The Importance of Metaphors as Information-Processing Tools

The Importance of Metaphors as Information-Processing Tools

It is this notion of limited information-processing abilities and the need for simplification that leads me to conclude that metaphor and other forms of symbolic representation can be most useful in the political arena. Metaphor seems uniquely designed to address the information-processing capacity problems discussed by the political cognition theory advocates. This discussion is reminiscent of Ortony’s (1975) compactness thesis; Ortony discussed how metaphors are important in conveying a great deal of information in a concise manner.

Cognitive psychologists have had a hand in contributing to this new informa­tion-processing perspective (e.g., Fiske & Kinder, 1981; Kinder & Sears, 1985; Ottati & Wyer, 1990; Sears et al., 1980). This general model has long been used as the basis of cognitive processes (Ashcraft, 1994). Because we are limited in our ability to process information, selection must be made to attend to only information that we are interested in, are drawn to, understand already, and so forth. We have certain preexisting notions, called schemas, that serve as filters through which information enters our minds. For example, if I were to have a schema for understanding world events from a liberal perspective, this perspective or schema would serve to filter in those ideas consistent with my liberal bias while screening out those ideas consistent with a conservative bias. This could also work at a more microscopic level as well; for example, I might have a specific schema to understand environmentally relevant information. This schema might render me to be more attuned to pleas for environmental conservation as opposed to complaints from industries regarding regulations designed to protect the environment. This works both for selecting events from any number of potential events as well as for interpreting ambiguous events in a manner more consistent with my preexisting beliefs (Ottati & Wyer, 1990). This occurs at the time of initial encoding of the information, not at the time of recall.

Iyengar and his colleagues (e.g., Iyengar, 1990,1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) seized upon this information-processing model and developed themes around cognitive heuristics such as those proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1982, 1984). Heuristics are “rules of thumb” that mimic logical processing but are much simpler and do not take into account all pieces of information. Decisions based upon heuristics are mostly consistent with decisions based upon careful considera­tion of all information, but such decisions often vary from maximally logical decisions. Because heuristics mimic logic, people can make choices or evaluations that are wrong or even opposite from what information is available while still operating under the impression that they are being logical. Iyengar and his col­leagues particularly focused upon the framing heuristic, in which decisions differ based upon how a particular issue is framed. They were especially critical of the media—particularly television—for not providing proper frames within which people can make logical, important decisions. Such presentation of the news maximally invites people to use simplistic heuristics for decision-making purposes.

Sniderman and his colleagues (e.g., Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Sniderman, 1993) focused their attention on the likability heuristic. This heuristic suggests that people decide if they like a politician or not and make broader decisions based upon this likability index. This is particularly true regarding their self-evaluation of their own conservative-liberal dimension. Sniderman suggested that abstract notions of conservatism and liberalism are not very well understood by the general public. Therefore, people assess which politician they like, then identify with that candi­date’s conservative-liberal dimension.

Turning more specifically to metaphor as an information-processing tool, Edel­man (1971) suggested, “Metaphor and myths are devices for simplifying and giving meaning to complex and bewildering sets of observations that evoke concern” (p. 65). He further suggested that what makes metaphor effective is that it evokes a part-to-whole relation. This can come in two forms. A certain metaphor can become symbolic of a broader issue, and solving a metaphor at the more local level addresses the issue at this broader level. This means that political metaphors can justify courses of action. Certainly, Franklin D. Roosevelt did this during the Great Depression with his New Deal metaphor. The country, in the throes of the Depres­sion, felt that all direction was lost. When certain specific programs, such as specific public works programs, were put in place, these became metaphors for the larger issue of the direction of the country. Confidence in the country grew, and the United States was pulled out of the Depression. According to Edelman, metaphors justi­fying courses of action are especially effective during times of heightened public anxiety, when the public needs to be reassured that there is some sense or organi­zation to the problem at hand and that government is addressing it. This is perhaps the reason why the Cold War was so successful as a metaphor for the general security of the country, and issues such as defense spending were accepted, by and large, by the public. A second implication of metaphors’ generating a part-to-whole relation is that simple metaphors that render complex issues understandable make the issues relevant to the general population. These make the public feel a part of the political process and supportive of decisions by the political elite (Thompson, 1996).

Edelman (1964) suggested that the goal of political discourse is not to find novel metaphors that mobilize public opinion but to use simple metaphors that are repeated continuously. Politicians often use metaphors that resonate with latent opinions and become symbolic or coded speech. Repetition of such metaphors results in

dulling the critical faculties rather than awakening them. Chronic repetition of clichés and stale phrases that serve simply to evoke a conditioned, uncritical response is a time-honored habit among politicians and a mentally restful one for their audiences.

The only information conveyed by a speaker who tells an audience of businesspeople that taxes are too high and that public spending is waste is that he is trying to prevent both himself and his audience from thinking and to make all present join in a favored liturgy consisting of the ritualistic denunciation of the symbols taxes and spending.

(pp. 124-125)

Sniderman (1993) revisited this theme of symbolic political models to discuss the topic of racism. Overt, crude racism has been replaced by symbolic racism, which has fused prejudice with individualism. Racial equality can thus be resisted “in the name of self-reliance, achievement, [and] individual initiative” (pp. 231-232). Thus, Ronald Reagan’s use of the “welfare queen” as a metaphor or symbol of the whole welfare system allowed people to view welfare mothers as unworthy of public assistance because they did not strive toward the American ideal of individualism.

Finally, Stone (1988) made a connection between political problems and stories. Stories have a beginning, a middle, and an ending, with some sort of change or transformation. They also have heroes, villains, and victims, with good battling evil. She suggested:

Metaphors are important devices for strategic representation in policy analysis. On the surface, they simply draw a comparison between one thing and another, but in a more subtle way, they usually imply a whole narrative story and a prescription for action, (p. 118)

These notions of metaphor as part-to-whole or as story prescribing action lead us into metaphor used in persuasion.

The Importance of Metaphors as Persuasive Devices

Bronowski (1972) asserted that metaphors are “the essential core of human thought and creativity.... To make a metaphor is also to make a political claim” (pp. 108-109). Certainly, for politicians to make a political claim, they are intending to convince their constituents of this claim. As Stone (1988) indicated, political metaphors make claims to justify political actions.

Metaphors as symbolic representation are effective only if they succeed at multiple levels (Grofman, 1989; Zashin & Chapman, 1974). Thus, when Grofman compared Richard Nixon to Pinocchio (using satirist David Fry’s observation), Nixon’s caricatured long nose was not the only reason why the Pinocchio compari­son was apt. Nixon was considered to be uncomfortable around people; he was perceived as physically stiff or wooden in his actions; he was characterized as being a cold person who wanted to be thought of as human; he lied in many ways to the American public; and to the most politically sophisticated, he was “made” by Murray Chotiner, who was considered to be the mastermind or puppet maker (Geppetto) of Nixon’s early career.

Similarly, Stone’s (1988) contention that metaphor is used in politics to stir and justify action is due to the fact that the metaphor for a particular political situation fits that situation but also resonates to a larger story that implies a whole range of action. In a sense, this process is like deductive reasoning: Metaphor is a minor premise; if accepted as such, it proves the major premise, and the conclusion is the course of action. Recentiy, in California, Proposition 187 was passed. This propo­sition put severe restrictions upon services rendered to illegal aliens. The context of this proposition was California’s ongoing budget problems. Thus, Proposition 187 became a metaphor for all of California’s budget problems:

Major premise: California has a budget crisis that needs to be solved in a political manner.

Minor premise: California provides services to illegal aliens that cost money.

If we put restrictions on these services, we will solve this particular monetary problem.

Conclusion: California can solve its overall budget crisis by restricting services to illegal aliens.

Will this particular use of symbolic politics work? Miller (1979) would suggest that time is needed to answer this question. Miller described two existing views of political metaphor: the verificationist view and the constituitivist view. The verifi- cationist view suggests that metaphors should be treated as hypotheses until they can be verified by political reality. In the case of Proposition 187 as a metaphor for California’s budget problems, if the budget problems are in fact solved in the future, it will be seen as a correct metaphor (i.e., it will be verified); if the budget problems are not solved, it will be seen as incorrect.

On the other hand, the constituitivist view of political metaphor suggests that metaphors create political reality. If accepted, metaphors can shape our perceptions and lead to logical consequences. It is a much more interactive view of metaphor than the verificationist view. If Proposition 187 is accepted as metaphor, resonating to latent conservative roots suggesting that “undeserving people should not be given money or services,” then it follows that no other “undeserving people”—neither welfare recipients, the disabled, students, nor any other group of individuals receiving public assistance—should be given money or services either. As Stone (1988) suggested, a conservative may view government spending on the rich as a “partnership, ” spending on the middle class as “spending, ” and spending on the poor as a "giveaway. ” From a liberal point of view, spending on the rich is a “bailout,” spending on the middle class is a “stimulus to the economy,” and spending on the poor is a “moral duty. ”

Miller (1979) proposed his own view: the manifestationist view. This view is a combination of the verificationist and constituitivist views and answers four pertinent questions about metaphor: (a) Why is political speech metaphorical? (b) How do metaphors make political things manifest? (c) How are political metaphors tested? (d) Are metaphors indispensable to political expression and political knowl­edge? Because political events are fundamentally abstract and cannot be directly experienced by the senses, metaphorical expressions must be used. Such metaphori­cal expressions make political events tangible to the average citizen. They interact with the political process and are judged at a later time for their veracity. Finally, because of these functions, they are indispensable in the political arena.

The literature on metaphors as persuasive devices can be divided into three categories: First, metaphors can simplify and make understandable political events. This process—making the unintelligible accessible—can be rewarding for its recipients and therefore persuasive. Second, metaphors can resonate to underlying symbolic representations in its recipients. These first two categories have already been discussed, but I will review them in the present context. Third, metaphors can stir emotions or bridge the gap between logical and emotional (rational and irrational) forms of persuasion.

Simplification and understandabiiity purposes. The new information- processing perspective of political metaphors has already been discussed at some length. Why might this simplification process be persuasive? At least since the time of Freud (1905/1960), psychologists have discussed how release from tension is pleasurable. This is one of the prevailing theories of humor (Graesser, Long, & Mio, 1989; Mio & Graesser, 1991). If some political issue is not quite accessible in its unorganized form but a metaphor encapsulates its essence, the receiver will feel relief from the tension created by not understanding the issue. This feeling of pleasure undoubtedly leads the receiver to be persuaded by the metaphor because

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