TONGUES 19 страница

Still, southern cotton planters realized that their own increased dependence on financial decisionmakers from outside their region was a thorny problem. Financial collapses and the sovereign defaults that southwestern states had executed during the era of repudiation made it impossible for would-be southern bankers to recapitalize themselves in the 1840s. But cotton demand began to climb again after 1848, leading to the longest period of high prices in the nineteenth century. Although southern state governments were rated as poor credit risks after their legislative repudiations, every year southern entrepreneurs sold the vast majority of the world’s most widely traded commodity, so there was profit to be made from investing in the whipping-machine. Moreover, the 3.2 million people enslaved in the United States had a market value of $1.3 billion in 1850—one-fifth of the nation’s wealth and almost equal to the entire gross national product. They were more liquid than other forms of American property, even if an acre of land couldn’t run away or kill an overseer with an axe.¹⁴

Yet since the debt-and-repudiation crisis of the early 1840s, enslaved people were no longer being fully tapped as collateral by world financial markets. One untold story of US prosperity and global economic growth in the 1850s would be the creation of a new set of credit flows that used enslaved people’s bodies, lives, and hands as the basis for lending in the cotton economy and profit-sharing by investors outside of it. This new financial ecology replaced the chaos of the 1840s, which in turn had succeeded the credit structures of the 1830s. In the 1830s, the securitization of mortgages on enslaved people through the medium of bonds sold on distant financial markets by planter-controlled, state-chartered banks had dominated and organized the flow of credit into the southwestern cotton frontier. The new system of the 1850s would finance massive new expansions in the southwestern United States while also allowing world capital markets to take advantage of the massive collateral held by enslavers. But this new system would not give enslavers what they had lost with the panics of 1837 and 1839, and with repudiation, and this was the control over the flow of credit and repayment that enslavers had once been able to exert.

The new financial ecology was brought into being by start-up firms launched by northerners with small amounts of capital, who moved to southern ports in the wake of 1839 to buy cotton. These were companies such as, for instance, Lehman Brothers of Mobile, Alabama. In the disrupted environment left by the destruction of the old mercantile firms, these new organisms acquired an old name, “factor,” which had a long history in the Atlantic slave trade, and their role in the cotton economy evolved quickly. They began to lend money to enslavers on the security of ensuing crops and mortgages on slaves. Factors also arranged for transportation, secured insurance for crops in transit, and bought supplies for clients’ labor camps. Any collection of mid-nineteenth-century personal and business documents from the South will be stuffed with the account sheets generated by factors, blue paper, covered in ferrous ink dried to rusty red and black. By the mid-1850s, the hinterland of every cotton port had several large firms—such as Buckner, Stanton, and Co., of New Orleans—standing head and shoulders above the rest.¹⁵

In the 1850s, the factor mediated between cotton producers and the world market, channeling credit and taking the immediate risk of lending. The factors themselves needed credit, and their financing came from New York banks, such as Brown Brothers. Factors alone could not satisfy all the borrowing needed to generate a cotton crop that increased in total value 450 percent between 1840 and 1859. The lenders depended on personal relationships that allowed them to evaluate the creditworthiness of potential borrowers, so small-scale cotton producers were often kept on a short tether, when they could get tied in at all. Bigger planters and small-town merchants found that they could take their own incoming flow of credit from factors, repackage it, and pass it on at more capillary levels, thus making money from their own investments in other people’s enslavement of still other people. Thus, $1 lent by Philadelphia-based factor Washington Jackson became $2 lent by Natchez megaplanter Stephen Duncan to his neighbors. Repackagers usually demanded a mortgage on individual slaves as security, and as locally powerful residents, they were in a position to enforce this requirement. While slave mortgages had been made since the seventeenth century, they now became ubiquitous. During 1859, Louisiana enslavers raised $25.7 million, 75 percent of the value of cotton produced in the state that year, by mortgaging slaves.¹⁶

The world market’s willingness to lend reveals its continued faith in the long-term profitability of slavery. The new system of credit delivery was capillary, as opposed to the arterial system of the 1830s, and so defaults and other breaks in its flow were less catastrophic. It certainly profited lenders up and down the chain, even the little old ladies in Mayfair townhouses who let London men of business put their inheritances into the hands of other men of business. Passing through a chain of intermediaries, that money would be lent on a slave in Mississippi, usually generating 8 percent interest, the highest allowed in many states that had passed usury laws. The collateral of enslaved bodies profited investors around the globe once again in the 1850s. But the new system also connected each borrower to the world economy primarily as an indebted individual property owner, rather than as a member of a unified group controlling a bond-issuing state as sovereign citizens, and a state bank as stockholders, as had been the case in the 1830s. The disempowering experience of mortgaging without local control over the entrance and exit of credit into statewide economies might have increased enslavers’ receptivity to the Calhounian substantive-due-process doctrine. And so southern public intellectuals’ cries for diversification were not just about where one’s shoes were made (Massachusetts), but about where one’s credit came from, and where one’s interest charges went (London, New York).

There was one possibility that, if it had become real, might have shifted the relationship between the enslavers and the world’s credit markets. In the past, the recipe of collusion between financiers, hard men with guns, and ambitious politicians had worked to expand both the United States and the power of southern enslavers. More than once, such groups had teamed up to break juicy chunks like Florida off the edges decaying of empires. When that happened, enslavers suddenly controlled the territory and the enslaved labor necessary to generate speculative gains, and in such situations they had often been able to get credit under favorable terms from investors who were eager to get in on the ground floor of the next big thing. There was an exceptionally attractive possibility of this sort right off the coast of Florida. If the South had acquired Cuba, the history of the expansion of slavery in the United States, including the history of investment in the expansion of slavery, would surely not have ended in 1865.

For by 1850, Cuba was the one real jewel yet to be pried from the crown of the Spanish Empire. It had become to sugar what Mississippi now was to cotton. Sugar production in the New World had moved from one island to the next, with new islands replacing old ones as the ones most desirable to investors, but the physical technology of making sugar had hardly improved over three centuries. Soon after Saint-Domingue, planters fleeing the Haitian Revolution brought enslaved laborers and entrepreneurial expertise to Cuba; however, they began to transform sugar production in ways parallel to the creative destructions within the whipping-machine. In this case, using new machine technology, Cuban planters rebuilt processes in ways that shattered the bottleneck on productivity imposed by the fact that the sucrose in cane begins to spoil if it isn’t extracted within twenty-four hours of harvesting. After harnessing the power of steam to turn cane-grinding mills fast enough to keep up with almost any number of enslaved cutters harvesting the raw cane, Cuban enslavers added vacuum pans to boil extracted cane syrup. This took the process of crystallizing sugar out of the control of skilled slave artisans. The new ingenios, as Cubans called mill complexes, led to a 400 percent increase in the acres of cane that a mill could turn into sucrose crystals, an efficiency increase in one generation greater than that of the preceding half-millennium of sugar production.¹⁷

Cuba was vast, as large as England and Wales together, and in 1791 it had only 86,000 slaves who made but 16,000 metric tons of sugar. Despite an 1835 Anglo-Spanish treaty that was supposed to stop the Atlantic slave trade, between 1800 and the 1860s, Cuban enslavers imported 700,000 enslaved Africans, with 300,000 arriving after the 1835 treaty was signed. Already by 1830, the new ingenio system had made Cuba the world’s biggest sugar producer, and then, using British credit, the colonial government began to extend railroad lines down the island’s spine, opening vast new areas for exploitation. By 1850, the slave population had climbed to more than 435,000, more than in any US slave state but Virginia, and Cuba was shipping 300,000 metric tons of sugar annually—one out of every four pounds of sugar made on the planet. And still the huge island was only partly developed.¹⁸

In 1848, the Polk administration offered Spain’s impoverished government $100 million for the island. Political conflict over the Mexican Cession dissuaded the executive branch from carrying negotiations further at that time. But over the four years after 1848, pressure began to build for Cuban annexation from within the United States. This pressure came from sources in both the North and the South. One was the Cuban exile community in New York, whose Havana Club proclaimed that rule from Madrid denied free Cubans basic natural rights, like that of free speech and political assembly, and denied them the right to trade freely. Spanish imperial officials also periodically held the threat of emancipation over Cuban enslavers’ heads; this threat in turn caused a defensive reaction among southern enslavers, who also wanted to acquire the island because an “Africanized” “free negro colony” off the Florida coast would “destroy the efficiency of mainland slaves,” as a Tennessee newspaper put it. The newspaper meant that freedom in Cuba would suggest to enslaved people on the mainland that their emancipation was next. Such fears seemed more than imaginary because, in 1839, fifty-three recently enslaved Africans had overthrown the white crew of the Cuban slave-ship Amistad as they were being transported from Havana to the island’s eastern sugar frontier. Trying to sail to Africa, the rebels made an accidental landfall on the Connecticut coast. State authorities charged them with murder, but abolitionists intervened and pushed the case into the Supreme Court. Concluding that the Amistad ’s cargo had been illegally transported across the Atlantic, the Court made its only pre-twentieth-century antislavery decision. It ruled that the rebels had been kidnapped, that they had freed themselves, and that they could return to Africa.¹⁹

After the Wilmot Proviso, however, southern expansionists were determined to regain the offensive. A Virginia-born State Department official, writing to Secretary of Wa r Jefferson Davis in around 1853, said that expansion into Cuba was “essential to the South both in a political and a geographical point of view.” Because of Cuba’s size and population, it could be carved into multiple states, each one sending proslavery senators and representatives to Washington to rebalance Congress. Bringing Cuba’s ultramodern sugar plantations inside American tariff walls would reduce Louisiana sugar’s market share, but then, as southern entrepreneurs anticipated, they could simply move operations to “the untouched soil of Cuba,” and thus find “the means of underselling the world in sugar.” The New Orleans Delta believed that “wresting [Cuba] from the mongrelism which now blights and blackens it” would make the enslaved population “yield its riches up to the hands of organized and stable industry and intelligent enterprise. ” This would be “ manifest destiny accomplished.”²⁰

Many northern Democrats also supported American acquisition of the “Queen of Islands,” as pro-expansion New York Sun journalist “Cora Montgomery” (pen name of Jane McManus Cazneau, daughter of a New York congressman) described Cuba. She was one of many aggressively pro-expansion New York journalists whose support for “Manifest Destiny”—a term the expansionists coined—was frankly chauvinist. But annexation also drew support from idealistic refugees from the failed European revolutions of 1848, or so Jane Cazneau claimed. She wrote that “the native Cubans are wild for annexation,” because they hoped its incorporation into the United States would make “Young America” a multilingual republican empire to eclipse the Old Europe that had forced out revolutionaries and still sought to shackle Cuba to a European throne. Above all, New York City had a deep economic interest in Cuba. Steam-driven sugar mills were the most significant heavy industrial product made in the city itself. Wall Street power-brokers such as August Belmont, the so-called “King of Fifth Avenue,” who founded (and bankrolled) the national Democratic Party Committee, knew that Cuba was already the mainland’s third-biggest trading partner, and he enthusiastically supported acquisition.²¹

White southerners were happy to see northern Democrats demanding a bigger empire for slavery. And in the 1850s, southern enslavers and northern allies didn’t just demand new territories. They acted. When the Whig-run executive branch didn’t move toward acquiring Cuba between 1849 and 1853, many Cuba expansionists supported extralegal tactics called “filibustering,” a term that in the mid-nineteenth century did not mean obstructionist legislative behavior, but still held its seventeenth-century meaning deriving from the activity of Caribbean pirates. Cuban exiles, Wall Street money, New York publicists, and Mississippi power-brokers supported a series of attempted “filibuster” expeditions intended to overthrow the island’s Spanish colonial government. The most substantial ones were led by Narciso Lopez, an exiled Cuban planter, in 1850 and 1851. Drawing on financial support from the money-men of New York and the Mississippi Valley (including R. C. Ballard and New Orleans-based millionaire enslaver John Henderson), Lopez recruited his foot soldiers among young men from Louisiana, Ohio, Kentucky, and the northeastern states. But his second invasion ended in disaster. The Spanish government captured his force and brutally executed Lopez and about fifty American prisoners in Havana’s public square.²²

“American blood has been shed! It cries aloud for vengeance,” shouted the New Orleans Courier. “Cuba must be seized!” Angry mass meetings erupted in US cities, leading in New Orleans to riots that attacked Spanish property. The New York Democratic Review, the organ of the “Young America” movement, argued that the party needed a “States-Rights” candidate who would make the 1852 presidential election a referendum on the Whigs’ passive expansion policy. When Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire won the Democratic nomination, he adopted Cuba acquisition as a key platform plank. August Belmont threw his money behind Pierce, who demolished Whig Winfield Scott, 253 electoral votes to 44. One victory parade banner proclaimed “The Fruits of the Late Democratic Victory—Pierce and Cuba,” and when March 1853 rolled around, the new president’s inaugural address proclaimed that his administration would “not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil from expansion.”²³

Southern and northern Democrats sensed that the time had come. At last they could fulfill the hopes of Manifest Destiny, provide an expansion pie big enough for all of their party’s interests, and, of course, frustrate the plans of Whigs, abolitionists, free blacks, and everyone else they collectively despised. Pierce, described in the press as a “Northern Man of Southern Principles,” announced that the executive branch would not attempt to stop citizens who chose to “emigrate” to Cuba. Spain could reflect on what happened when US citizens had “emigrated” to Mexican Texas. Pierce sent expansionists as the government’s official emissaries to the courts of Europe—such as Louisiana Senator Pierre Soulé, who went to Spain, and Belmont, appointed to the Netherlands. In April 1854, Secretary of State William Marcy instructed the emissaries to “detach that island” from Spain, authorizing them to offer $130 million for Cuba. Belmont already planned to manipulate European financial markets in order to bring Spain’s heavily indebted government to its knees.

Image 10.2. By the 1850s enslavers had their eyes on expansion into Cuba in order to expand Southern political power. Here we see an idyllic image of a Cuba tobacco plantation, plus the idea of “Southern rights” being used to sell cigars. “Southerner rights segars. Expressly manufactured for Georgia & Alabama by Salomon Brothers. Fabrica de tabacos, de superior calidad de la vuelta-abajo,” Broadside, 1859. Library of Congress.

In October, the US ministers gathered at Ostend in Belgium, where they crafted a policy paper called the Ostend Manifesto. This report, which Belmont et al. sent back to Marcy and Pierce, proclaimed that if Spain refused to sell Cuba, “the law of self-preservation”—a euphemism here for protecting mainland slavery from the alleged destabilization that offshore emancipation would inflict —entitled the United States to seize the island. But even as they wrote, on the other side of the Atlantic Pierce was learning that the survival of the Democratic Party itself depended so heavily on alliance behind the cause of expanding slavery that he wasn’t going to be allowed to wait for Spain to sell Cuba.²⁴

IN 1852, A YEAR after Rice Ballard’s business partner Samuel Boyd helped to buy arms for Narciso Lopez’s invasion of Spanish territory, other things that Boyd had been doing caught up to him. Boyd, a Natchez lawyer and judge, and former slave trader Ballard had been buying distressed properties through the trough of the 1840s. As the new decade opened, they began to buy dozens of new “hands” through a New Orleans slave-consignment agent named C. M. Rutherford. Pre-1850s financial innovations had worked in tandem with new slave trades, from coffle-chain and Georgia-men to the supertraders and the securitization of hands. Now the factors’ capillary credit created demand, to which the domestic slave trade responded with a new business model. Unlike 1830s’ supertraders who owned enslaved hands from one end of the pipeline to the other, new players, such as Richmond’s Richard Dickinson, behaved more like consignment agents or commodities traders. Using the tools of faster communication—instant telegraph, or mail carried by rail—to gauge demand and supply, they held slaves in their jails for owners who wanted to sell, graded captives, provided clothes and insurance, found remote buyers, and put captives like Ben Slaughter on trains headed southwest. Sellers often waited until final sale to get their money, but they benefited from more predictable prices. Dickinson sent employees around the selling states to gather market data—“No. 1 women $1300 to 1350 and girls size of Margaret and Edmony $1025 to 1100.... [S]ome think No. 1 men will go as high as $1600 to 1700.” He repackaged this data into regular price circulars, which he mailed to potential sellers and brokers across Virginia. The new pattern of trade reduced opportunities for arbitrage but didn’t require a single middle party to bear all the risk. Capital requirements for entry declined, and there was demand to fill. The price of an adult man in New Orleans climbed from $697 in 1850 to $1,451 in 1860. The reorganized slave trade moved about 70 percent of the decade’s 250,000 forced migrants.²⁵

Rising prices, returning credit, and the efficiencies of the newest iteration of the domestic slave trade enabled wealthy cotton enslavers to expand their operations dramatically. US cotton production reached 4 million bales by 1859, an incredible testimony to the seemingly unlimited capacity of both the southern economy to increase its production, and the world economy to absorb it. Boyd and Ballard, who owned almost a dozen labor camps, did their share. On one of them near Natchez, Ballard owned a woman named Virginia. She wasn’t a girl, for she had a teenage daughter, and she began to call herself Boyd because Samuel carried on a relationship with her. It doesn’t take much imagination to understand why she carried on with “the Old Man,” as she later called him. In the early 1850s, Boyd and Ballard were sending enslaved people to carve new labor camps out of the land they now owned on the heavily forested western shore of the Mississippi River: Elcho, Brushy Bayou, Pecan Grove, and Outpost in northeastern Louisiana, and Wagram in Arkansas. In 1852, the partners sold 2,000 bales to their factors. By 1855, a memo showing returns from only six of the partners’ ten camps recorded 3,319 bales made—1.34 million pounds of clean ginned cotton.²⁶

The partners were not alone. In contrast to the 1810s or 1830s, in the 1850s the borders of slavery’s empire were not expanding, even though southern whites hoped for Cuba. In the Mississippi Valley, much of the expansion of cotton production was driven by high capitalization to fill in the vast stretches of untapped rich soil.

On this set of internal frontiers, some of the entrepreneurs who had survived the last crash in good shape achieved a kind of superplanter status. Ballard wasn’t the only one who realized old slave-trading profits in the form of massive new projects. For instance, take Tennessee lawyer Joseph Acklen, who married the widow of Ballard’s former business partner Isaac Franklin in 1849. Franklin had built up “Angola” and several other labor camps in West Feliciana Parish, Louisiana. By 1860, Acklen had added one hundred newly purchased people to the labor force acquired by marriage, and his Angola complex made over 3,100 bales a year. Across the river, where armies of enslaved people were being deployed to turn Carroll, Concordia, and Tensas Parishes into a new lobe of the world economy’s cotton-breathing lung, four camps owned by the Routh family generated 5,000 bales a year by 1859. Back on the Mississippi side, another new frontier opened in the vast stretch from Vicksburg north to Memphis, which had been mostly unexploited before the late 1840s. Issaquena County, for instance, did not exist before 1849. By 1860 its median slaveholding had reached an astonishing 118.²⁷

Issaquena County is today one of the poorest counties in the United States, but in those days that whole region was being turned with industrial rapidity into a wealth-generating landscape of endless cotton fields. The Chickasaws had been driven out during the 1830s, leaving a citadel of 7,000 wild square miles, “a chaos of vines and cane and brush” untouched by axe or plow and patrolled by wildlife that included bears, wolves, cougars, and even a few jaguars. But the roots of trees (their trunks up to six feet in diameter) twined through some of the richest dirt for cotton on the surface of the planet—“pure soil endlessly deep, dark, and sweet,” as the journalist David Cohn put it a century later. Unlike all preceding North American slavery frontiers, most of the delta’s entrepreneurs came from a small group of the most heavily capitalized men in the country. Few settled in the region. Instead they operated massively productive slave labor camps as if by remote control. You can see that in the new delta’s demographics. From 1850 to 1860, the enslaved population in its six core counties almost doubled, from 17,000 to 30,000. The white population, which had not yet reached 7,000, stood at roughly 20 percent of the slave population—a fact revelatory of a commitment to large-scale specialized cotton production as complete as the Saint-Domingue enslavers’ commitment to sugar.²⁸

As the number of enslaved people on this internal frontier grew, so, too, did the demands on them. In 1849, the Issaquena slaveholdings of Robert Turnbull, a Westchester, New York, resident, amounted to 200 slaves who made 300 bales of cotton. By 1859, Turnbull’s estate in Issaquena exploited 400 captives who made 2,000 bales of cotton—an increase from 1.5 to 5 bales per enslaved person, which is evidence of how hard they were driven in the new fields. George Young was born on a similar labor camp in that same decade. If he’d had a birth certificate, it would have given a date within a year or two on either side of the Ostend Manifesto. But Young’s elders always told him he was born in “The Lawler Year,” because enslaved people sometimes remembered years by the names of the annually changing overseers, and Lawler was memorably violent. Indeed, across the South, the 1850s were a Lawler Decade. As slavery’s center of gravity lurched south and west, the number of enslaved African Americans who lived in cotton districts grew from 1.6 million to 2.2 million. The re-acceleration of forced migration, the shift of the population into disease-friendly ecologies, and the increasing pace of labor brought hunger, alienation, and death. Life expectancy for African Americans, which had climbed in the less market-frenzied 1840s, now dropped again, as it had in the 1810s and 1830s.²⁹

Virginia Boyd was able to avoid the most Lawler-like places as long as Samuel Boyd wanted to keep her handy. They were certainly together in the summer of 1852 outside of Natchez. Just a few months later, she knew she was definitely pregnant. But then someone else—maybe Samuel’s wife in Natchez—found out what they had been doing. Ballard also found out. That old and “smooth hand at Cuff” went into action. He wrote a letter ordering Virginia’s overseer to send her up to Karnac, a labor camp he and Boyd owned near Port Gibson on the Mississippi River. And, Ballard warned Boyd, Virginia had to be sent farther still. Samuel didn’t put up an argument, even replying that he didn’t want “to be bothered with her, & if she will not behave, put her in the stocks until you start her off.”³⁰

Somehow, however, the information in one of Ballard’s letters had gone astray, because Virginia, who was literate, had clearly learned many details about his plans. Then, she tried to send a note to Boyd.

In response Ballard’s letters began to fly around her, weaving a web that wrapped her tight. His agents moved her, first up the river to Karnac, leaving her daughter near Natchez; then down to New Orleans in February, where Ballard’s agent, C. M. Rutherford, was waiting for her. She’d be sent too far away to ever trouble Boyd again—to Mobile, or to the slave market in Houston. Virginia told Rutherford that the child was due soon, trying to delay the inevitable sending-away, and she snuck out of his store whenever she could to try to find her own buyer in New Orleans. Samuel Boyd, meanwhile, may have had second thoughts, for (as Ballard discovered) he traveled down to New Orleans. But by April, Virginia was consigned on board a Texas-bound ship, guarded by a white man, like a fugitive being escorted by a marshal.

Texas was not a good option for Virginia Boyd, but it was a good one for bootstrapping white men on the make. In the 1850s, they moved 100,000 enslaved people into eastern Texas, a region as big as Mississippi or Alabama. Many of these migrant white entrepreneurs were small slave owners, such as S. G. Ward. In 1850, Ward left Warren County, North Carolina, and, as he explained in a letter, “carried all my negroes, save 3 or 4 and as many children, to Texas,” to rent them to his brother, “because they were making nothing clear here.” The immediate application of crowd-tested techniques of production gave life on the East Texas frontier to the familiar tang of a society composed of undercapitalized men committed to creative destruction: “Cotton is the leading idea here and men neglect everything else,” wrote one migrant. They “lay out all their money on negroes and land. You frequently see men worth $100,000 who seem no better off than our own mountain people.”³¹

Virginia was to be sold to one of those men. She had lost everything except her unborn child and her literacy. Somehow she obtained pen and paper, convinced someone to mail a letter, and on May 6, 1853, wrote a remarkable message to Ballard from “the city of Houston at a Negro traders yard.” She confronted Ballard with what the relationship between her and her child’s father should mean: “Do you think that after all that has transpired between me and the old man (I don’t call names) that it is treating me well to send me off among strangers to be sold... for the father of my children to sell his own offspring, yes his own flesh and blood.” “Is it possible,” she asked, testing every rhetorical switch she knew in an attempt to flip Ballard’s choice, “that any free born American would hand his character with such stigma as that?” What would slavery’s critics say, and couldn’t he sympathize with her as a caring father? “You have a family of children & no how to empathize with others in distress.” She begged to be reunited with her daughter, for her children to be set free, that she might be permitted to raise the money to buy her own freedom. “If I am a servant”—and slavery’s defenders were industriously cranking out articles insisting that the South was built upon a paternalistic relationship between kindly masters and loyal “servants,” not slaves—then “there is something due me better than my present situation.” And don’t worry, she closed, with both promise and threat, she knew how to send letters back to Adams County, but “I shall not seek ever to let anything be exposed, unless I am forced by bad treatment.”

Дата добавления: 2015-09-04