Pavel Palazchenko

Cor. In this series of conversations we've been givingn an intimate glimpse of the communication problems of the world's leaders when they don't share a common language. The role of the interpreter in our century has become evermore crucial, though that's only imperfectly understood outside those tiny groups at the summit.

Pavel Palazchenko was always one of the most unobtrusive figures, even when he was pictured standing at the shoulders of President Gorbachev and President Reagan. Last Sunday night viewers of the Clive Anderson show saw him slip quietly onto the set, while the ex-president acknowledged the applause. He has been beside him now ever since Gorbachev blew into the Kremlin like a blast of fresh air.

P.P. My impression was that this is a kind of surprisingly normal person, a surprisingly reasonable individual. Certainly the previous Soviet leaders were quite different. I've never actually worked with any of them but we had a certain impression about the kind of person that the Soviet leader was supposed to be. They were quite old... they looked rather dogmatic and they looked like people on a kind of pedestal. Gorbachev never looked like that. And that was my first impression, which I still think, was correct.

Cor. What was your first big experience in interpreting?

P.P. Oh, I don't know what you call a "big experience." I started working for the UN in 1974 in the interpretation service of the United Nation's Secretariat, worked there for 5 years, so that was, probably, what you would call the big experience and certainly a major learning experience for me. I would say that professionally I owe everything to, first of all, my school, the Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow, and, secondly, my 5 years of working at the UN.

Cor. What was your first meeting and acquaintance with Mr.Gorbachev?

P.P. Right after he became General Secretary... April, 1985... he was interviewed by a reporter from India because the visit of Radjiv Gandhi, the Indian Prime Minister, was being prepared and so he granted an interview to an Indian reporter, and I interpreted that interview.

Cor. Within hours of the Chernenko¹ funeral President Reagan proposed a summit with the new leader, with Mr.Gorbachev at Geneva. When did you know you would be going to Geneva with him?

P.P. Actually during the preparations for the Geneva summit I was in New York, working in the Soviet delegation. And I was not at all prepared for the kind of news that I received. It was totally a surprise. It came, I think, less than a week before the summit.

Cor. There had been more than a 6 year hiatus, a gap between the last meeting between the Soviet and American leaders and this one in Geneva...

¹ Генсек ЦК КПСС 1984-1985 гг. 18

What was the atmosphere like when President Reagan met Mr.Gorbachev?

P.P. Well, their first meeting certainly was not marked by an atmosphere of trust and cooperation that developed a lot later. But, I think, they both made a good effort, even though they both regarded themselves as representing countries who are adversaries and even potential enemies. They both made a good effort.

Cor. Before their meeting President Reagan had been talking about "the Evil Empire" and using phrases like that. Presumably, he didn't do that at the summit?

P.P. Well, he certainly didn't use the phrase "the Evil Empire" at the summit. In some of his subsequent public speeches he did use some similar phrases. But so far as I know, as the relationship between Gorbachev and himself, and the relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States improved, he really in most cases tried to avoid that kind of language. And, of course, during his visit to Moscow in May 1988 he was asked specifically by an American reporter, whether he still considered the Soviet Union "an Evil Empire." And he said, "No." He said: "I no longer consider it 'the Evil Empire' because the country is changing in the direction that we welcome." This happened during Mr. Reagan's tour of the Kremlin, and I was present there, and I heard that response to a very pointed question. And I think it really marked the evolution of the relationship.

Cor. Were those one-on-one meetings very intense in terms of concentration from your point of view?

P.P. Well, any meeting when you interpret at the highest levels of government, any summit meeting work requires a lot of concentration and you do feel, you know, more than kind of average responsibility. On the other hand any interpreter, when he or she do any kind of work, have to concentrate. This is a must whether you interpret at a summit or you interpret at some conference on tax policy.

Cor. Reagan kept quoting the Russian proverb which meant " trust but verify. " Was that his only Russian phrase?

P.P. Well, yes, he actually liked to quote that proverb, but he also quoted a number of others, and some of them many Russians did not even know. And those were good proverbs. I understand that some people specifically did research for him in order to find the proverbs that would sound good.

Cor. That first meeting in Geneva was very much a sort of getting-to-know-each-other meeting. The meeting in Reykjavik in 1986 was a much more important meeting in terms of the discussions. How did you find that meeting? What kind of pressure were you under for that?

P.P. I would disagree that the Geneva meeting was just a get-to-know-each-other meeting, just the first-handshake-kind of a meeting. I believe that it was a very important meeting. You remember, it was at that meeting that they included in the Joint

Statement the phrase that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. And before that there was a lot of talk on the American side and probably some talk on the Soviet side at least, you know, within government, that nuclear war is just another kind of war. There are things more important than peace etc, etc. And it was very important that the two leaders made that statement, and I believe that really the beginning of the process of nuclear disarmament can be traced back to the Geneva summit. But, of course, the Reykjavik summit was very very substantive discussions of the nuts and bolts of arms control, of the bean counting of missiles, submarines, Strategic Defense Initiative. All of these things were at that time very important, I think, they still are. And that, of course, placed on the interpreters who worked on both sides a great burden of responsibility.

Cor. When Gorbachev proposed a mutual elimination of all strategic offensive arms over the period of 10 years and said he was prepared to accept any form of verification. This surprised the Americans. Did it surprise you?

P.P. No, it didn't surprise me. I, of course, knew in advance of that meeting that Gorbachev will be making a rather dramatic proposal, and the first very dramatic proposal was about cutting in half, about a 50% [half] cut of all types of nuclear weapons, both land-based, sea-launched and bombers. And that was a very important proposal because he agreed that within that cut the Soviet heavy missiles, which the Americans regarded as the most dangerous ones, would also be cut in half.

And that was the first time that a Soviet leader agreed to that kind of cut in that particular category of weapons. And in the process also, when President Reagan started to talk about his fears of nuclear war, and that the strategic defense initiative is aimed at preventing nuclear war, Gorbachev did say that the best way to prevent nuclear war would be to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons over a period of 10 years. It was quite dramatic, but it was quite consistent with Gorbachev's general policy and with his statement calling for the elimination of nuclear weapons within 10 years. That statement was made long before the Reykjavik summit on January 15, 1986. The fact that they went on to discuss this idea was, to me of course...it was very welcome. I believe that it was a kind of psychological breakthrough, that both leaders were thinking about this.

Cor. Can you give me some idea of the flavour of these meetings, which were clearly so very important?

P.P. Well, the very first meeting in Reykjavik was just a one-on-one meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan. And there was an interpreter on each side and also a note-taker on each side. So there were 6 individuals in the room. Then after about half an hour, I forget whether it was Reagan or Gorbachev who said, "Let us invite our foreign ministers." And therefore Shevardnadze and Shultz. were invited. And the rest of the Reykjavik summit was two-on-two rather than one-on-one. And it was a rather small room actually and 8 people in that one room... it was I think more than enough, you know, at some point it got a little bit stuffy in

the room because of the presence of 8 people in the room. Actually the Heitje house ¹ in which the Reykjavik summit was held is a very small place and it would have been a good place to hold a really small and informal summit that was initially envisioned. But in real life whenever the two leaders agreed that a summit would be small, informal, without protocol formalities etc, etc... it never really works out that way and there were dozens of officials present on both sides. But, of course, in the room itself there were just those eight individuals, and most of the talking was done by Reagan and Gorbachev. But particularly the presence of George Shultz. was very important because President Reagan never really paid much attention to details. He was not a detail kind of political leader. And Shultz was very knowledgeable about those details.

Cor. There were quite a number of observers of President Reagan who felt that he didn't have too much of a grasp of foreign affairs and that kind of detail. Was that Mr.Gorbachev's feeling either before or after they'd met?

P.P. All I would say, it's common knowledge that President Reagan did not have much interest in the details. When he wanted to get into some detailed matter, he was quite able to understand. But the fact is that he was a kind of instinctive, intuitive politician and statesman. And therefore for him more general things were important, and he could hold his ground on those things quite well. And I think Gorbachev understood that and, to my

¹ Iceland government's residence.

knowledge, he really never tried to take advantage of Reagan's style. Reagan was the elected leader of the United States. Gorbachev had a lot of really healthy respect for that from the start. He really understood who he was dealing with.

Cor. There was an outside perception at that time the President Reagan was initially inclined to accept Mr.Gorbachev's proposals in Reykjavik and very nearly agreed, and was then talked out of it by his own foreign minister and foreign staff. Was that your impression?

P.P. Well, that really was not just an impression... I think that is the way it was. And the records of the Reykjavik summit, which have been published, I think they confirm that that was indeed the fact. Obviously, at that time if Reagan even had accepted that proposal, the Americans would have found the way to back out of that agreement. So, I would say, that however the fact that Reagan, the President of the United States, discussed in very serious terms the possibility of the elimination or the abolition of nuclear weapons was of great political and psychological importance.

Cor. But was Gorbachev very disappointed when the Americans finally wouldn't agree?

P.P. I think he was, yes. But his disappointment was not of a bitter kind. And if you recall, right after the Reykjavik summit there was that famous press conference where he spoke about the outcome of the Reykjavik summit. And he used the phrase that Reykjavik was not a failure but rather a breakthrough. He really went beyond any initial disappointment in that comment.

Cor. When they met in Washington in December, 1987 they did in fact reach the first arms elimination agreement of the nuclear age in that INF treaty. But;was much more modest than Mr.Gorbachev's original proposals in Reykjavik. Was it however, do you think, important psychologically?

P.P. Oh, absolutely... And he wanted to take that first step. He believed that eliminating at least two categories of nuclear weapons was a very important beginning on a road to the abolition of nuclear weapons. And that's why he agreed to taking that step, even though it fell short of his goals for the first phase of nuclear disarmament. He would have liked to add a 50% cut in strategic nuclear weapons. He wanted to regard that as a package. But when he saw that pragmatically, realistically... that was not possible, that the next step would have to be somewhat postponed, he agreed with that. And he agreed that the first step would be modest, but remember this was and still is the only agreement in history that totally eliminates a certain class of nuclear weapons, held by the two great powers.

Cor. Reagan had this very relaxed style, Mr.Gorbachev's was a very forceful style. Did you and your American opposite number try to echo that in your interpretations?

P.P. Normally my interpretation style is that you try to be a little more neutral than the speaker because the principal speaker has other ways of expressing whatever he wants to express, whether it is warmth, or strength, or cordiality, or relaxed

manner, the body language also works. And it is good to leave it to the principal... to use the body language and to use all the other resources. So my interpretation style is always somewhat more neutral than what the speaker is saying. I believe that that's the right approach. So certainly the evolving relationship and the emerging warmth, the emerging human relationship is mostly expressed by the speaker, by the President or whatever the person is. I never try to act too much, I never try to pick it up altogether. After all I am an interpreter, I am not someone who is playing the role of my principal in a different language. Cor. After that Washington meeting former President Nixon made a famous remark. He said: "Gorbachev was born with Master's Degree in a Public Relations. " I don't know whether he intended that as a compliment or not, I suspect he did.

P.P. Well, frankly I really don't think that Gorbachev was really a public relations man — to my knowledge and I think that, knowing him for more than 10 years now, he really has always cared more about issues than about the way the issues are presented. It was probably the contrast between him and the Leonid Brezhnev of his later years and other Soviet leaders. That made Nixon make that kind of statement, that kind of characterization. The real breakthrough and the real difference, that Gorbachev made, was that he understood that in international relations, in relations between countries like the Soviet Union and the United States public relations alone and, frankly, propaganda alone can not change the relationship

in a way that he wanted to change it. He really cared more about the issues than about grandstanding, public relations or propaganda.

Cor. Obviously, the personal relations between the leaders do matter because the clear rapport between Reagan and Gorbachev, that one saw on the newsreels, didn't seem, certainly to begin with, to have the same warmth when President Bush succeeded him. Why do you think that was? P.P. Well, I really wouldn't say so. The first meeting between Gorbachev and Bush in Malta in December, 1989 that was less than a year after Bush became President.

Cor. Obviously that warmth did begin to come in Malta because I think Shevardnadze wrote later that in Malta the Cold War quietly came to an end. Did you feel that way at the time?

P.P. Absolutely, absolutely. I believe that, yes,... psychologically the Cold War ended in Malta. And a lot of preparatory work was done by Reagan and Shultz and Gorbachev and Shevarnadze during the Reagan years. But it was really in Malta that the end of the Cold War became, in my opinion, quite final. Both Gorbachev and Bush are pragmatic, no-nonsense politicians and statesmen. And when Gorbachev saw that the ideas and the proposals and the positions that Bush brought to Malta really indicated a desire on the American side to move toward the partnership with the Soviet Union, to move from confrontation to real cooperation, he appreciated that and he tried to begin that interaction on the Soviet side. So, the warmth, may be there wasn't much warmth in Malta but the

relationship picked up speed, picked up a lot of momentum in Malta and after Malta.

Cor. It wasn't long after Malta that the attempted coup happened. Where were you when it happened? Were you surprised?

P.P. Yes, of course, I was surprised. I was on vacation. On that particular day I was in Moscow and I was supposed to report back to work on August 20, which was the day when the Union Treaty... the Union Treaty into which Gorbachev had really invested so much effort and which was supposed to be signed on that day between Gorbachev, Yeltsin and the leaders of other republics... the Union Treaty was supposed to be signed and I was supposed to report back to work on that day. So instead on August 19 we learned about that coup and I just like everybody I think I was quite surprised.

Cor. I mean it looked from the outside as if obviously it was a great shock to Mr.Gorbachev's self-confidence. And we've never seen quite the same man again. Was that your impression?

P.P. No, no... I think it was a shock to him but he continued to make his best efforts. And I saw him very determined, I saw him very often because at that time I was already working on his staff in the office of the President of the USSR. And I saw him quite often during those days and weeks. And I remember him very, very determined and quite strong, not at all a shaken man.

Cor. You were at his side for most important international meetings that he had throughout that very important period which changed the face of

the whole of Europe and the whole of the world in many ways. How did you feel had he himself changed over those years?

P.P. He is a person who has, I think,... one of his qualities is that he is a person who changes, he is a person whose views evolve and certainly he came to power as someone who believed in the old system,whatever you call that system, Communist or Socialist or Soviet system. And at that time he definitely believed that some kind of partial reform, some kind of facelift could change the system for the better, could make the system work. He also believed that most of the positions, taken by the Soviet Union internationally, were just and right and appropriate. And it was rather gradually but inexorably and always, I think, step by step that those views changed. And in 1988, for example,... he proposed that relatively free and contested elections be held for the first time in the history of the Soviet Union. Obviously, a person had to undergo tremendous evolution to propose that, given that, as I say, he came to power with the belief in the Soviet system. Also internationally he was quite willing to listen to the views of others. And when he saw that any particular Soviet position or policy was incorrect, inappropriate or needed dramatic change, he was willing to accept that. Look at the INF missiles, for example. When he came to believe that the very existence of INF missiles was dangerous for the world and for the Soviet Union, he was able to change that. So I would say that he is a man, who can change his ideology. He developed within himself and in the country the acceptance of democratic process and

that of course is, I still believe, his greatest achievement, probably as important as working to end the Cold War.

Cor. He went through that very difficult situation for a world statesman as his reputation and his popularity grew abroad, it seemed to fall at home. And now he seems not to be very popular at all as we're shown in recent presidential elections. But do you think that his reputation home will change over time?

P.P. Well, perhaps. You never know. You know, Russia is a difficult country. It has a history of not appreciating leaders who work toward at least relative freedom and democracy. Russia doesn't seem yet to appreciate the role, for example, of Tsar Alexander II or of Mr. Khrushchev. So, I don't know. I hope that the Russian people will appreciate Gorbachev as much as the world appreciates him. But I don't know.

Cor. Did you never despair?

P.P. Yes, there were moments of great disappointment and even despair. I still think that the republics of the former Soviet Union should have found the way of working together. And this did not happen and as a result we see many dramatic and even tragic things. That there should have been a better way and there was a better way. It didn't happen and that's very disappointing to me. On the other hand I see that very bumpily and with a lot of problems the democratic process continues in most of those republics. That is a source of hope. So, you know, it's life. There are good days and bad days. There are good periods in history and bad periods in history... and some that are like in between... that's life.

Cor. Did you feel at that time that you were standing at the shoulder of a man who was making history? And do you think that's even more important now?

P.P. I believe that what was done in Gorbachev's time by Gorbachev and other leaders to end the Cold War was tremendously important. I believe that that kind of transition from total nuclear confrontation to cooperation and interaction between the world's biggest countries, biggest powers was done with, I think, miraculous smoothness and the Cold War ended in a kind of a whimper. It ended also, I think, on very fair terms. So, I very much believe in what was done at that time and I really think that it was my great luck to participate in the process.

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