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II. Mercenary activities in Africa



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34. The Special Rapporteur has been following the situation surrounding an alleged coup d’état attempt in Equatorial Guinea. According to reports reaching her, on 6 March 2004, 19 men - 8 South Africans, 6 Armenians, 1 German citizen and 5 suspects from Equatorial Guinea - were arrested in Malabo. The German reportedly died in custody some days later. The men were charged with spearheading an attempt to overthrow the Government of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema, which was allegedly to be supported a day later by additional mercenaries who were allegedly to arrive by plane, travelling through Zimbabwe. Prosecutors in Malabo reportedly accused the country’s “opposition leader”, Severo Moto, of offering the men a large sum of money, together with oil rights, to overthrow the Government.

35. The defendants went on trial in Malabo on 23 August and the case was adjourned on 31 August at the request of the country’s attorney general, reportedly to gather further information from abroad. The trial was postponed in mid-October after the death of a defence lawyer and resumed on 16 November. Upon its resumption, eight new men were reportedly added to the accused, including a British citizen charged in South Africa, mentioned below, as well as members of the “government in exile”.

36. It is reported that the trial ended on 26 November with the following judgements: the acquittal of three Equatorial Guinean and three South African defendants; the conviction and sentencing to 34 years in prison of the alleged leader, Nick du Toit; a sentence of 17 years in prison for the South African co-defendants; a sentence of 24 years for one Armenian co‑defendant; 14-year sentences for six other Armenians; a 16-month sentence for one Equatorial Guinean and a sentence of one day for another Equatorial Guinean. Mr. Moto was sentenced to 63 years’ imprisonment, while the members of his “government” were each given prison terms of 52 years.

37. Amnesty International, in a press release issued on 30 November recounting observations made by its delegation, which had attended the trial since 23 August 2004, expressed the following concerns:

(a) The defendants were arrested without a warrant and were not promptly informed of the charges against them in a language that they understood, as prescribed by law;

(b) They did not have access to their defence lawyers until two days before the start of the trial. In addition, the defence did not have sufficient time to prepare the defence and were not shown the prosecution’s evidence against their clients;

(c) All the accused stated in court that their statements were taken not by the investigating judge (juez de instruccion), as prescribed by Equatorial Guinean law, but by the Attorney General, who was prosecuting the case in court and who, under the law, has no legal role in the interrogation stage of the proceedings;

(d) The defendants were required to sign statements in Spanish without the assistance of qualified interpreters. The initial statements of the South Africans were translated by one of the Equatorial Guinean co-defendants who, according to his own statement in court, also provided evidence against them. In court, interpretation for the South African defendants was performed by the Attorney General’s official interpreter, which begs the question of his independence and impartiality. Amnesty International’s delegates observed that vital pieces of information, such as defendants’ statements about torture, were not translated, while others were distorted;

(e) One South African, of Angolan origin, spoke only Portuguese. The court was not aware of this crucial fact and there was no official interpreter for him. This raises serious concern regarding the circumstances in which he signed his statement.

38. The Special Rapporteur is seeking a transcript of the trial and will be undertaking further investigation.

39. On 7 March 2004, 67 suspected mercenaries, along with three flight-crew members, all holders of South African passports, were arrested on board a plane that landed at Harare International Airport in Zimbabwe and charged with violating the Public Order and Security Act, the Firearms Act and the Immigration Act. The Government of Zimbabwe alleges that the mercenaries were on their way to overthrow the Government of Equatorial Guinea, charges denied by the group, which maintained that it was headed for the Democratic Republic of the Congo to guard diamond mines.

40. Following a trial in Zimbabwe, on 27 August 66 of the men pleaded guilty to violating the Immigration Act, but were absolved of attempting to procure arms for the alleged coup in Equatorial Guinea. The two pilots received 16-month sentences while the other 65 men were served with sentences of one year each. The group leader, a British citizen, pleaded guilty to the charges and was subsequently sentenced to seven years in early September for breaching the Public Order and Security Act.

41. The Deputy Prime Minister of Equatorial Guinea reportedly announced that international arrest warrants had been requested for anyone connected with the coup attempt. A British citizen was arrested on 25 August in South Africa on charges of financing the attempted coup and violating South Africa’s Regulation of Foreign Military Assistance Act.

42. The Special Rapporteur notes that Equatorial Guinea, South Africa and Zimbabwe have neither signed nor ratified the International Convention. She urges the respective Governments to give serious consideration to becoming parties to the Convention. The Special Rapporteur also notes that Zimbabwe and Equatorial Guinea are parties to the Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and commends the actions undertaken thus far by those Governments in line with the Convention.

43. The Special Rapporteur further advocates that related legal proceedings be pursued and sentences pronounced in keeping with international legal and human rights standards. She recalls that she had hoped to attend the trial of the alleged mercenaries in Equatorial Guinea, as well as the trial of the British citizen in South Africa.

44. The Special Rapporteur has followed with interest events in West Africa. She notes the steps being taken with respect to regional initiatives for the repatriation of former combatants. In early October 2004, the Governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone signed a memorandum of understanding in Monrovia to finalize arrangements for the repatriation of the first group of Liberian fighters in Sierra Leone. Reports indicate that within this framework Sierra Leone will start the repatriation in January 2005 of 435 former Liberian government fighters who fled across the border to seek refuge during the latter stages of Liberia’s civil war, while Liberia would send back to Sierra Leone 231 Sierra Leoneans who fought with armed factions in the Liberian conflict and who had recently registered for disarmament. Agreement was also reached between the two government delegations to grant total amnesty to the former fighters. The ex‑combatants had reportedly already benefited from vocational training and other elements of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation programmes.

45. The Special Rapporteur believes that in post-conflict situations repatriation initiatives and related training efforts such as these would serve to reduce the pool of foreign ex‑combatants from which mercenaries are often recruited for armed conflicts in neighbouring countries. However, she also cautions against the extensive use of amnesties, which may have the effect of seeming to grant impunity for mercenary acts and may therefore undermine the objective of decrying mercenarism as an unacceptable alternative vocation.

III. THE IMPACT OF THE ACTIVITIES OF PRIVATE COMPANIES
OFFERING MILITARY ASSISTANCE, CONSULTANCY AND
SECURITY SERVICES ON THE INTERNATIONAL MARKET

46. Over the last decade, the proliferation of international private military companies operating in over 50 countries around the world has outstripped the effectiveness of the existing legal framework and enforcement mechanisms. This situation poses a problem on several levels. The nature and degree of accountability of these organizations and their employees is uncertain, paving the way for impunity for a range of acts which would otherwise be criminal. Also, the
legal status of private actors offering military services internationally is unclear, thus rendering the actor vulnerable to national legislation, often deficient where it exists, and thereby to improvised procedures in the case of perceived breaches. The uncertainty derives from the current inability of international law to accommodate actors whose attributes include international scope and private motive, and whose role may include either individual or corporate involvement in military operations.

47. Critically in question as well is the degree to which States are willing to cede, or are even fully conscious of ceding military force, a traditional privilege and right of the State, to private actors, whose motive is by definition profit as opposed to national interest or the protection of nationals.

48. As noted in this report, the Special Rapporteur will be reviewing elements of the International Convention with a view to capturing a contemporary picture of the phenomenon of mercenarism. This will take into consideration the responses of Member States during consultations, the results of the expert meetings on mercenaries, consultations with other relevant actors and the outcomes of the Special Rapporteur’s own research.

49. During the period covered by the present document, reports reached the Special Rapporteur of the killing and mutilation of four United States private security contractors in Falluja, Iraq, at the end of March 2004. The acts were allegedly instigated by an angry mob. The Special Rapporteur has received no reports of legal action taken and the Government of the United States reportedly responded with a heightened military operation in the area.

50. The attention of the Special Rapporteur was also drawn to alleged incidents in April 2004 in Iraq of torture and sexual abuse of Iraqi prisoners by United States soldiers in the United States-run Abu Gharib prison outside Baghdad. The soldiers reportedly claimed that they were acting in part under the instruction of private military company interrogators hired by the Pentagon. It was further alleged that during this period one employee of a private company was accused of raping a male prisoner, but had not been charged since the jurisdiction of military law could not be established.

51. While United States soldiers are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, a system of regulations and mechanisms for enforcement, contractors fall outside its jurisdiction. The 2000 Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act extends federal United States law to persons “employed by or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States”, but applies only to contractors hired by the Department of Defense. Iraqi law also apparently does not apply under these conditions since in June 2003 the declaration known as Order 17 granted immunity from local prosecution to civilian contractors working in the country. This was subsequently revised, and in June 2004 was extended until a transitional Iraqi Government is elected in January 2005.[1]


52. The Special Rapporteur also received reports of three United States citizens involved in a private security business being sentenced to up to 10 years in jail after being found guilty by an Afghan court in September 2004 on charges including torture, running a private prison and illegal detention. Jonathan Idema, a former United States Green Beret, was arrested in July along with another ex-serviceman, Brent Bennett, and documentary filmmaker Edward Caraballo. Mr. Idema is reportedly a former United States Army Special Forces operative who subsequently ran a military equipment firm in the United States. Other reports suggest that the large rewards offered for the capture of Al-Qaida members in Afghanistan have contributed to the expansion of private security activity in the country.


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