Is BRICS a Viable Project?

Against the background of the developing countries' growing awareness of structural power being redistributed in their favour and common challenges these actors face, BRICS formally emerged in 2009, with South Africa joining a year later, adding 'S' to the acronym. Six official summits have been held so far, with astonishing initiatives proposed. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs as well as some influential scholars consistently praise the BRICS endeavours and emphasise the fact that BRICS serves as an indispensable constituent of an emerging multipolar world in order to counterbalance established sources of power. In this respect, an intriguing question may be raised: to what extent arguments about BRICS tangible accomplishments and far-promising durabulity are justified? This essay suggests that despite BRICS institutionalising on the world arena and demonstrating specific achievements, its capacity to take timely and far-reaching decisions on contentious issues and forsake significant difficulties among these countries for harmonising their actions should not be overestimated.

Firstly, in terms of Hurrell's 'uneasy coexistence' of liberal solidarist (Western, or Kantian, as some scholars prefer) and pluralist (Hobbsean, or multipolar in modern terms) world orders, obviously the BRICS solidarity is not as deep as Euro-Atlantic one. In comparison to the Western tough institutional framework with frequently obligatory decisions and genuinely shared values, BRICS is just a forum, with joint committments assumed on a voluntary basis. Furthermore, although it is not denied that all these states support multipolarity and express discontent with the Western hegemony, so far they have failed to craft a semblance of a consistent approach to and interpretation of global norms and rules, such as use of force, non-proliferation or macroeconomic policy surveillance. For instance, the BRICS states responded differently to the responsibility to protect applied in the Libya and Syria crises. Additionally, BRICS cherishes absolutist understandings of sovereignty; however, Russia's annexation of Crimea and further actions in Ukraine contradict the proclaimed values of this forum. For example, although China condemned sanctions against Russia, it is very difficult for Beijing to approve of Russia's support for secessionism, given its own experience in Xinjiang. Moreover, despite BRICS occasionally speaking with one voice, the underlying motivation of the member states may significantly differ. In this sense, a BRICS common stance may seem to be no more than a sporadic coincidence of interests rather than something more sustainable and predictable.

Secondly, the BRICS states are primarily competitors rather than allies in a number of spheres and their long-standing bilateral tensions should not be left out of account. These developing economies contend for investments and technological innovations that originate largely in the West. They also compete for lucrative shares of Western markets, with no BRICS genuine economic intergation taking place. In particular, China and India are traditional geopolitical rivals that are predominantly occupied with their own issues on the regional level (including developmental goals) rather than containing the Western hegemony as an end in itself. Although Russia maintains friendly relations with both India and China, neither of them is likely to abandon national interests for the sake of accommodating Russia's concerns. Furthermore, South Africa is not a politically influential actor; therefore, at best it may end up with bandwagoning with Russia and China. The problem of multidimensional inequality of the members of this forum makes it even more difficult to avoid possible coercion on behalf of Russia and China. Additionally, Moscow and Beijing are wary of the Indian and Brazilian efforts at obtaining permament membership in the UN Security Council, as it would dilute their own power, increasing the number of undesirable veto-holders. Consequently, there exist quite a range of objective obstacles on the road to an enhanced and sustainable BRICS cooperation.

At the same time those who are more optimistic about the BRICS potential may argue that this project is a manifestation of these countries' growing economic and political heft and emphasise their capacity to act as an independent and relatively coherent power hub. A certain extent of commonality of their vision for world order and similar economic aims in line with such prominent initiatives as the New Development Bank (formerly known as the BRICS Development Bank) add to these expectations. In particular, given its share of the world GDP amounting to 20%, BRICS is capable of challenging the US hegemony at least in the economic field. However, this essay does not question these facts, it argues that it is a simplification to take the BRICS clout as something coherent, as this power is still rather dispersed and unconsolidated. For example, the BRICS economic weight is sufficient to subvert the Western long-lasting dominance in the world economy, but in reality this would mean China's rather than BRICS' decision to assert economic dominance, given an obvious inequality among the BRICS states. Furthermore, the commonality of interests does not always mean that these interests are mutually beneficial; on the global level they are often competitive. Additionally, the Bank has to prove its effectiveness during economic upheavals, with the bulk of financial sources still located in the West. Therefore, the proponents of the BRICS viability seem to overrely on an assumption that its accumulated power and the political plattform they share allow these actors to act as a coherent entity.

In conclusion, although BRICS enjoys significant weight on the world arena and certain commonality of approaches to global order as well as puts forward remarkable initiatives, its capacity to perform as a coherent and consistent actor is rather weak, since the forum lacks genuine solidarity while interpreting global norms and addressing particular issues and still faces the problems of divergent interests and inequality among its constituent parts.

Дата добавления: 2015-08-18