This conversation occurred between the first officer and the captain of the Air Florida Boeing 737 (Flight 90) that crashed into the Potomac River in January 1982. The crash was caused by

A Deadly Conversation

This conversation occurred between the first officer and the captain of the Air Florida Boeing 737 (Flight 90) that crashed into the Potomac River in January 1982. The crash was caused by excessive ice and snow on the airplane and a frozen indicator that gave the crew a false engine power reading.

The aircraft had been de-iced, but 45 minutes elapsed before it was cleared for takeoff. The captain had little experience flying in winter weather. While awaiting their takeoff clearance, the following conversation took place between the crew:

First Officer: Look how the ice is just hanging on his, ah, back, back there, see that? (Pause)
First Officer: See all those icicles on the back there and everything?
Captain: Yeah. (After a long wait following de-icing, the first officer continued.)
First Officer: Boy, this is a, this is a losing battle here on trying to de-ice those things, it (gives) you a false feeling of security. That's all that it does.
(Shortly after being given clearance to take off, the first officer again expressed his concern.)
First Officer: Let's check those tops again since we've been sitting here a while.
Captain: I think we get to go here in a minute. (Finally, while they were on their takeoff roll, the first officer noticed that something was wrong with the engine readings.)
First Officer: That don't seem right, does it? (three-second pause) Ah, that's not right....
Captain: Yes, it is. There's 80.
First Officer: Naw, I don't think that's right. (seven-second pause) Ah, maybe it is.
Captain: Hundred and twenty.
First Officer: I don't know.

The Air Florida crash killed 78 people, including four motorists who were on a bridge hit by the aircraft. Only five aboard Flight 90 — four passengers and a flight attendant — survived.

The National Transportation Safety Board determined that the probable causes of this accident were: the flight crew's failure

Confronting one's boss can be intimidating for anyone, but for first officers co-piloting commercial aircraft, it can be a matter of life or death. Such was the case in 1982 when an Air Florida Boeing 737 crashed into the Potomac River because of excessive snow and ice on the airplane.

The aircraft had been de-iced, but 45 minutes elapsed before it was cleared for takeoff. While awaiting clearance, the first officer tried unsuccessfully to convince the captain — who had little experience flying in winter weather — of his serious concerns about the icing and a malfunctioning (frozen) engine power gauge. The first officer hinted at the possibility of a problem, rather than explicitly stating what he suspected and what he thought should be done. Unfortunately, the consequences were tragic. Just 37 seconds after takeoff, the aircraft crashed into the Potomac.

With these high stakes, a Georgia Institute of Technology expert in cognitive linguistics and a NASA Ames Laboratory researcher are investigating the types and structure of communications between commercial aircraft captains and first officers in the United States and Europe. A paper based on Fischer and Orasanu's initial study was published in the "Proceedings of the Ninth International Symposium on Aviation Psychology."

This study found that first officers who need to correct a captain's mistake often initially rely on indirect methods — such as "hints," usually in the form of problem statements (e.g., "We are 15 knots too slow.") — rather than explicitly stating what to do.

In addition to the implications for airline safety, the NASA-funded study's findings could be important to future space missions that use multi-cultural crews, and to other high-stress situations requiring teamwork. The study also found differences in the way female pilots communicate with other members of their crews.

"There are advantages and disadvantages to being indirect," says Dr. Ute Fischer, an adjunct assistant professor in the Georgia Institute of Technology'sSchool of Literature, Communication and Culture.

"Statements such as, 'You are 15 knots too slow,' are often sufficient to get the captain to increase the approach speed," says Dr. Judith Orasanu of NASA's Ames Laboratory. "Ordering the captain to do so, on the other hand, may be unwarranted by the situation and may actually interfere with the safe operation of the airplane by inducing annoyance at the socially inappropriate behavior of the co-pilot, and thus disrupting crew harmony."

There can be disadvantages to indirect communication, too, Fischer adds. "By being indirect, speakers run the risk of not being heard. Problem statements may be taken at face value and may not be understood as a request to act. Also, because problem statements exert little pressure, the hearer may not take the speaker's intention sufficiently serious."

The effectiveness of any request strategy depends on the situation in which it is used, the researchers explain. They are trying to determine which strategy is most effective in which situation as their research continues.

The initial study revealed that, apparently because of their status, airline captains — both U.S. and European, male and female — give more than twice the number of commands that first officers give. Yet case studies of airline accidents show it is often first officers who are in the position of needing to correct a captain's mistake, the researchers say. They found that first officers in this situation would most often initially use "hints" in the form of problem statements — overall in fact, twice as often as captains use them — to convey their messages.

"But there is absolutely no basis to conclude that co-pilots will continue to use indirect requests if their initial request for captain action is unsuccessful," Fischer notes. "Indeed, there is ample data to suspect otherwise. We found that co-pilots used direct requests in proportion to the degree of perceived risk in the situation. These were primarily statements indicating what the crew should do."

As for gender differences in communication, the study only showed differences in the structure of communications. Females — all Americans in this study — tended to give more two-part utterances than males: They would state the problem and then give a command or suggestion.

"There are two perspectives on the more complex structure of these utterances," Fischer says. "One is that the females are excusing themselves for giving commands by stating the problem. The other perspective is that the females are setting the stage and grounding their directive with the problem statement."

A follow-up study already under way will give insight on the effectiveness of these two-part utterances. Other research indicates that stating the problem before giving a command or other type of communication creates a shared understanding, Fischer says. It gives the hearer a better comprehension of the task at hand.

"But in a high risk situation, this more complex talking might not be more effective," Fischer adds. "A lot depends on the risk of the situation and the professional setting. Those are questions we will address in the second part of this study."

Several cultural differences also appeared in the current study. For example, some European captains were twice as likely to give hints to first officers than were U.S. captains. Meanwhile, U.S. captains were twice as likely to make suggestions for the crew to implement. Also, European first officers were six to nine percentage points more likely to give commands to captains than were U.S. first officers. The Europeans were also about twice as likely to give self-directives than their American counterparts.

"Cultural differences in communication are important to understand because foreign airlines often train their crews with U.S. airlines' crew resource management plans," Fischer explains. "In addition, forthcoming space missions will involve people from various multi-cultural backgrounds. What we don't know is how much cultural predispositions affect communication in a professional setting, particularly in times of stress. We are trying to gain insight into that question in this study."

What is known is that communication problems — both within aircraft crews and between air and ground crews — contribute significantly in aircraft incidents and accidents, Fischer says. There are numerous examples, including: the crash of Avianca Flight #052 near JFK airport in New York in 1990 because it ran out of fuel; and the Air Florida crash mentioned above.

Because communication problems often contribute to airline disaster, Fischer and Orasanu got the help of pilots in developing eight fictional flight scenarios. Then they posed these scenarios to 576 airline captains and first officers — including 20 females — from six American and European airlines via questionnaires. In the surveys, researchers manipulated the risk level and social implications of the situations. Survey participants were asked how they would initially respond verbally to their colleague in each scenario. Researchers devised a coding scheme to which they assigned the survey participants' responses.

The scheme consisted of eight communication types: commands, queries, preferences, hints, crew obligations, crew suggestions, self-directives and permission-seeking questions.

The study also revealed that captains:

• gave commands about 45 percent of the time followed by crew suggestions (~10 percent) and crew obligations (~7 percent).
• asked permission-seeking questions least frequently (~3 percent), followed by preferences (~5 percent) and queries (~6 percent).

Researchers found that first officers:

• gave commands (~15 percent) only about half as often as hints (~32 percent) on U.S. airlines.
• asked permission-seeking questions 12 percent of the time versus giving commands 15 percent of the time on U.S. airlines. European first officers were about half as likely to ask permission-seeking questions (~6 percent).

In the follow-up study, the researchers are analyzing responses to questionnaires completed by 60 U.S. airline pilots. One group of captains was asked to rate the effectiveness of nine different one-part utterances by first officers attempting to correct mistakes of captains in a variety of high- and low-risk scenarios. Another group did the same, but with two-part utterances. Also, first officers rated captains. Fischer expects to have the study completed later this spring.

The results of the studies could have implications beyond airline crew communication, says Dr. Ken Knoespel, a professor in the School of Literature, Communication and Culture. He and Fischer suggest that mine workers, oil tanker crews, air traffic controllers, emergency medical and public safety personnel, and astronauts, including those on multinational missions, could benefit from the insights gained in this study.

NASA, in fact, funded this study because of its implications for teamwork among crews on planned international space missions, Fischer says. The study surveyed pilots, instead of astronauts, because they are much easier to access, and astronauts often come from commercial and/or military aircraft piloting positions.

"In a broader context, NASA research seeks to link space exploration and making the earth more inhabitable," Knoespel says. "In order to live in space, we need to solve some problems on Earth and vice versa. Communication is one of those problems.... It's interesting that at Georgia Tech, we provide NASA with the research expertise in rocket science and telecommunications, as well as the increasingly important field of human interaction with technology. You cannot separate human communication from technology."

In fact, Fischer adds, insights into human communication can bring insights into how to build better automated systems.

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