against gangs. However, at the same time this did not mean the extermination of all the people in the gang areas. Only the criminals and their accomplices deserved death ”.[33] According to the directive the remained male population of the areas influenced by partisans were also subject to the mobilization as workforce to the Reich. It was also noted that “ the elimination of bandits [partisans] was to be associated with the effective capture of humans, animals and grain (...). The bandit areas in particular were good sources for provision as in these cases full seizure of food implied at the same time depriving criminals of living ”. Nazis might also assume that famine would force locals to volunteer for the recruitment for work in Germany.

Saukel developed the fourth program by the beginning of 1944. It suggested delivery of 4.2 million foreign workers to Germany within a year. According to the established norms of workforce the territory of the Reich Commissariats Ostland and Ukraine have to supply 350 000 people to the Third Reich. The management of the General Okrug Belarus have to supply 50 000 people to the Third Reich.[34]

The attitude of German commanders toward the measures that were performed to deport population to the Third Reich changed radically from the spring of 1944. On May 5, 1944 Rosenberg, the Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, issued an order “ On the inadmissibility of coercive methods of labor recruitment ” which stated that the forceful recruitment for work in Germany led to the population turn to partisans. For this reason Nazis decided to no longer use the police for forceful mobilization of the population but did it rather on a voluntary basis. [35] Such a radical change was due to the fact that leaders in Berlin decided that among the top priorities was suppression of partisans’ movements. In order to attract people to work in the Third Reich voluntarily the civilian occupational authorities again started to use extensively propaganda methods of recruitment such as persuasion and agitation. However these methods didn’t carry them forward because locals knew from the letters and those people who managed to get back home that conditions of the Osterbeiters and prevailing hostile attitude of the German civilians improved only from bad to worse as the war progressed and the Red Army began to attack. Only people who closely collaborated with Nazi regime were voluntarily leaving the country.

It was the last stage of the four year struggle for human resources. Protection of the population from the deportation to Germany was among the main objectives of partisans during this period. On the one hand, this was done in order to prevent the population from deployment to Germany and use for the Nazis’ benefit, on the other hand, to use it in restoring the country's ruined economy and replenishing the rows of the Red Army. The representatives of the occupational authorities noted that “ the main obstacle for the population deployment was partisans. There would be any problems with capturing and sending people without the partisans ”.[36] Therefore power and scale that the partisan movement reached at that time on the territory of Belarus was the main obstacle on the way to realization of the Saukel’s fourth program. Moreover, comparatively rapid wide-front offensive of the Red Army in 1944 and shortage of human and technical military sources didn’t allow Nazis forcefully deport locals to the Third Reich.

Conclusion

Nazi understood the importance of foreign labor for the economy of the state from the very beginning of World War II. They learned this lesson from World War I. Deportation of the labor force to the Third Reich followed the occupation of the territories of the USSR. Thus, Ostarbeiters became a significant part of the labor market of the Third Reich.

It is important to consider moral and ethical aspects in the evaluation of policies pursued by Nazis against Ostarbeiters. Forceful mobilization of Eastern workers made by deceit, violence and terror and exploitation of Eastern workers and Soviet prisoners of war through the methods of exhaustion and excessive workloads were among typical and frightful elements of fascist ideology of conquering and occupational policies of Nazi Germany and a consequence of the Nazi policy of oppression and elimination of Slavic peoples. When compared with the treatment given to other groups of foreign workers in Germany the Ostarbeiters were possibly the most oppressed and faced high levels of torture, suffering and racial discrimination because they were considered as sub-humans and allies of Judeo-Bolshevism.

During the period of German occupation a fierce military-political and ideological struggle took place in Belarus. In order to win the population’s support and use locals for their own needs the occupational authorities launched an extensive propaganda campaign. The partisans and underground fighters, in turn, took actions. Propaganda and agitation in those conditions were of great importance. They were no less important than armed struggle. Partisans told people that the employment and living conditions in Germany were poor and inadequate. The success of the struggle for human resources in majority of cases also depended on the success of the outreach. Among important factors that were supporting the Soviet propaganda was the fact that partisans and underground fighters who were involved in propaganda work were local inhabitants. This factor was particularly important in villages where the link between people in the community was stronger in comparison with the city. Another important source of the information for the locals about real conditions of Ostarbeiters in the Third Reich was correspondence between Eastern workers and their families. Knowing about real status of Osterbeiters in Germany people unwillingly participated in labor mobilization performed by Nazis. Thus the initial stage of voluntary participation led to forced labor conditions that were far from ideal.

Growing needs of the German economy in human resources, situation on the fronts and partisans’ activity shaped Nazi labor mobilization policy on the occupied territories of the Soviet state. The prevailing perception of the peoples from the Eastern European territories of the USSR as sub-humans and treatment that was congruous with that idea was one of the main reasons of the failure of voluntary mobilization of the population for the labor market of the Third Reich. A growth of awareness of the Belarusians about living and working conditions of Osterbaiters in Germany and local actions of Nazis turned to the raise of consciousness of local inhabitants that Nazi do not carry out any good and that liberation is a part of their business contributed to the growth of partisan movement and success of the Soviet propaganda. It’s fair to say considering Nazis need of workforce that avoiding labor mobilization and deportation to Germany was also a form of resistance of local population. The growing power and scale of partisan movement from 1942 on the occupied Belarus created a serious obstacle for the mobilization and deportation of the laborforce. Saukel’s four plans of recruitment of the foreign workers failed in Belarus mainly for these reasons.

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1. The war behind enemy lines: Some problems in the history of the Soviet partisan movement during World War II. Vol.1, Moscow: Politizdat, 1974

[1] Herbert Ulrich, Forced Laborers in the Third Reich: An Overview. International Labor and Working-Class History, No. 58, Wartime Economies and the Mobilization of Labor (Fall, 2000), pp. 192-218

[2] Forced workers and prisoners of war in the “Third Reich”: Exhibition materials “Memory-secret of reconciliation” of the Institute of Cerberus. Hamburg, 1986, p. 9

[3]K. Streit, “Soviet prisoners of war - mass deportations forced laborers.” In World War II. Discussion. Major trends. The results of research. Translation from German, Moscow: Worldwide, 1996. 592-615, p. 610

[4] Omer Bartov, The German Military mentality in the Soviet Union, WW2History.com | From Churchill to Hitler - the history of World War Two (WW2). http://ww2history.com/experts/Omer_Bartov/The_German_Military_mentality_in_the_Soviet_U (accessed May 6, 2013)

[5] Belarusian Ostarbaiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 1 (1941 - 1942), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc. Minsk: NARB, 1996, p. 194

[6]Ibid, p. 9

[7] Ibid, p. 14

[8] Ibid, pp. 9, 65

[9] Omer Bartov, The German Military mentality in the Soviet Union, WW2History.com | From Churchill to Hitler - the history of World War Two (WW2), http://ww2history.com/experts/Omer_Bartov/The_German_Military_mentality_in_the_Soviet_U (accessed May 6, 2013)

[10] Funds of the Belarusian State Museum of the Great Patriotic War (BGMIVOV), KP - 66107

[11] Funds BGMIVOV, KP - 66884

[12] Funds BGMIVOV, KP - 66986

[13] Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann. The racial state: Germany, 1933-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 260

[14] Belarusian Ostarbaiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 1 (1941 - 1942), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc. Minsk: NARB, 1996, pp. 64

[15] G.D. Knatzko, V.I. Adamushko, N.A. Bondarenko and V.D. Selemenev. Belarusian Ostarbeiters. Historical and analytical research. Minsk: National Academy Science of the Republic of Belarus, 2001, p. 29

[16]Ibid, p. 53-54

[17] Belarusian Ostarbaiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 1 (1941 - 1942), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc. Minsk: NARB, 1996, pp. 165-169

[18] Ibid, pp. 225-226

[19] Crimes of Nazi invaders in Belarus. 1941 - 1944. Minsk 1965, pp. 302-303

[20] Belarusian ostarbeiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 2 (1943 - 1944), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc., Minsk: NARB, 1997, p.14

[21]Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wippermann. The racial state: Germany, 1933-1945. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991,, p. 260

[22] Joseph Goebbels, "Goebbels on the Soviet Union (July, 1942)" Calvin College - Minds In The Making. http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/goeb11.htm (accessed May 6, 2013)

[23] G.D. Knatzko, V.I. Adamushko, N.A. Bondarenko and V.D. Selemenev. Belarusian Ostarbeiters. Historical and analytical research. Minsk: National Academy Science of the Republic of Belarus, 2001, p. 66

[24] Belarusian ostarbeiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 2 (1943 - 1944), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc., Minsk: NARB, 1997, p.14

[25] Belarusian Ostarbaiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 1 (1941 - 1942), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc. Minsk: NARB, 1996, p. 14

[26] The war behind enemy lines: Some problems in the history of the Soviet partisan movement during World War II. Vol.1, Moscow: Politizdat 1974, p. 362

[27] Funds BGMIVOV, KP - 66105

[28] Funds BGMIVOV, KP - 66112

[29] Belarusian ostarbeiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 2 (1943 - 1944), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc., Minsk: NARB, 1997, p. 222

[30] Belarusian Ostarbaiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 1 (1941 - 1942), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc. Minsk: NARB, 1996, pp. 241-247

[31]Ibid, p. 208

[32]Ibid, p. 208

[33]Ibid, p. 38

[34] Belarusian ostarbeiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 2 (1943 - 1944), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc., Minsk: NARB, 1997, p. 264

[35] Belarusian Ostarbaiters. Deportation of the Belarusian population to forceful works in Germany (1941-1944): Doc. and materials. In 2 books. Book 1 (1941 - 1942), Comp. GD Knatko, VI Adamushko etc. Minsk: NARB, 1996, p. 322-323

[36] G.D. Knatzko, V.I. Adamushko, N.A. Bondarenko and V.D. Selemenev. Belarusian Ostarbeiters. Historical and analytical research. Minsk: National Academy Science of the Republic of Belarus, 2001, p. 46

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