Section D: Analysis

Understanding Mao’s motivation behind the Hundred Flowers campaign is crucial to distinguish whether he was a ruthless dictator portrayed by J.Chang or an ideological visionary, presented by P.Short. The evidence presented in part B and historiography of part C gives rise to various interpretations of Mao’s intentions, ranging from a trap[35], through a gamble[36], to a democratic check.[37]

As Short argues the Hundred Flowers campaign appears to be intended as a “rectification movement for the party”[38]. This is supported by Mao’s ideology of self-criticism and the speeches given by Mao in 1956, which blamed the estrangement of the party from the people for the Hungarian crisis. This implies, that Mao was democratically checking if CCP was becoming too bureaucratic and elitist in the eyes of people to avoid Hungarian-like consequences. From this perspective, Mao was intending to make the party more responsive to the wishes of the people and to allow the venting of the public dissatisfaction. However, public speeches referred to by Short, may not reveal Mao’s true intentions as he could be simply laying grounds for the trap, especially because they are countered by Chang’s interviews with Mao’s closes circle.

A more realistic intention of Mao would be creating favorable climate for intellectual-state cooperation in the light of Mao’s economic ambitions, which required initiative from educated intellectuals. Letting intellectuals speak out after years of repression would make them more willing to whole-heartedly contribute to China’s economic drive. Increase in salaries, better apartments, less bureaucratic interference and wooing back of Chinese professors working abroad by 1956 supports this[39].Mao’s decision to fully neglect Russian expertise by 1956 made good state-intellectuals relationship important. The pre-1956 persecution of intellectuals would have made intellectuals scared to contribute, therefore the Hundred Flowers campaign could be meant to regain their trust in the CCP in order to harness their expertise.

This viewpoint doesn’t explain the launch of the Anti-rightist campaign. Mao could be reacting to the unexpected negative consequences of the Hundred flowers campaign rather than initially planning a trap[40]. The set-up of the Democratic Wall in Bejing University and many destructive claims, made Mao question whether the campaign will destabilize the country and his authority. Mao was “alone with the people[41]” as the rest of the party didn’t support his liberal policy (1950s). The pamphlet, which speculated about him being liberal and opposing the rest of the party, put Mao in a dangerous position. Because of this on the June 12 Mao issued a circular to all reliable party members clearly stating that he set-up a trap. However, this doesn’t mean that it was his original intention, but could instead show that he was trying to re-establish his authority over the party and show that the campaign is under his full control from the start.

However, the events of 1956-57 can be interpreted as a trap and Mao’s final step in purging intellectuals if Mao’s private conversations with his close circle are taken into account. For instance, according to J.Chang’s interview with Ke Quingsh Mao’s reaction to Hungarian crisis was that his previous attempts to stamp out bourgeois opposition were not enough[42]. The three campaigns against intellectuals have silenced possible dissidents so Mao needed to “let the snakes out of their lairs to catch them”[43]. Mao was aware that in the atmosphere of De-Stalinization and Hungarian crisis an unjustified purge of the intellectuals could provoke strong opposition within the population and make Mao look like Stalin; therefore the Hundread Flowers can be seen as a campaign aimed to justify the coming purge. He needed full obedience of “useful” intellectuals to fulfill his economic plans and the space “Superpower Programme”, therefore the atmosphere of terror installed after the Anti-Rightist campaign was fulfilling this aim. This view is more consistent with Mao’s previous treatment of intellectuals, however it doesn’t explain the fact that in 1956 many intellectuals were treated better, given apartments and better salaries, therefore terror doesn’t seem to be initial policy line.

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