Critiquing the discursive definition

The principal alternatives to the discursive definition are the structural, economic, and political-institutional approaches. These approaches are common in the study of populism in the developing world, particularly Latin America, and have already been extensively critiqued by other scholars (Roberts, 1995; Weyland, 2001). The structuralist approach to populism emphasizes its social origins and associates it with certain stages of development, especially the attempt at industrialization in countries located at the periphery of the world economy.

According to this view, populist regimes are those using cross-class coalitions and popular mobilization to support state-led policies of import-substituting industrialization (ISI) (Germani, 1978; Di Tella, 1965; Di Tella, 1997; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Weffort, 1973; Ianni, 1975). The economic approach to populism identifies populism with policy outputs—specifically, shortsighted economic policies that appeal to the poor (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991). And the political approach sees populism as a phenomena rooted in the basic struggle over control of government, policy, and core values of the community. This latter approach focuses on institutional or material aspects of populism such as the degree of institutionalization of the organization embodying the populism, its low esteem for existing institutions of representative democracy, its emphasis on support from large numbers of voters, and the presence of a charismatic leader who substitutes for institutions (Weyland, 2001; Roberts, 2003).

Why use the discursive definition of populism rather than these more traditional ones? Essentially, the discursive definition is a better minimal one (Roxborough, 1984). It explicitly gets at the underlying logic of populism and analytically separates the conceptual core from its causes or consequences.

For example, the discursive core helps us understand at least two key components of structuralist approaches to populism: the presence of cross-class coalitions, and their association with late modernization in former colonies. The broad cross-class coalitions emphasized by structuralist theories are natural outgrowths of an antagonistic discourse that seeks to erase narrow sectoral or class-based identities and reaffirm a common, popular identity of the subaltern majority. This is not just a big tent under which many groups fit, but a space in which populist activists must include large numbers in order to justify their claims that they represent the popular will. Cross-class coalitions are a direct consequence of a discourse emphasizing citizens’ fundamental moral unity, not an accidental feature or (merely) a dominant strategy for winning elections. Likewise, many of the historical aspects of classic populism—its emergence in late- modernizing former colonies and its re-emergence in these same countries as they fail to adequately confront the rigors of globalization—can be seen as causes of populism rather than definitional attributes. It is something about these countries (their endemic inequalities and the lack of institutions that enshrine the rule of law) that makes them prone to recurring bouts of populism (de la Torre, 2000). Populist discourse is a powerful response to governments that repeatedly fail to generate justice and economic growth, and it emerges at critical junctures when these problems are laid bare.

The discursive core also helps us situate the macroeconomic policies highlighted by the economic approach. Shortsighted economic policies that appeal to the poor can be seen as a natural consequence of populist discourse and charismatic leadership in an environment where inequality is high, exploitation is systematic, and the bulk of the population is desperate and poorly informed. Under these conditions, the poor voters that typically make up the bulk of the population (and hence “the people”) are more likely to demand radical redistribution. The charismatic leader and his followers may have great disdain for traditional institutions, including economic ones, believing that economics must be subject to the political will of the leader and the demands of the people. But in this case what really makes economic policies seem populist are not the policy outputs and outcomes by themselves, but the stated motivation for them—the discourse that gives them meaning. Presumably, even the most fiscally responsible policies could seem populist if framed the right way, and irresponsible policies might result from mere ignorance or incompetence (Knight, 1999).

Finally, the discursive definition sees the organizational attributes highlighted by the political definition as additional consequences of populism, rather than its core. As in the case of economic policies, we have to ask not just how populists organize, but why. Attributes such as low institutionalization, the pursuit of “large numbers,” and charismatic leadership are natural consequences of the crisis environment that typically gives rise to populism, and they constitute sensible means for embodying the putative will of the people. Populists preach an egalitarian ethic that is incompatible with hierarchical, professional political organization, and they typically react to an existing set of pluralist institutions; thus, populists must organize as a movement in order to be true to their message. Yet once again it is the motivation for organizing this way that matters most. Other political organizations also have charismatic leaders or low levels of institutionalization (e.g., because of a millenarian ideology or because they are closely tied to outside organizations such as churches or labor unions), but because they lack the right message they would normally not be considered populist.

Nevertheless, a discursive approach to populism is problematic for many social scientists in the positivist tradition. First, there are epistemological concerns. Can populism or other aspects of political culture really be measured in a way that is valid, reliable, and efficient, with results that can be easily replicated and verified by other scholars (Barry, 1978; Little, 1991, Chap. 4; Lichbach & Zuckerman, 1997)? In other words, can a discursive concept be subjected to the rules of “valid scientific inferences” (King, Keohane, & Verba, 1994, p. 38)? Second, there are ontological concerns. Is populism really populism if it is spoken but never followed? Doesn’t it require action in order to be important or real—some manifestation in a movement, party, or candidate that pursues power and seeks to implement policies? Finally, there is the question of real-world importance. Even if we accept discourse as the defining attribute of populism, does it matter for politics? Do different discourses actually have consequences for policy outputs and elections, i.e., for the material and moral well-being of the community?

Regarding the first epistemological issue, one of the purposes of the rest of this paper is to demonstrate that populist discourse can be measured in a way that satisfies scientific criteria. I think that readers will find this demonstration a compelling one. The answer to the second question is a little more evasive. In offering discourse as the defining attribute of populism, I am not claiming that manifestations of populism can exist without some material component. A discourse is meaningless unless believed and shared by actual human beings. However, the important point made by the scholars who use the discursive definition is that actions alone— raising the minimum wage, calling for a constitutional convention, repressing the opposition— are insufficient conditions for populism. In contrast, a consistent discourse is a necessary condition for anything to be considered populist. Actions are “populist” because of the meaning that is ascribed to them by their participants, not because of any objective quality that inheres in them.

The third question—whether a populist discourse in the end really matters for actual politics, or whether all politicians and voters respond to similar sets of preferences rooted in, say, material self-interest—is of course one of the grand theoretical questions that we struggle with as political scientists. The short answer I provide here is that this is partly an empirical problem. If we can measure populist discourse and calculate its correlation with aspects of politics and economics that interest us, then we have showed that it matters. The question then becomes the more theoretically enriching one of how or why it matters, and especially how the norm-based dimensions of populism fit into the more familiar assumptions of material self-interest that are common to rational-choice theory. I insist, however, that we can pursue these questions without abandoning positivist epistemology. Although we are exploring a discursive concept, we can maintain standards of reliability and validity in measurement and engage in a search for general causal understandings.

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