Main Strategic Principles of China in Central Asia

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF

THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

SULEYMAN DEMIREL UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES

Altynbekova Shynar

THESIS WORK

Specialty 5B020200 – «International Relations»

Kaskelen 2015

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KAZAKHSTAN

SULEYMAN DEMIREL UNIVERSITY

FACULTY OF ECONOMICS AND ADMINISTRATIVE SCIENCES

«Approved»

Head __________________
Department

_______________________
_______________________

THESIS WORK

Theme: «In the fist of heavenly Empire: Why China’s Investments poses a big threat to Kazakhstan»

Specialty 5B020200 – «International Relations»

Submitted by: Altynbekova A.

Scientific supervisor: Dr., prof. Zhanabel Zh.

Monitoring of
Implementation __________

Kaskelen 2014

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

1 SHAPING OF CHINESE STRATEGIC IMPERATIVES TOWARDS CENTRAL ASIA (1949-2013)…………………………………………...

2 CHINESE ECONOMIC PRESENCE IN KAZAKHSTAN

2.1 Brief Review of bilateral trade…………………………………………..

2.2 Under the drive of heavy Chinese Investments………………………….

3 THREATS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF SINO-KAZAKH COOPERATION

3.1 Kazakhstan’s response to Chinese advance: SCO and ECU compared…………………….

3.2 New level of cooperation between RK and PRC………………………

CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………...

REFERENCES………………………………………………………….....

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 five new independent states emerged on the territory of Central Asia, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Five of them had been a part of one state and its dissolution was as surprising for them as for the whole world. Russia’s territory size quickly decreased many times and former superpower bogged down in economic problems. Meantime the emergence of new states in Central Asia captured the attention of the rising power on their eastern borders. China having freed from the burden of having big neighbor started establishing diplomatic contacts with its western neighbors. The vacuum resulted in a collapse of the Soviet Union in Central Asia created some threats for China as well as a lot of opportunities. Weak countries of the region were not able to defend themselves against rising threats such as spread of terrorism and religious extremism which also posed risk to the security of China. However the relative weakness of Central Asian states on the other hand was a positive factor for Beijing. The pressure exerted by the Soviet Union disappeared. The vast market for Chinese products emerged in the region. After detailed analysis of the situation People’s Republic decided that its role was to fill the vacuum. With the help of the work of research institutes Chinese government started developing its approach towards Central Asia which later turned into complex strategy. The most preferred cooperation for China was with Kazakhstan, as it was the biggest and richest country of the region with open economy and stability.

More than twenty years passed from then. In two decades it grew up and became the second largest economy in the world after the United States and the third military power after USA and Russian Federation. PRC is without any doubts a regional power and is continuing gaining strength. Nowadays China is actively engaged in Kazakhstan and is increasing its influence.China is one of the biggest economic partners of Kazakhstan and the biggest investor. Chinese companies’ presence in energy sector of Kazakhstan tangible. PRC helps to build infrastructure and renew old roads. Confucius institutes are teaching Chinese language to local young people and promote Chinese culture. All of these are the ways to ensure China’s national security, access to vital energy resources and build a corridor connecting China with Europe. Chinese interests in Kazakhstan are rising and its strategy becomes more active with every year.

Therefore a reasonable question arises about the real intentions of China in Kazakhstan. Despite Beijing’s assurances of China’s peaceful environment strategy, policy of non-intervention in internal affairs and respecting sovereignty of its neighboring countries strengthening of PRC raises concerns of those in rule of relatively weak Central Asian states, especially Kazakhstan. Can Chinese soft-power one day turn into offensive and aggressive power? Nowadays no one can say it for sure. History proves Central Asia has always been in the sphere of strategic interests of China. No doubt, in the era of globalization and institutionalization the situation should be interpreted much differently. But we should not rule out the possibility that such scenario may take place especially considering the hard fact that Russia is gradually losing its influence in the region to China and the United States is slightly decreasing its presence in Central Asia after the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

The relevance of this thesis work is therefore in its newness and originality. In last twenty years not so many scientists analyzed the scale of Chinese presence in the Kazakhstan. In contrast there are dozens of research centers in China which study Central Asia. The Chinese factor is a relatively new topic and started gaining interest in academic sphere only recently. This factor has increased rapidly and still without clear analysis it is very difficult to understand how China is successful in penetrating the region. In author’s opinion, this is due to the fact that culturally it is Russia and the West who dominate in Central Asia. But China is actively involved in those areas where it needs to be involved, particularly trade, energy sector and infrastructure. In cultural dimension China has just started gaining momentum. Confucius institutes as the engines of Chinese cultural influence attract more students and higher education in China becomes more appealing to locals due to its quality and availability. While China as well as other geopolitical actors has a lot of leverages to use when dealing with Kazakhstan in turn have to rely on skillful diplomacy so not to become mere parts of games between great powers. In order to fully understand what are the plans of China for Kazakhstan rigorous research needs to be conducted.

In general, Chines factor in Central Asia it was thoroughly analyzed by several experts. One of them is Ablat Khojaev from Uzbekistan. He wrote a book on Chinese factor in Central Asia basing on sources of Chinese analysts which beyond question added value to his work. Another scholar is Zhao Huasheng from China. His contribution is mainly presented by the book he wrote together with another two experts called “Central Asia: Views from Washington, Moscow and Beijing”, and many other articles. It also was analyzed by considerable number of specialists from Kazakhstan. Their views are primarily expressed in articles of different journals like “Central Asia and The Caucasus”.. Among the western experts in-depth research was made by two co-authors Rafaello Pantucci and Alexandros Petersen who write a number of articles on China’s strategy in Central Asia in modern era. Some findings and opinions of respective experts and many other authors are cited in this thesis work.

The main purposes of this thesis work is to describe the interests of China in the region, to analyze the economic presence of China in Kazakhstan, to examine Chinese investments, which can be considered as the main tool of expansion, and to try to show the future perspectives of Sino*Kazakh cooperation. To achieve this aims the following objectives needs to be fulfilled:

- To analyze the shaping of Chinese strategy in Central Asia over time starting from the emergence of People’s Republic of China in 1949;

- To analyze the bileteral trade between two states;

- To analyze the Chinese investments on implementation of Chinese strategy in energy sector of Kazakhstan;

- To compare SCO to ECU, to explain their influences and roles.

During the research the methods of theoretical and practical analysis and ascent from the abstract to the specific has been used by the author.

Practical significance of the thesis work lies in the fact that its findings and recommendations may be used by other specialists in their researches as a literature and in general can help to understand reading audience the current situation in Kazakhstan.

The thesis work describes the shaping of Chinese economic presence and advance in Kazakhstan starting from 1991 till today. Exception is the first chapter where a brief analysis of history takes place starting from the emergence of People’s Republic in 1949.

In the thesis work the following structure has been used: introduction, three chapters, conclusion and list of references. The main body is divided into three parts. The first chapter explains the history of the problem, in our case how the strategy of China towards Central Asia was formed in a process of time from 1949 till today.

The second chapter describes the bilateral Trade and Chinese FDI’s. The first paragraph analyses both import and export dimensions between Kazakhstan and China, gives information about the value of trade since 1995, including detailed groups of goods. The second paragraph addresses the investment policy of China, and the cooperation on energy sector, the main sector of Chinese interests.

The third Chapter describes the competition of danger of Chinese rising role of our economy and its opportunities for the future development. The firat pargraf compares SCO and ECU, analyses it aims and possible implications on Economy of Kazakhstan. While the second paragraph describes the new level of cooperation between China and Kazakhstan, allocation of recent 14 bln $ investment is explained.

The literature used in the research is extensive and includes scientific articles of analysts from Central Asian states, mainly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, analysts from Caucasus and Turkey, Russian and western as well as Chinese analysts. The emphasis has been put on the diversity of sources. Analyzing thoughts of scholars from different nations including those discussed in this thesis work ensures greater objectivity.

Main Strategic Principles of China in Central Asia

China established close contact with Central Asia through the Silk Road as early as 2,000 years ago. However, this direct contact was suspended after the middle of the nineteenth century, because most of Central Asia became a component part of the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union, the collapse of which enabled Central Asia to open its doors to the outside world again. [ ]

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 on the territory on Central Asia five newly independent states emerged, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Disintegration of one of the super powers completely changed the world order and puzzled the whole international community. Another rising power on the east, China was faced with difficult question of how to deal with new states on its western borders. This prompted China to reconsider some aspects of its foreign policy. Since then the Heavenly Empire started developing its approach towards Central Asian Region.

Since the emergence of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 with the change of international environment foreign policy of China towards its neighboring countries also changed several times. The emergence of the zhoubian concept, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and famous “wait-and-see strategy” proposed by Chinese reformist leader Deng Xiaoping may be called as cornerstones of China’s relations with its neighbors.

One of the Chinese scholars Zhang Chi wrote about the meaning of zhoubian concept and its implication in the sphere of international relations. The Chinese concept zhoubian “refers to a mathematical term for the sum of the length of the edge of a polygon or means “around the edges” [1, p.11]. However, in the foreign affairs and security fields, zhoubianhas a special meaning. The concept is geopolitical and refers mainly to countries in the vicinity of China. The countries considered to belong to China’s neighborhood have changed since the term was first mentioned in documents concerning China’s diplomacy and security strategy in the late 1980s. In the summer of 1987, the term ‘neighborhood environment’ appeared for the first time in China’s main newspaper, the People’s Daily. In October of that year, at the 13th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, it was reported that China’s structures of opening up had already been founded, and that this new opening up had caused the government concern. The first time the concept appeared in the Report on the Work of the Governmentwas in March 1988. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union zhoubian included South Asian countries, ASEAN countries, Mongolia and the Korean Peninsula. With the gradual deepening of China’s opening up policy, the scope of the neighborhood has expanded. Since the early 1990s, China’s use of the concept started to include Japan, the independent states of Central Asia, and Russia [1]. The increasing number of countries involved may be explained by the rising economic power of China and its expanding reach. Along with neighborhood concept the term ‘neighborhood security environment’ started appearing in the reports of the leaders of the Communist Party of China [1]. The emergence of the zhoubian concept can be related to the need by the Chinese leaders to deal with the neighboring countries as China started opening to the world. Moreover the concept aimed at promoting the peaceful intentions of Chinese government as China’s leaders in their speeches were referring to this term precisely in a positive manner. In his speech delivered to the Central Military Commission in 1993 the General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Jiang Zemin noted: “Our neighborhood security environment is getting better and better. It is the best period of our good-neighborly and friendly relations with neighboring countries since the founding of the People’s Republic of China” [1, p.13].

This friendly approach of China towards its neighbors was developed in early 1950s when the Prime Minister Zhou Enlai at his meeting with the delegation from India in 1953 proposed the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence [1]. Zhang Chi writes that “Under the guidance of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, China established diplomatic relations with 36 countries during the first decade after the PRC’s foundation in 1949, including twelve neighborhood countries. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence marks a crucial change in the transition from the previous Revolutionary Diplomacy to National Diplomacy [1, p.22]. From that time Chinese leaders avoided the idea of the world revolution and decided to concentrate on the improvement of diplomatic relations with their neighbors. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence referred to “mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence” [1, p.21]. Thereafter the Chinese leaders stated their determination in establishing good-neighborly relations with all neighbors on the basis of these principles.

The last but not the least point that put an end to the formation of Chinese foreign policy was wait-and-see strategy announced by reformist leader Deng Xiaoping. In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the international situation was undergoing profound changes, including drastic changes in Eastern Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. Domestic political disturbances occurred in China, and reform and development suffered some temporary difficulties. Internationally, the United States did not need China’s help on the Soviet Union issue any longer. Disagreements appeared on both sides on, for instance, the issues of human rights, most favored nation treatment, and the proliferation of weapons. In the second half of 1989, faced with the enormous changes in the domestic and international situation, Deng Xiaoping summed up the policy in a famous slogan: “observe and analyze developments calmly, deal with changes patiently and confidently, secure our own position, conceal our capabilities and avoid the limelight, be good at keeping a low profile, never become a leader and accomplish things where possible” [1, p. 30]. This phrase once again underlined the position of China towards the world and its priorities of being more concentrated in China’s internal economic development. The official position of China was not to seek hegemony and the absence of any aspiration to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

The emergence of new independent states on the territory of the former Soviet Union brought new challenges for the Chinese leaders as well as new opportunities. Earlier China had only one big neighbor on its western borders – now it had to establish good relations with several countries [2]. New realities required from China to adjust its foreign policy principles and develop a new approach towards countries of the region. According to Xing Guangcheng, in doing this PRC had to take into consideration several positive and negative factors.

Positive ones were:

- Change of the political and economic relations between China and Russia;

- The emergence of a buffer zone consisting of several formerly Soviet countries between Russia and China;

- The disappearance of military pressure on China that emerged during czars rule and continued under Soviet power;

- The appearance of a vast market for Chinese products and the possibility of using the natural resources of Central Asia’s independent states;

- The Central Asian region’s openness to China and the rest of the world after the collapse of the Soviet Union;

- The possibility of building another “railway bridge” between China and Europe to free PRC of its dependence on transit ways across Russia;

- The transformation of the region into a corridor connecting China to Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East both economically and politically;

- Significant reduction of the border length between China and Russia;

- The region became divided into small, disunited, and therefore non-threatening states: Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan;

- The emergence of good conditions for investing in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) [3].

There were negative factors as well:

- The Central Asian countries were populated by nationalities, whose diasporas were represented in China;

- After they obtained sovereignty, Central Asian states developed national self-awareness which could strongly affect the sentiments of those who live in XUAR and other western regions of China;

- The Chinese leaders had to ensure the population of XUAR and other ethnic regions were isolated from brother Central Asian nations to prevent the spread of separatist ideas;

- This forced China to negotiate with the Central Asian republics to achieve stability in China’s western regions, as well as to ensure timely interception of separatist activities of ethnic groups;

- The emergence in Central Asia of the threat of spread of Islamic fundamentalism and pan-Turkism that forced China to provide support for region’s countries to prevent the strengthening of these movements;

- Contacts between the Central Asian states and Taiwan should be prevented;

- The Central Asian nations that emerged as independent political forces might unite into a new alliance of Turkic peoples (history showed such kind of moments), which China should try really hard to avoid;

- Central Asia had the possibility of producing nuclear weapons; if an alliance of Turkic-speaking states becomes a reality, or if religious fundamentalists come to power, China will find itself face to face with a serious threat. To avoid this, China must accept Russia’s control in the region;

- Beijing had to protect XUAR more zealously than ever against the ideas of separatism, fundamentalism, and pan-Turkism by strengthening Chinese western borders and encouraging all neighbors to cooperate on solving the issue;

- Central Asia became a region where the major powers were competing for their geostrategic and geopolitical interests; at that moment, China was not ready to join the rivalry [3];

Considering these factors and their possible consequences Chinese government decided to take following necessary steps:

- In order to keep away Central Asia from the direct influence of new geopolitical actors, particularly of USA China should join forces with Russia. However China also doesn’t want Central Asia to become Russian backyard. Therefore it should develop friendly relations with new states and provide them with support in their becoming. Cooperation on security issues should be established;

- China should oblige Central Asian states to support Chinese position on Taiwan issue;

- To call on Central Asian states to support China’s fight against separatism. They should together promote peace on international arena;

- In order for fears about pan-Turkism and spread of Islamic fundamentalism not to become a reality China should cooperate with Russia;

- To develop economic cooperation, create better conditions for transportation of goods and improve roads condition [2];

It is necessary to note that culturally, China’s position in Central Asia was much less advantageous than that of its Eurasian neighbors: its geopolitical rivals could rely on ethnic affinity, shared religions, common lifestyle and mentality shaped by the long history of living in one state, and cultural affinity created by history and integration prospects. China had none of the above in any of the three regions. Its ethnic and religious affiliations and lifestyle and mentality placed it apart from the titular nations of Central Eurasia [30].

Having established diplomatic relations with the Central Asian governments, Beijing mobilized a large group of Chinese scholars to complete a comprehensive study of the region, established research centers in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Lanzhou, Urumqi and funded extended research travel for scholars to the Central Asian Republics. Soon Chinese researches released a large number of works on the region, focusing on the idea that the economic development of Central Asia was sluggish with insufficient security guarantees and on the weakness of relations between the Central Asian states. Chinese scholars also identified other negative influences, such as uneven economic development, lack of feelings of unity, ethnic heterogeneity, the availability of highly developed and independent nationalist ideas in each state, and the risk of Islamic extremism [4].

The perspectives of Chinese scholars allow one to conclude that Beijing wishes to see the region free from the influence of other major powers and aims to strengthen its own presence. Excluding the possibility of unexpected negative changes in China, this raises at least three issues. How will China act when it becomes the region’s primary superpower, specifically, will it impose its own rules on everyone? Will the PRC maintain the same attitude towards Central Asia if Russia cannot counterbalance it and if the region ceases to be seen as Moscow’s backyard? What will happen in the future if more ambitious and nationalist individuals rise to leadership positions in China? These issues are quite complex and unpredictable. Currently, no one can answer the question of whether it is possible to permanently reduce the decisive role of personality in the Chinese government, where a tradition exists of absolute authority of the supreme ruler. It is also difficult to answer the question of whether China could continue to grow without any political or economic crises, as one can observe several problematic symptoms (e.g. limited domestic energy resources, growing dependence on foreign capital, increasing complexity of employment problems and food resources that have resulted from ongoing population growth, environmental deterioration due to permanent expansion of industry and use of various unnatural fertilizers in agricultural production, uneven economic growth in the regions, a heterogeneous population, and existence of separatist movements in some regions) [4].

Understanding Central Asian fears about the unpredictable consequences of strengthening China’s position in the region, some Chinese scholars believe that building confidence and creating a solid background for cooperation is a priority for the development of Sino-Central Asian cooperation. China therefore must focus on the following tasks: persuading Central Asian countries that it will always treat them as equals despite differences in power; raising Central Asia’s interest in the modernization, development, and enhancement of the Silk Road’s international significance; obliging Central Asian states to support the position of China on the Taiwan issue; and enticing them to fight against separatism [4].

Paramonov, Strokov and Stolpovskiy in their joint article divided the shaping of Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asian region into three stages.

The first stage begins in 1992 and lasts till 1995. In that period of time China was still practicing wait-and-see strategy proposed by Deng Xiaoping. It was still weak economically and politically and calmly continued gaining strength. Russia was still dominant geopolitical actor in Central Asia and China was reluctant to challenge it. Instead PRC decided to establish diplomatic relations with new neighbors, discuss security issues involving Russia and gain support in its fight against separatism. Border issues were discussed on the bilateral level. Annual trade turnover between China and Central Asian region was insignificant, about $350-512 million [5, p.68]. Summing up the PRC’s policy, with no clear idea about its interests in Central Asia, the results of China’s efforts to establish relations with the local states in the early 1990s proved contradictory. On the one hand, Beijing was moving ahead; it laid the foundation for these relations, which had to be started from scratch. On the other hand, in the first half of the decade China demonstrated a lot of caution; it did not show an interest in institutional and economic cooperation with the newly independent states. The far from simple international context in which China found itself at the time forced it to maintain good relations with Russia, which slowed down its progress in the Central Asian direction [5].

1996 – 2001 marked the second stage in the Central Asian policy of China. With the globalization, increasing influence of the United States on the international arena and emergence of new challenges PRC decided to lead more active policy and take a course to become the global power which can influence international system and does not just merely responds to changes in it. China needed international alliances and institutions in which it could preserve the leading role. This period can be marked as a turning point when Beijing avoided its wait-and-see strategy. In the Central Asian region China also increased its activities. The worsening situation in Afghanistan made Chinese government worry about country’s unstable XUAR. The risks of spread of terrorist movements, drug-trafficking and religious fundamentalism were increasing. This led in 1996 to the creation of Shanghai five which included China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and was supposed to take a lead in the fight against three evils: separatism, terrorism and religious extremism. After Uzbekistan joined it in 2001 the structure was transformed into Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Discovery of oil reserves in the Caspian region attracted Beijing’s attention as it needed energy resources for its growing economy. The economic relations improved significantly as China started flooding Central Asian markets with cheap goods. Annual trade turnover reached $580-1050 million [5, p.72]. “In its trade with Central Asian countries, China moved rapidly toward the formula “raw materials in exchange for finished products” [5, p.72]. This formula generally satisfied both parties. Central Asian states did not have enough production capabilities and needed to support developing economy as well as to meet the needs of the population. From that time “Beijing no longer accepted Russia’s right to domination in Central Asia and treated it as an equal partner” [5, p.74].

The third stage of Chinese foreign policy towards Central Asia started in 2001 and according to authors mentioned above continues nowadays. After 9/11 terrorist attack in United States and consequent deployment of American troops in Afghanistan to fight world terror USA increased its presence in almost every part of the world and Central Asian region was not an exception. Emergence of United States in a dangerous proximity to China could not leave Beijing unconcerned. In response Chinese leaders came up with even more vigorous strategies by increasing cooperation within SCO and on bilateral level. Several countries were accepted to Shanghai Cooperation Organization as observers such as Mongolia, India, Pakistan and Iran. Later Afghanistan joined them. In 2004, The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure was established with its headquarters in Tashkent [5, p.75]. The economic rise of China allowed its leaders to invest into projects in Central Asia, lend money and sign big contracts in oil and gas industries of Central Asian countries. By 2008 the annual trade turnover between China and Central Asia reached about $20.2 billion [5, p.75]. Oil-and-gas rich Central Asia was found by PRC as a perfect source to meet the needs of Chinese growing economy. Being heavily dependent on energy supplies from Africa, Middle East and Asia-Pacific using seaways, considering rising prices for oil, China started thinking about diversifying its energy imports by building continental pipelines in Central Asia [6]. And it is increasing its influence in the region.

Despite China’s foreign policy became more persistent in the region one of the Chinese authors Zhao Huasheng claims that nevertheless Central Asia is not of the first importance for Beijing. China looks mainly eastward and southward. That is where main Chinese political and economic partners are located. These regions provide China access to ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, United States of America and Europe, and what is more important to the main PRC’s headache Taiwan. In comparison with trade turnover of China and United States the trade between PRC and Central Asia seems largely insignificant. Even so, China continues to conduct active policy in Central Asia. This happens due to three simple reasons: security, energy and trade. Central Asian region plays a role of a rear for China. In case Beijing has a problem with Taiwan it must be sure its western borders are secure so China does not have to act on two or more fronts. The instability of XUAR is the main security concern of PRC on its western borders. Therefore China needs to assure that Central Asian states support its fight against separatism and terrorism. The geographical proximity of Afghanistan also makes China to pay more attention to this region. Energy is the second factor and it is probably much more important and even vital for China. The energy potential of Central Asia proved to be as impressive as of Middle Eastern exporters. Trade between PRC and Central Asian countries which at first glance seems small still plays an important role, especially for the development of western parts of China [6].

As Zhao Huasheng states in his article, in 2003, China formed new concept of foreign policy which put the creation of friendly, peaceful and prosperous environment on the first place [6, p.161]. This was mainly dictated by the rapid growth of Chinese economy and its rising power and consequent fears by China’s neighbors of its expansion. In such conditions it was necessary for PRC to create a new policy concept. The key element of the new concept is Chinese willingness to develop relations with neighboring countries by not only preserving own goals and interests but also considering goals and interests of neighbors [6].

The friendly environment prioritizes the development of friendly relations with all neighboring countries. The peaceful environment shows the intention of PRC to achieve the condition where all its neighbors, especially small and weak, feel safe and secure, in other words were not afraid of China. The prosperous environment stands for economic policy and requires from Beijing to provide more support for China’s neighbors and let them to receive more benefits from China’s growth [6].

According to Zhao Huasheng, China pursues several main aims in Central Asia:

- Border Security. Even if border issues were solved a long time ago, China needs to be sure nothing poses a threat to its western regions;

- Fight against terrorism, separatism and extremism. This is also related to western part of China where “East Turkestan” movement is seeking to separate Xinjiang from China. The goal of PRC is to prevent Central Asian states from providing support for separatists;

- To guarantee the stability of Central Asia as the strategic rear of China. Beijing should prevent the emergence of any real or potential strategic threat, ensure that Central Asia does not fall under control of any state or a group of states hostile to China, prevent militarization and military rivalry by outside powers in the region and emergence of any political and military groups directed against China;

- To guarantee availability of energy resources to China. Energy is one of the main interests of not only China but also of other geopolitical actors. Beijing should prevent the monopolization of vast energy resources by one of these actors. However China itself is not seeking a control over resources rather it stands for the development of energy sector of Central Asia based on fair competition and cooperation with other countries;

- To develop friendly relations with Central Asian states. All issues should be solved in a peaceful way. China in its relations with Central Asian countries should show the spirit of friendliness and fairness. It also should concentrate on interests acceptable for the states of this region;

- To maintain regional stability. It is necessary condition for the development of normal and predictable economic and political relations with Central Asia [6];

As the classification made by Paramonov, Strokov and Stolpovskiy was published in 2010 it didn’t take into account the new realities of post-2010 which, probably, may mark a new stage in PRC’s foreign policy. There are two main points indicating it. Firstly, the new fifth generation of Chinese leaders with Xi Jinping came to power. Secondly, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014 poses very reasonable question of what is going to happen next. As growing number of American analysts continue to emphasize that Central Asia is not a priority for United States, Washington is significantly decreasing its presence in the region. Who is going to bear the burden of responsibility for security in Central Asia? Russia with its historical and cultural influence and new global economic power China seem to be the most obvious candidates. In this new stage we should expect much more active and offensive foreign policy of Beijing towards Central Asian states. Xi Jinping’s super productive tour in the region last year shows China’s determination to strengthen its positions in Central Asia.

Nowadays Chinese concerns and interests in Central Asia stay as following:

- Withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan in 2014;

- Cooperation in the sphere of security and struggle against three evils;

- Trade facilitation, development of the western regions of China and promotion of New Silk Road connecting East and West;

- Ensuring stable energy supplies.

Withdrawal of ISAF troops from Afghanistan in 2014. The question bothering minds of all scholars and policymakers is what is going to happen after United States leave Central Asia. Will Afghan government be able to maintain stability in the country? Should we expect the spread of religious extremism, drug trafficking and terrorism? All of fears hypothetically may turn into reality. The main question is how Central Asian leaders are planning to secure the peace in the region in order not to let the worst fears become true. As we have already mentioned much of the responsibility falls on the regional leaders Russia and China. Both of them are strongly interested in obtaining stability in the region. Russia is maintaining close economic ties with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the framework of Eurasian Union. After the Ukrainian crisis and consequent cooling of relations with the west Central Asian countries seem to be those of the few who didn’t turn away from Russia. Moreover Central Asia has been for a long time a corridor for drug trafficking from Afghanistan to Russia. The possibility of deterioration of this situation makes Russia think about the ways avoiding such scenario. Unlike Russia, China is located closer to Afghanistan and even shares though very short border which is called Wakhan corridor. Therefore Beijing has much more to concern about. China suffers from the terrorist attacks in its western region committed by so-called “East Turkestan” movement which wants to create their own state by separating from PRC. The possible spread of terrorism from unstable Afghanistan may lead to the worsening of situation in Xinjiang. China also should not let the extremism and terrorism cross borders and reach Central Asian countries as it will endanger Chinese positions in the region. In order to prevent this China is already providing economic help to Afghanistan. The fact of granting to Afghanistan observer status in SCO shows the determination of PRC to deal with Afghan issue.

Cooperation in the sphere of security and struggle against three evils are largely related to problem in XUAR. This is somehow also related to the first issue as unstable Afghanistan may pose a threat to China by influencing Xinjiang. Last terrorist attacks which took place in XUAR shows that the problem is far from being solved. China should continue strengthening cooperation with Central Asian countries in security issues on bilateral basis as well as multilateral.

Trade facilitation, development of the western regions of China and promotion of New Silk Road connecting East and West. China should continue improving economic relations with Central Asia which in turn helps PRC to pour money in underdeveloped western parts of the country. According to Beijing strategy the economic development of Xinjiang may reduce the intensity of separatist movements there. However, as many scholars tend to think, this issue is not going to be eradicated fully, at least in the near future. The intention by minorities living there to fight for independence is not only related to economic problems. The issue has historical roots. Many times the western part of China was separated and China itself was disintegrated. Last time this happened in the XXth century when East Turkestan Republic was proclaimed though it didn’t last so long. For PRC separation of its XUAR would have catastrophic consequences. The only fact of losing access to Central Asian countries is already a huge problem, not to say about the loss of big reserves of natural resources of Xinjiang. Therefore it seems natural that Beijing is going to take whatever measures are necessary to keep its inland territories. One of the strategies adopted by PRC is a revival of the Silk Road, a major trade route which once in a history connected East and West. According to New Silk Road concept Central Asia will become a bridge through which China will be able to reach European markets, and what is more important the road is designed to put into operation western provinces of a country.

China should ensure stable and increasing energy supplies from Central Asia. While the situation on the eastern borders of China may deteriorate due to tensions with Japan over disputed islands or with United States and Taiwan Beijing is trying to secure its position on the west. So in case energy imports through Asia-Pacific region are interrupted for some reasons, Chinese economy will not be hurt so much. Another reason is of course Chinese growing economy and energy rich countries of Central Asia are those who can help to meet PRC’s needs.

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