The Soviet assistance in designing the Nuclear Weapon.

The emergence of the North Korean Nuclear Program after WWII.

1.1.The impact of Korean War (1950-1953) on the development of the nuclear program.

1.2. The influence of an ideology on the DPRK’s nuclear strength.

1.3. The Soviet assistance in designing Nuclear Weapon.

The evolution of the Nuclear Project of the DPRK.

2.1. Stages of development of the North Korean nuclear program

2.2.Motivation of nuclear proliferation.

Nuclear Program of the DPRK as the current issue of international concern.

3.1. Nuclear crisis at the beginning of the 1990s. The Framework Agreement of 1994.

3.2.The six party talks and the Nuclear Program of Korean Peninsula.

The emergence of the North Korean Nuclear Program after WWII.

The impact of Korean War (1950-1953) on the development of the nuclear program.

Activities in the nuclear field have a long history in the northern part of the Korean Peninsula. One cannot underestimate the direct influence of the Korean War (1950-1953), which split the whole country into two warring pieces, on the development of this issue. This struggle between two antagonist halves, backed up by major powers, enhanced the security concerns of northerners forcing them to strengthen nuclear capacity. There are numerous historical evidences and records proving the first-hand relation between this state’s launch of nuclear project and the civil war.

According to former Soviet ambassador in Pyongyang from 1987 to 1989, Alexandre Mansurov, the Soviet Union send a team of scientists to North Korea to conduct a geological survey of the monazite mines in 1974, even before the establishment of the DPRK in1948. Moreover, he mentions that Northerners used radioactive resources in exchange for armament and weaponry. From late 1949 to the outbreak of the Korean War, North Korea exported concentrates of monazite, tantalum, niobium, and uranic ore to the Soviet Union in partial payment for military equipment and arms delivered to Pyongyang in 1949 to 1950. [1] Besides, another communist ally of North Korea, China also prepared a group that was operating similarly. In 1952, when the Chinese People’s Volunteers were holding the battle line along the 38th parallel, China sent Dr. Wang Gaochang to North Korea to search for and collect radioactive materials. [2] These events significantly contributed to the emergence of the idea of the strong defense in the form of nuclear weapon.

In addition to this, one of the most crucial factors affecting the emergence of nuclear capacity in the DPRK is the threat posed by the USA to North Korea. The commander in-chief of the American armed forces General MacArthur proclaimed an ultimatum, and demanded the retreat of Chinese volunteer forces on the Korean Peninsula. He threatened to use nuclear weapon against the DPRK unless Chinese forces halt their attack. Even though American leadership rushed to denounce the ultimatum, organizing honorable retirement of MacArthur, the threat could have been real: the single case of combat use of the nuclear weapon by the United States was fresh in memory. [3]

Nonetheless, conventional armament was enough to demonstrate American military power. Almost all large overground objects were destroyed as a result of a massive bombardment. Overall, the concept of “peaceful atom” was not appropriate at the beginning of the 1950s. This was due to the sub-conscious associations of a nuclear energy with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the Soviet nuclear tests in 1949.[4] American atomic bombardment of Japan made an indelible impression on Kim Il-Sung. Before the liberation of Korea in August 1945, Kim Il-sung and his guerrillas had been fighting the Japanese colonial troops for almost 15 years and yet had lost almost every battle. Finally, they were forced to retreat to the sanctuary of the Soviet Far East during the second part of the World War II. In contrast, the United States dropped only two atomic bombs and ostensibly almighty Japan surrendered overnight. Somehow these two unrelated facts got connected in Kim Il-Sung’s mind, and he came to admire the atomic bomb, believing in the power of nuclear weapons to overcome even the most formidable foes swiftly. [5]

Therefore, in the mid-1950s, the DPRK government established nuclear physics departments at Kim Il-Sung National University and Kim Ch’aek Industrial College. These two universities were in charge of the academic education of most of the North Korean nuclear scholars and technicians. Their faculties conducted basic nuclear research and were responsible for keeping abreast of international developments in the field of nuclear physics. [6]

Former ambassador Mansurov also wrote that at the beginning of the Korean War Kim Il-Sung discounted the threat of the US military intervention in the conflict. The mass landing of the U.S. Marines at Inch’on on September 15, 1950, proved him wrong. Despite carpet bombardment of North Korean territory by the U.S. Strategic Air Command, Kim Il-sung did not believe that the United States would use an atomic bomb against Korea. However, later, after the Korean War was over and some American war documents were made public in the late 1950s, he was shocked to discover that the Truman administration did consider very seriously the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the North Korean troops in order to break the North’s rapid advance at the beginning of the war and to break the bloody stalemate later in the war. Kim Il-Sung’s reaction was said to be one of shock, anguish, and undisguised fear that one day his country could become helpless prey to the U.S. nuclear monster. Moreover, he realized that the DPRK was on the U.S. “black list” of countries against which it might consider and use nuclear weapons should the need arise. This could well be one of the reasons why Kim Il-sung rushed to sign Alliance Treaties on Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union and China in 1961, thereby acquiring the protection of their nuclear umbrellas. [7]

Prior to the end of the ideological clash between two Koreas, the United States and South Korea signed series of treaties that caused an apprehension among North Koreans. These agreements made South Korea an “American danger” in the eyes of the DPRK leaders. Despite the factual ending of the War in 1953, the atmosphere in the peninsula remained tense. Conflict, culminated by an armistice, however, was actively opposed by Seoul. American side had to make a considerable diplomatic effort to prevent the breach of the agreement by the Southerners. One of the concessions was the signing of the Declaration of 16 states, which were fighting on the United Nation’s side. All of the participants of the document agreed to take part in the armed conflict in case of the threat against South Korea. [ 8]

Furthermore, the most important factor, fortifying the threat from the South, became concluding a military alliance between the Republic of Korea and the USA on October 1953. [9] The arrangement allowed the ROK to utilize, with the consent of the second party, American military bases established in the territory of the Republic. This article of the agreement gave a legal force to the deployment of American armed forces in the territory of the Korean Peninsula on the bilateral bases without any United Nations official resolution. Accordingly, these circumstances, associated with the threat coming from the USA, served as the solid ground for the development of nuclear program in the country.

Following this example, after the war, on March 26 and September 7, 1956, the Soviet Union and the DPRK signed two agreements on cooperation in nuclear research projects. In accordance with these agreements, the framework for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK in the nuclear field was established, and North Korean scientists began to receive professional training in the field of nuclear physics at the Soviet Dubna Nuclear Research Complex. In 1959, the DPRK signed an additional protocol with the Soviet Union on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This protocol authorized the transfer of a small research type nuclear reactor and other complex nuclear equipment to Pyongyang. Also, in the late 1950s, the DPRK government sent some nuclear scientists to the People’s Republic of China for nuclear training at the Chinese nuclear-related facilities.[9]

To sum up, the Korean War, which occurred between 1950 and 1953, played a great role in the laying down the foundations of the North Korean nuclear program. The Soviet Union and China, the DPRK’s two ideological allies, contributed to the research and detection of necessary radioactive minerals in the country, and used it as remuneration for military aid during the war. Moreover, growing fear of an approaching Western threat, existence of the American bases nearby, official agreements signed between the powerful United States and South Korea made a final contribution to the consolidation of an idea about the might of nuclear weapons in the mind of North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung.

1.2 The influence of the “juche” ideology on the DPRK’s nuclear strength.

There is a wide spread belief among the people living in the North Korea that shape the way they think and establishes ideological framework. This ideological tool called “juche” made significant contribution to the emergence of nuclear weaponry in the northern part of the Korean peninsula. This belief can be a relevant addition to the factors, such as fear of “American threat, bilateral treaties between ROK and the USA, affecting the evolution of the nuclear program in the DPRK.

In the late 1970s North Korean government learned that South Korea was engaged in a clandestine nuclear weapon development program. Kim Il-Sung felt betrayed because, obviously, the only potential target for these nuclear weapons was his own regime. Previously, he had thought that nuclear weapons were outside the established rules of the game of legitimate behavior on the Korean peninsula, especially after the joint North-South Declaration on Three Principles of National Unification was signed on July 4, 1972. But the revelation of the ROK’s nuclear weapon program was bitter proof that he had misjudged his southern opponents and had been effectively outflanked by them. This was such a blow to Kim Il-Sung’s personal vanity and sense of national pride that, reportedly, he could not bear it.

Later in the 1970s, the United States forced the Park Chong-Hee regime to abandon its nuclear ambitions. But, in return, the U.S. government covertly introduced tactical nuclear weapons in the southern part of the Korean peninsula and committed these to the defense of South Korea. Moreover, both sides agreed to conduct the “Team Spirit” joint military exercises annually (from 1977 on), which Pyongyang considered extremely threatening and designed to train U.S. and ROK troops for combat in future nuclear warfare against the North. All these related developments apparently prompted President Kim Il-sung to order the DPRK Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Public Security, and the Korean People’s Army (KPA) to launch a joint nuclear weapons development program in the late 1970s.[10] This actions of the North Korean leader can be easily justified by the dominant ideology of “juche”, which a decade earlier had laid a foundation for a self-sufficient military.

To make things clear one should firstly identify the true meaning of this ideology. The political philosophy known as juche became the official autarkic state ideology of theDemocratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK)in 1972. Although foreign scholars often describe juche as “self-reliance,” the true meaning of theterm is much more nuanced. Kim Il-Sungexplained:Establishing juche means, in a nutshell,being the master of revolution andreconstruction in one’s own country. Thismeans holding fast to an independentposition, rejecting dependence on others,using one’s own brains, believing inone’s own strength, displaying therevolutionary spirit of self-reliance, andthus solving one’s own problems foroneself on one’s own responsibility underall circumstances.

The DPRK claims that juche is Kim Il Sung’s creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles to the modern political realities in North Korea. Kim Il-Sung and his son Kim Jong-Il have successfully wielded the juche idea as a political shibboleth to evoke a fiercely nationalistic drive for North Korean independence and to justify policies of self-reliance and self-denial in the face of famine and economic stagnation in North Korea. Kim Il-Sung envisioned three specific applications of juche philosophy: political and ideological independence, especially from the Soviet Union and China; economic self-reliance and self-sufficiency; and a viable national defense system. [11]

The governing principles of juche were clearly expressed by Kim Il-Sung in a speech entitled “Let Us Defend the Revolutionary Spirit of Independence, Self-Reliance, and Self-defense. More Thoroughly in All Fields of State Activities,” which he delivered to the Supreme People’s Assembly on December 16, 1967. In this speech, he declared that

“…the Government of the Republic will implement with all consistency the line of independence, self-sustenance, and self-defense to consolidate the political independence of the country (chaju), build up more solidly the foundations of an independent national economy capable of insuring the complete unification, independence, and prosperity of our nation (charip) and increasing the country’s defense capabilities, so as to safeguard the security of the fatherland reliably by our own force (chawi), by splendidly embodying our Party’s idea of juche in all fields.” [12]

The principle of political independence is one of the central tenets of juche ideology. With respect to international relations, the principles of juche stress complete equality and mutual respect among nations. Furthermore, juche ideology asserts that every state has the right of self-determination in order to secure the happiness and prosperity of its people as it best sees fit. These political tenets – equal sovereignty and nonintervention – would satisfy the fierce desire for respect and security of a small and weak nation-state such as North Korea.

In practice, this political stance has caused North Korea to truly become a hermit kingdom because of the huge stigma juche places upon cooperation with outside powers. According to juche as interpreted by the DPRK, yielding to foreign pressure or tolerating foreign intervention would make it impossible to maintain chaju, or the defense of national independence and sovereignty. This in turn would threaten the nation’s ability to defend the interests of the people, since political independence is seen as being absolutely critical for economic self - sustenance and military self-defense. Kim Jong Il predicted that dependence on foreign powers would lead to the failure of the socialist revolution in Korea.

Among countries that he considered socialist peers, such as China, the USSR, Cuba and several African countries, Kim Il Sung urged cooperation and stressed the need for mutual support and limited dependence. However, while acknowledging that it was important to learn from the examples of other socialist countries, Kim Il Sung was highly sensitive to the problems of flunkeyism towards Moscow and Beijing and the inevitable Marxist-Leninist dogmatism that he abhorred during his guerrilla days. In constructing the socialist revolution in North Korea, he warned that the North Koreans must “…resolutely repudiate the tendency to swallow things of others undigested or imitate them mechanically.” Furthermore, he claimed that his regime’s “success” was credited to the independent manner in which all problems were solved, conforming Marxist-Leninist principles to the specific conditions of North Korea without altering their fundamental substance.

If we consider internal matters, Kim Il-Sung noted that is obligatory to build domestic political forces to ensure chaju. The pivotal factor in the success of achieving chaju would be the extent to which the people rallied around the party and the leader Kim Il Sung, and later Kim Jong Il himself. This insistence on internal unity of support, stemming perhaps from the elder Kim’s disgust with internal factionalism before the Korean War, conveniently helped to justify his consolidation of personal power.[13]

One of the most crucial areas of independence in juche philosophy of the sovereign is considered to be self-reliance in defense. The North Korean attitude towards military confrontation was summed up in this manner by Kim Il Sung: “We do not want war, nor are we afraid of it, nor do we beg peace from the imperialists.” The decidedly belligerent policy of countering any perceived “imperialist moves of aggression and war” with violence was seen as the best way to defend national independence and to win the revolutionary cause. The implementation of this self-reliant defense system would involve the mobilization of the whole country and the complete inculcation of ideology in the armed forces. Those who were not directly taking up arms were to contribute to the construction and maintenance of the domestic defense industry and remain ideologically prepared, so that the home front would be united in a sense of socio-political superiority.

Although Kim Il Sung conceded that foreign support played a secondary role in the holistic war against foreign “imperialists” and “aggressors,” he heavily emphasized that the decisive factor would be the preparation of internal domestic purposes. Thus he pledged the government to prepare the Korean people and the army thoroughly and ideologically to cope with war and to make full material preparations to defend the country by relying on an independent national economy. [14]

This political philosophy has three major schools of thought regarding its origins. The first of these is the instrumental perspective, which emphasizes domestic and international relations factors. The second perspective focuses on the influence of traditional Korean politics. The last viewpoint considers juche to be original political thought stemming directly from the life experiences of Kim Il-Sung.[15]

Instrumental Perspective

The instrumentalist viewpoint focuses on both domestic and foreign political factors as the root of the juche ideology. Some scholars believe that Kim’s unstable power during and immediately following the Korean War caused him to deploy ideological purges in order to consolidate his political position, using the juche principle of national solidarity as a domestic instrument of personal cult-building. [16].Furthermore, any other ideology was forbidden to taught, and Kim Il-Sung was the only one who could successfully implement the philosophy. Thus, executing policies based on juche effectively consolidated North Korean leader’s political power and served as the justification for the dictatorship in the DPRK.

There is an outstanding example of the application of this ideology in practice as the means to justify its isolations sentiments from their strategic allies. Kim Il-Sung had to encounter a major disappointment in his relations with one of his “protectors”—the USSR. In October 1962, the Cuban missile crisis broke out. In its aftermath, the perception began to grow in Pyongyang that the Soviet Union had abandoned Cuba, its peripheral ally, for the sake of its own security. Kim Il-sung was said to have begun to have doubts about the reliability of the nuclear shield provided by his allies, especially the Soviet Union, in the moment of crisis. Consequently, he authorized the reassessment of the DPRK’s nuclear policy, with a greater emphasis being placed upon its self-sufficiency and diversification. But still, the emotions Kim Il-sung had about the power of atom—the admiration, fear, and disappointment— stopped short of pushing him to order a full-scale nuclear build-up at that time.[17]

The statement above provided by A. Mansurov proves the argument that North Korea began to use juche tenet of foreign non-intervention and national self-determination as an ideological excuse for cordoning off its governance from Moscow and Beijing.

Traditional Political Culture

The second perspective is more long-term and focuses on the influence of traditional political culture in Korea. The scholars in this second camp argue that juche is a reflection of a centuries-old tradition of independence from foreign powers. Strategically located at a peninsular tip of the East Asian continent, Korea has long been a pawn of contention between its two powerful neighbors, China and Japan. From the earliest recorded history, the Korean people have fought fiercely to maintain their independence in the face of multiple invasions by Mongols, Manchurians, Han Chinese and Japanese pirates and samurais. The sum total of these invasions may qualify Korea as the most oft-invaded territory in the world.[18]

These historical evidences were imprinted in the hearts and minds of Koreans and were equalized to the national humiliation. The brightest example is the Japanese rule in the peninsula from 1910 to 1945. There was the strongest willingness to defend national pride and obtain national status corresponding to nation’s ambitions. Thus, nuclear power was seen as the way to overcome Japan and raise the nationalist spirit.

Individualism: Kim Il Sung’s Original Thought

The third viewpoint is the North Koreans’ view of juche as a prime example of their late Supreme Leader’s brilliance and originality. This last group insists that juche was the intellectual result of Kim Il Sung’s highly exaggerated and romanticized personal experience as a guerrilla fighting against the Japanese in the 1930s. This immediate attribution of juche to Kim Il Sung’s personal history is emphasized by his son and heir Kim Jong Il in his book On the Juche Idea. He argue that his father “put forward a juche-oriented line for the Korean revolution” and that “…this was a historical event which heralded the creation of the juche idea and the birth of the juche-oriented revolutionary line.” [19]

To conclude, “juche” is a complex set of philosophical ideas designed to make people believe in self-sustenance and self-reliance. The North Korean dictator claimed that this ideology would unite Korean people in order to secure country’s independence and sovereignty. It has three roots: the first one is focused on domestic and foreign policy of the state, the second is aimed to explain traditional origins of the ideology and the last one stems from Kim Il-Sung’s original thoughts. Totalitarian leaders used the ideology to justify their mismanagement to rule the government, combat with famine, and to find an excuse for their isolationist foreign policy. In addition to this, the DPRK utilized the “juche” to explain the reason of their estrangement from the Soviet Union and China. Lastly, Kim Il-Sung ensured that pure “self-defence”, “self-sustenance”, and “self-reliance” could be provided by the development of nuclear weapon and rallying around the successful launch of this program.

The Soviet assistance in designing the Nuclear Weapon.

Cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy between the Soviet Union and North Korea was one element in the overall plan for promoting socialist economic integration in the Far East. Within this cooperative framework, Soviet goals were to raise the standards of North Korea's scientific and technological potential while also promoting the country's industrialization. The two sides based their cooperation on the following principles: (1) its voluntary nature; (2) mutual respect for state sovereignty and noninterference in the internal affairs of the other side; and (3) friendly mutual assistance.[20]

According to Alexandre Y. Mansurov, from late 1949 to the outbreak of the Korean War, North Korea exported concentrates of monazite, tantalum, niobium, and uranic ore to the Soviet Union in partial payment for military equipment and arms delivered to Pyongyang in 1949 to 1950. Following the war, on March 26 and September 7, 1956, the Soviet Union and the DPRK signed two agreements on cooperation in nuclear research projects. In accordance with these agreements, the framework for cooperation between the Soviet Union and the DPRK in the nuclear field was established, and North Korean scientists began to receive professional training in the field of nuclear physics at the Soviet Dubna Nuclear Research Complex. In 1959, the DPRK signed an additional protocol with the Soviet Union on the peaceful use of nuclear energy. This protocol authorized the transfer of a small researchtype nuclear reactor and other complex nuclear equipment to Pyongyang.[21]

When the first generation of the North Korean nuclear specialists completed their term of study and practical training at the Soviet Dubna facility and returned to the DPRK in the early 1960s, the North Korean government decided to build a similar complex for them about 90 kilometers northeast of Pyongyang. This was the beginning of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research of the DPRK Academy of Sciences.

In late 1955, the KPA initiated a series of national level nuclear defense exercises for units within the “Rear Area” corps. By 1958, the DPRK, with Soviet assistance, had established the KPA’s “Atomic Weapons Training Center” located near Kilchu, on the east coast north of Kimch’aek. According to Joseph S. Bermudez, it may still be operational now, although most likely under a different name. Since 1959, as part of their standard curriculum, North Korean graduates of the Soviet General Staff Academy have been exposed to Soviet military thinking on the possibilities and ramifications of the use of nuclear weapons in a future war. Since 1965, as part of their field training, they have been able to witness the organizational and technical changes made in the Soviet Armed Forces to meet the challenges of the nuclear age.[22]

The Yongbyon area was designated a “Special District” directly subordinate to the Administrative Council, with access being severely restricted. Approaches were heavily guarded by the troops of the Ministry of the Public Security. In August 1965, the Soviet Union delivered to the DPRK a 0.1 megawatt thermal (MWt) critical assembly and a two MWt research reactor under the terms of the 1959 nuclear cooperation agreement. The reactor was set up in a special compound directly on the Kuryong River at Yongdong, 4.7 kilometers west of Yongbyon. Reportedly, it became operational in 1967. In the following decades, it has been used to produce radioactive isotopes for scientific research, industrial, and medical purposes. Gradually, North Korean scientists expanded the capacity of this reactor into an eight MWt research reactor, using their indigenous technology.

In September 1974, the DPRK officially joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), although it had not yet acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). On July 20, 1977, the DPRK signed an INFCIRC/66-type agreement with the IAEA, which provided a mechanism by which its two MWt research reactor and 0.1 MWt critical assembly could be monitored.

The model reactor named IRT-2000 was launched in Yongbyon in 1965. It assisted the research projects of the scientists working in the various fields as physics, chemistry, and biology. It was up-to-date and met with all characteristics necessary for sophisticated scientific programs. After the receiving of the reactor, the DPRK did not followed the strict rule of reporting about it day-to-day work with this machine. North Korea covertly modernized reactor in order to make it much more powerful and use it to produce plutonium necessary for weapon. On the other hand, it was impossible to produce huge amounts of plutonium to prepare nuclear weapons using this research reactor. Nonetheless, the IRT-2000 was a crucial source of experience for further development of this issue. Nonetheless, the DPRK joined the International Atomic Energy Agency and was forced to legally promise not to use the atomic reactor and radioactive materials for preparing nuclear bomb.

After the joining the IAEA, North Korea was obliged not to use the reactor for military purposes. Besides, the DPRK could not utilize radioactive materials, regardless whether they were local or exported from the USSR, for preparing a nuclear weapon. The International Atomic Energy Agency was responsible for monitoring the compliance with these rules. North Korea, in its turn, had to prepare annual reports about new nuclear resources entering the country.

In the work of I. Dyachkov we can find the assumptions about the original intensions of the becoming a member of the IAEA by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He considers the influence of the Soviet Union to be a major force of that led to the membership. In addition to this, being a member of such organization could give the opportunity for those times recent technological advancements in the field of nuclear energy. Nonetheless, the DPRK rejected the signing of Non-Proliferation Treaty, despite the insistence of Soviet Union and international community. Northerners regarded the agreement disadvantageous and considered possessing nuclear weaponry acceptable.

As the result of complex negotiations the Soviet Union adopted the modification of the previous reactor and supplied the DPRK with 80% enriched fuel. The supervision and control, however, rose together with the imported materials. Supply of the materials were conducted only when the USSR were ensured about the proper utilization of the previous goods.

. Although highly enriched uranium fuel could be easily used to make a nuclear weapon, international community and the Soviet Union regarded this issue as the normal practice. The IAEA, on the other hand, took over the control of the supply of such materials to the DPRK. Conditions, however, changed and from 1986, the USSR provided North Korea only with 36% enriched uranium. Furthermore, the gift in the form of research reactor IRT-2000 was not unusual thing those times. Even there was similar reactor launched in Bulgaria with the direct participation of the USSR.[23]

In a nutshell, the Soviet Union made a great contribution for the development of the nuclear capability of the DPRK. Initially, at the end of the WWII it was in the forms of geological expeditions to identify the radioactive materials. Then, assistance came as an opportunity to educate and prepare the strongest academicians to serve in the sphere of nuclear energy. Furthermore, participation of the USSR grew and Soviet authorities equipped North Koreans with modernized atomic reactors and provided highly enriched uranium for scientific purposes. All of the facts above were a strong foundation to develop experienced academic staff, appropriate facilities and collect necessary resources to design and implement powerful nuclear program.

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