Lady I: Special RelationshipsThatcher and the Foreign Officethe time she embarked on her second term in June 1983, Mrs Thatcher was far more confident in foreign affairs than she had been in 1979. Then she had been the new girl on the international block, admittedly inexperienced and up against established leaders at the head of all her major allies: Jimmy Carter in Washington, Helmut Schmidt in Bonn and Valéry Giscard d’Estaing in Paris. But already by October 1982 – when Schmidt was replaced by Helmut Kohl – she was boasting in her constituency that she was now the most senior Western leader.1 (She did not count Pierre Trudeau, who had been Prime Minister of Canada on and off since 1968.) The longer she remained in office, the more she was able to exploit what she called in her memoirs the ‘huge and cumulative advantage in simply being known both by politicians and by ordinary people around the world’.2 She had scored a notable diplomatic success in Zimbabwe, partial victory on the European budget issue and above all a stunning military triumph in the Falklands. Before the Paras had even landed in San Carlos Bay she was proclaiming, in refutation of Dean Acheson’s famous gibe that Britain had ‘lost an empire and not yet found a role’: ‘I believe Britain has now found a role. It is in upholding international law and teaching the nations of the world how to live.’3 Once the war was won there was no holding her belief that Britain was once again a model to the world.now on she travelled extensively and was royally received wherever she went; she milked her global celebrity to the full. But she always travelled with a purpose, to promote her views and British interests, not just to inform herself as she had done in opposition. Wherever she went she exploited the Falklands triumph as a symbol of Britain’s rebirth under her leadership, her resolution in the cause of freedom, and proven military prowess. ‘Better than any Prime Minister since Macmillan,’ David Reynolds has written, ‘she understood that prestige was a form of power.’4 Every foreign leader who came to London, however insignificant, wanted to be photographed with Madame Thatcher to boost his prestige back home. She posed with them all in front of the fireplace in the entrance hall of Number Ten, and sent them away with a lecture about the free market or the need to combat Communism.[h]all long-serving Prime Ministers, she increasingly wished to be her own Foreign Secretary. She quickly replaced Francis Pym with the more amenable Geoffrey Howe, then treated Howe as little more than her bag carrier, entrusted with the tiresome detail of diplomacy while she handled all the important conversations. She liked dealing directly with the heads of government but had no inhibitions about receiving their foreign ministers or lesser emissaries and thoroughly enjoyed subjecting them to the same sort of interrogation she gave her own ministers: few of them came up to scratch. As Charles Powell put it: ‘She was ready to go toe-to-toe with any world leader from Gorbachev to Deng Xiaoping… She had the huge advantage of being unembarrassable.’6 As a woman she could say things to foreign leaders – most of whom had little experience of female politicians – that no male Prime Minister could have got away with.7and Mrs Thatcher made an excellent partnership precisely because he was the perfect foil to her rampaging style. She positively prided herself on being undiplomatic; but for that very reason she needed him to smooth ruffled feathers and mend broken fences in her wake. In truth she resented the fact that the policies she followed were very often closer to Foreign Office advice than her rhetoric implied. Howe deserves as much of the credit for her foreign policy successes in the second term as he does for holding firm at the Treasury in the first.Thatcher’s conviction that the Foreign Office – officially the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – was a limp institution dedicated to giving away Britain’s vital interests had only been reinforced by her experience since 1979. After the Falklands war she appointed Sir Anthony Parsons, fresh from his brilliant performance at the UN, to be her private foreign-policy adviser in Number Ten. A large part of Parsons’ job, as he described it, was to try to anticipate crises, so that she would not be ‘caught short again as she had been over the Falklands’.8 He stayed for only a year, but was replaced by Sir Percy Cradock, a China specialist who initially handled the Hong Kong negotiations but stayed on to become her general foreign-policy adviser right up to 1990.she travelled with no Foreign Office presence in her party at all, but was accompanied even on important trips only by her own private entourage. When she first visited President Reagan in 1981, for example, she took with her a whole phalanx of senior mandarins and several juniors. By the time she flew right round the world from Beijing and Hong Kong to bend the President’s ear about his ‘Star Wars’ programme in December 1984 she was accompanied only by her two private secretaries, Robin Butler and Charles Powell, and her press secretary, Bernard Ingham. And towards the end it was usually just Powell and Ingham.continued to seek foreign-policy advice from independent academic experts outside the Foreign Office. Though to an extent these tended to tell her what she wanted to hear – or, more accurately, she chose advisers who would tell her what she wanted to hear – it is to her credit that she tried to go beyond the narrow circle of official advice. Nevertheless both her special advisers, Parsons and Cradock, were former FCO insiders; and the most influential of all from 1984 onwards – Charles Powell – was, ironically, a Foreign Office man par excellence.career diplomat in his early forties, Powell succeeded John Coles as Mrs Thatcher’s foreign-affairs private secretary in June 1984 and immediately established an exceptional rapport with her. The basis of their relationship was his skill at drafting: he was brilliant at finding acceptable diplomatic language to express what she wanted to say without fudging it. Second, he needed as little sleep as she did: he was unflagging and ever-present, never went to bed but seemed to be always at her side. In addition, he had a knack of getting things done by informal personal diplomacy of his own: he would go direct to Washington or Paris, behind the back of the official Foreign Office, and fix what she wanted with a word in the right place. He came to be seen as the second most powerful figure in the Government, no longer confined exclusively to foreign affairs but the real deputy Prime Minister, practically her alter ego. ‘It was sometimes difficult,’ Cradock wrote, ‘to establish where Mrs Thatcher ended and Charles Powell began.’9three or four years, by normal Whitehall practice it would have been time for Powell to move on, but Mrs Thatcher refused to let him go. This might not have mattered if he had been just an indispensable Jeeves. But, in fact, the longer he stayed the more his views began to influence Mrs Thatcher’s. Whereas in the earlier years of her premiership Mrs Thatcher was surrounded by overwhelmingly pro-European advice, from about 1986 Powell’s informed and articulate Euroscepticism increasingly encouraged her to follow her own anti-Community and anti-German prejudice – with serious consequences both for herself and for Britain.most of her premiership, however, she actually followed Foreign Office advice far more than she liked to pretend – on Zimbabwe, Hong Kong, Northern Ireland, Eastern Europe and even during her second term on the EC. Though she went to war for the Falklands, she liquidated most of the last vestiges of empire around the world; though famously hostile to Communism, she was persuaded that she could do business with a new generation of Soviet leaders; though an instinctive Unionist, she was likewise persuaded that the only chance of peace in Northern Ireland was with the involvement of Dublin; and against her instinct she took the decisive steps in committing Britain to an integrated Europe.by the objectives she set herself, she was ‘hugely successful’ in foreign affairs.10 First, she played Ronald Reagan skilfully to revive and maximise the US ‘special relationship’; then she spotted and encouraged Mikhail Gorbachev, and acted successfully as an intermediary between him and Reagan. She finally settled the EC budget row and went on to set the pace in promoting the introduction of a single European market. She achieved as good a settlement as could be hoped for in Hong Kong. She defied the world by pursuing her own route to ending apartheid in South Africa and arguably was vindicated by the result. And despite her strongly expressed views, she managed to maintain good relations with almost everyone, not only the leaders of both superpowers, but on both sides of the Jordan and the Limpopo too. In short, one recent history concludes, she ‘utterly transformed Britain’s standing and reputation in the world’.11and Margaretunshakeable cornerstone of Mrs Thatcher’s foreign policy was the United States. She had no time for subtle formulations which saw Britain as the meeting point of overlapping circles of influence, maintaining a careful equidistance between America on the one hand and Europe on the other, with obligations to the Commonwealth somewhere in the background. She had no doubt whatever that Britain’s primary role in the world was as Washington’s number-one ally. No Prime Minister since Churchill had believed so unquestioningly in the mission of ‘the English-speaking peoples’ to lead and save the rest of the world. But she had no illusions about who was the senior partner, nor did she seek to deny the reality of British dependence on the United States. It was the Americans – with British help – who had liberated Europe from the Nazi tyranny in 1944; it was American nuclear protection which had defended Western Europe from Soviet aggression since 1945. ‘Had it not been for the magnanimity of the United States, Europe would not be free today,’ she reminded the Tory Party Conference in 1981 (and repeated on innumerable other occasions). ‘We cannot defend ourselves, either in this island or in Europe, without a close, effective and warmhearted alliance with the United States.’12, she increasingly believed that it was not just America’s military might that underwrote the survival of freedom in the West, but American capitalism, which was the pre-eminent model of that freedom. Nothing made her angrier than the condescension of the British political establishment which viewed America as crude, refreshingly vigorous but sadly naive. She envied the energy and optimism of American society – the unapologetic belief in capitalism and the refusal to look to the state for the solution to every social problem – and wanted Britain to become in every respect (from penal policy to the funding of the arts) more American. She was herself, as one US Ambassador in London shrewdly noted, a very American type of politician: patriotic, evangelical, unafraid of big abstract words, preaching a message of national and even personal salvation quite unlike the usual British (and European) style of ironic scepticism and fatalistic damage limitation.13 Proud as she was of Britain’s glorious past, at the end of the twentieth century a part of her would really rather have been American. Her entourage felt the almost physical charge she got whenever she visited America. ‘When she stepped onto American soil she became a new woman,’ Ronnie Millar noted. ‘She loved America… and America loved her back. There is nothing like the chemistry of mutual admiration.’14was distressed and angered by the overt anti-Americanism of British liberals who professed to see little difference between the Americans and the Russians, or nuclear disarmers who painted the United States as a greater threat to peace than the Soviet Union. There was no group she more passionately despised than academics who abused their personal freedom by equating Tyranny and Freedom. Her world view was uncomplicatedly black and white. ‘This party is pro-American,’ she declared roundly at the 1984 Tory Party Conference.15 Whatever differences she might have with the Americans on specific issues, she was determined to demonstrate on every occasion Britain’s unqualified loyalty to the Atlantic alliance. If she could not be the leader of the free world herself, the next best thing was to be his first lieutenant.as she was lucky in her enemies, Mrs Thatcher was extraordinarily fortunate to coincide for most of her eleven years in Downing Street with an American President who allowed her to play a bigger role within the Alliance than any other Prime Minister since the days of Roosevelt and Churchill. During her first year and a half in office she tried hard to cultivate a good relationship with Jimmy Carter. Deeply as she revered his office, however, she enjoyed no rapport with the well-meaning but in her view hopelessly woolly-minded Democrat. The election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980, by contrast, changed everything. It was not just that Reagan was an ideological soulmate, elected on the same sort of conservative backlash that had brought her to power in Britain. Ideological symmetry does not guarantee a good relationship: it can just as easily make for rivalry. Far more important than the similarity of their ideas was the difference in their political personalities.Reagan was Mrs Thatcher’s opposite, an easygoing, broad-brush politician who made no pretence of mastering the detailed complexities of policy, but was happy to let others – including on occasion Mrs Thatcher – lead and even bully him. The bond of their instinctively shared values was reinforced by sexual chemistry: he had an old-fashioned gallantry towards women, while she had a weakness for tall, charming men (particularly older men) with film-star looks. Out of his depth with most foreign leaders, Reagan knew where he was with Mrs Thatcher, if only because she spoke his language: he understood her, liked her, admired her and therefore trusted her. Unlike Helmut Schmidt, he did not feel threatened in his ‘male pride’ by a strong woman: as Americans often remarked, Margaret Thatcher held no terrors for a man who had been married for thirty years to Nancy Davis. For a politician, Reagan was unusually secure in his own skin. Unlike Mrs Thatcher he did not have to win every argument: he knew what he believed, but shrank from confrontation. Once when she was hectoring him down the telephone from London, he held the receiver away from his ear so that everyone in the room could hear her in full flow, beamed broadly and announced: ‘Isn’t she marvellous?’16 Their contrasting styles served to disguise the disparity in power between Washington and London and for eight years made something approaching reality of the comforting myth of a ‘special relationship’ between Britain and the United States.Thatcher exploited her opportunity with great skill – and uncharacteristic tact. Privately she was clear-sighted about the President’s limitations. ‘If I told you what Mrs Thatcher really thought about President Reagan it would damage Anglo-American relations,’ Nicholas Henderson told Tony Benn some years later.17 ‘Not much grey matter, is there?’ she once reflected.18 But she would never hear a word of criticism from others. In Reagan she put up with a bumbling ignorance she would have tolerated in no one else, partly because he was the President and leader of the free world, but also because she realised that his amiable vagueness gave her a chance to influence American policy that no conventionally hands-on President would have allowed her – as was quickly demonstrated when Reagan was succeeded by George Bush.basis of their partnership was laid back in 1975, when Mrs Thatcher was a newly elected Leader of the Opposition and the ex-Governor of California was just beginning to be talked of as a Presidential candidate. They had immediately found themselves on the same wavelength, and in due course each was delighted by the other’s election.Yet their relationship in office took a little time to develop. By no coincidence Mrs Thatcher was the first major foreign visitor to Washington after Reagan’s inauguration. She stated her position unambiguously at the welcoming ceremony on the White House lawn: ‘We in Britain stand with you…Your problems will be our problems, and when you look for friends we will be there.’ Reagan responded in kind. ‘In a dangerous world,’ he asserted, there was ‘one element that goes without question: Britain and America stand side by side.’19this was the conventional rhetoric of these occasions. At this stage the two leaders were still addressing each other formally on paper as ‘Dear Mr President… Dear Madame Prime Minister’.20 Their working partnership really began at the Ottawa G7 in July 1981. This was Reagan’s first appearance on the global stage, while she was now relatively experienced: he was grateful for her support, both personal and political. She chaperoned and protected him, and made the case for American policy more effectively than he could, on the one hand for market solutions to the world recession against most of the other leaders who favoured more interventionist measures; and on the other in standing firm in support of the deployment of cruise missiles, from which the Europeans – faced with anti-nuclear demonstrations – were beginning to retreat. At the same time she warned Reagan privately that American criticism of European ‘neutralism’ risked provoking exactly the reaction it sought to prevent.21Reagan wrote to her for the first time as ‘Dear Margaret’, thanking her for her ‘important role in our discussions. We might still be drafting the communiqué if it were not for you.’ She in return addressed him for the first time as ‘Dear Ron’.22 Nine months later the Falklands crisis caused a temporary hiccup; but after some initial hesitation Reagan gave Britain the full support Mrs Thatcher felt entitled to expect. Arrangements had already been made for Reagan to visit London after the Versailles summit in June 1982. The trip had been planned at the nadir of Mrs Thatcher’s domestic unpopularity to lend support to an embattled ally; in the event it took place a few days before the Argentine surrender, at the climax of her military triumph. As well as meeting the Prime Minister in Downing Street, the President went riding with the Queen in Windsor Great Park and addressed members of both Houses of Parliament in the Royal Gallery, where he overcame a sceptical audience by praising Britain’s principled stand in the Falklands and borrowing freely from Churchill in asserting the moral superiority of the West. Freedom and democracy, he predicted, would ‘leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history’.[i] While the rest of his visit to Europe was disrupted by anti-nuclear demonstrations, the warmth of his reception in London moved the ‘special relationship’ visibly on to a new level.23subsequent summits Reagan treated Mrs Thatcher explicitly as his prime ally. He was particularly pleased that she found time to attend the Williamsburg summit in the middle of the June 1983 election. White House files show how his staff coordinated with hers to advance their joint agenda, and afterwards he thanked her for her help. ‘Thanks to your contribution during Saturday’s dinner discussion of INF [Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces],’ he told her, ‘we were able to send to the Soviets a clear signal of allied determination and unity.’24 And before the London meeting the following year he wrote to her that he planned to provide her with ‘the same stalwart support’ that she had given him at Williamsburg.25 They made a powerful and well-rehearsed double act.now on Mrs Thatcher invited herself to Washington at the drop of a hat. As soon as she had secured her re-election in June 1983 she asked to come over in September ‘to continue bilateral discussions with the President’.26 ‘She will speak plainly about British interests’, the US Embassy in London warned, ‘and will appreciate plain speaking from us’.27 Henceforth this was the basis of the relationship, as Lady Thatcher explicitly acknowledged in her memoirs: ‘I regarded the quid pro quo for my strong public support of the President as being the right to be direct with him and members of his Administration in private.’28 ‘She not only had her say,’ Richard Perle remembered, ‘but was frequently the dominant influence in decision-making.’29, as an outsider, she was able to have this degree of influence, it was because, compared withWhitehall,Washington is highly decentralised. American government is a continuous struggle between different agencies – the State Department, the Pentagon, the National Security Adviser, the CIA and others – all competing for the President’s ear. Well briefed by the British Embassy, Mrs Thatcher knew the balance of views on every issue and where her intervention, judiciously applied, might be decisive. It was well known that Reagan did not like quarrelling with her, so those Presidential advisers on her side of a particular argument had every incentive to deploy her to clinch their case. George Shultz, who replaced Al Haig as Secretary of State in the summer of 1983, recalled that he always found her influence with Reagan ‘very constructive’, and was ‘shameless’ in calling on her aid when required.30 Others, however, found her interventions maddening.she could not come to Washington in person, she would write or telephone. She regularly reported to Reagan her views on other leaders she had met on her travels, and pressed her ideas of the action he should take in the Middle East or other trouble spots. Sometimes their letters were purely personal, as when they remembered each other’s birthdays, congratulated one another on being re-elected, or expressed horror and relief when the other narrowly escaped assassination. At least once, at the height of the miners’ strike in 1984, Reagan simply sent his friend a note of encouragement. ‘Dear Margaret,’ he wrote:recent weeks I have thought often of you with considerable empathy as I follow the activities of the miners and dockworkers’ unions. I know they present a difficult set of issues for your government. I just wanted you to know that my thoughts are with you as you address these important issues; I’m confident as ever that you and your government will come out of this well. Warm regards, Ron.31years later, when Reagan in turn was in trouble over damaging revelations about his administration’s involvement in the exchange of arms for the release of Iranian hostages, in defiance of its declared policy, Mrs Thatcher rushed publicly to his defence: ‘I believe implicitly in the President’s total integrity on that subject,’ she told a press conference in Washington.32 As the Iran – Contra scandal deepened the following year and America was seized by a mood of gloomy introspection, she visited Washington again – fresh from her own second re-election – and toured the television studios, vigorously denying that Reagan was politically weakened and defending his honour. ‘I have dealt with the President for many, many years,’ she told a CBS interviewer, ‘and I have absolute trust in him.’ Moreover, she insisted, ‘America is a strong country, with a great President, a great people and a great future. Cheer up! Be more upbeat!… You should have as much faith in America as I have.’33fulsome encomiums, repeated every time she went to Washington and lapped up by the American media, were regularly condemned by her opponents at home for showing an excessive degree of grovelling subordination.Yet the truth is that in her private dealings with Washington she never grovelled. On a whole range of issues, from the Falklands to nuclear disarmament, on which she had differences with the Americans, she fought her corner vigorously. As Richard Perle remembered: ‘She never approached the conversations she had… with American officials and with the President from a position of supplication or inferiority. Quite the contrary.’34first battle was over the consequences for British firms of American sanctions on the Soviet Union following the imposition of martial law in Poland in December 1981. She passionately supported the Polish Solidarity movement and was all in favour of concerted Western action to deter the Russians from crushing the flicker of freedom in Poland as they had done in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. But the Americans’ chosen sanction was to halt the construction of an oil pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe, which they proposed to enforce by applying sanctions to European firms, including the British company John Brown Engineering, which had legitimate existing contracts to build the pipeline. This, Mrs Thatcher objected, would hurt the Europeans more than the Russians, while it was not matched by comparable American sacrifices: the Americans had actually ended an embargo on grain exports to Russia which was hitting American farmers in the Midwest. She also objected to the Americans trying to impose American laws on British firms operating outside the USA.once she was speaking for Europe against America. In truth she was fighting for British interests, but, with her usual ability to clothe national interest in a cloak of principle, she was also standing up for sovereignty and the rule of law against American extraterritorial arrogance. ‘The question is whether one very powerful nation can prevent existing contracts being fulfilled,’ she told the House of Commons on 1 July. ‘I think it is wrong to do so.’35 The British Government instructed John Brown not to comply with the US embargo.her main concern was still to prevent damage to the Alliance. ‘The only fly in the ointment,’ she told Weinberger in September, ‘is the John Brown thing.’ ‘She fervently hoped,’ he cabled Reagan, ‘that what the US did would be so minimal that she could ignore it. She desperately needed some face-saving solution.’ Characteristically she was worried about fuelling anti-Americanism. ‘Mrs Thatcher said she had a serious problem with unemployment and bankruptcies, and she didn’t want her closest friend, the United States, to be blamed by her people.’36so often, she knew that she had allies in Washington. In this instance her pressure helped the new Secretary of State, George Shultz, to get the pipeline ban lifted in return for a package of joint measures limiting Soviet imports and the export of technology to Russia.Telling her of his decision on 12 November, Reagan thanked her – and Pym and the British Ambassador in Washington, Sir Oliver Wright – for helping achieve this consensus.37 This was the special relationship in action.the Polish pipeline question was just one of a number of ‘chronic economic irritants’ which Mrs Thatcher felt she had to raise with the Americans every time she visited Washington in the mid-1980s. 38 First there was the fallout of British Airways’ price war with Freddie Laker’s independent airline, Laker Airways, which succeeded in forcing the price-cutting upstart out of business in 1982. Much as she admired Laker as a model entrepreneur, Mrs Thatcher was worried that an American Justice Department investigation into BA’s unscrupulous methods was holding up plans to privatise the national carrier. In March 1983 she appealed ‘personally and urgently’ to Reagan to suspend the investigation, once again threatening that it ‘could have the most serious consequences for British airlines’ and warning that if it was not stopped, ‘our aviation relationship will be damaged and the harm could go wider’.39 Advised by his staff that he could not interfere in the judicial process, Reagan replied regretfully that ‘in this case I feel that I do not have the latitude to respond to your concerns’.40 But seven months later he did stop the investigation – an ‘almost unprecedented’ intervention which left the Justice Department ‘stunned’. In March 1985 Reagan intervened again to persuade BA’s biggest creditors to settle out of court, thus clearing the way for privatisation to begin in 1986.running sore was the attempt of some American states to tax multinational companies on the proportion of their profits deemed to have been earned in that state. British objections to this ‘unitary taxation’ – at a time when British companies were investing heavily in America – bedevilled several of Mrs Thatcher’s meetings with Reagan and his colleagues, before this too was eventually settled to her satisfaction. In this case, however, the resolution probably owed more to American multinationals making the same complaint than it did to Mrs Thatcher’s protests.all, she worried about the impact on Europe of the Americans’ huge budget deficit, caused by the Reagan administration’s policy of tax cuts combined with increased defence spending. After five years the deficit was running at $220 billion a year and the US was the world’s largest debtor nation – especially heavily indebted to Japan. This was Mrs Thatcher’s one serious criticism of her ally’s economic policy. When she had been unable to bring spending under control in 1981 she had felt bound to raise taxes and she could not understand Reagan’s insouciance. At successive G7 summits she warned that the unchecked deficit would raise interest rates and ‘choke off world recovery’.41 In fact US interest rates fell in the second half of 1984 and the booming US economy led the world out of recession. But still Mrs Thatcher worried, though she was reluctant to criticise in public. She wrote to him that she remained ‘very concerned by… the continuing surge of the dollar’:firm programme for the reduction of the budget deficit is the most important safeguard against financial instability and I wish you every success with your Budget proposals to Congress.tried, in his fashion; but in practice the conflicting priorities of the Republican White House and a Democrat-dominated Congress ensured that the deficit persisted for the rest of the decade.even more sensitive issue on which Mrs Thatcher’s intransigence exasperated Washington was the future of the Falklands. The Americans had, with some misgivings, eventually backed what the Washington Post called her ‘seemingly senseless, small but bloody war’ in the South Atlantic.42 But as soon as the fighting was over, Washington’s priority was to resume normal relations with Argentina (and South America as a whole) as quickly as possible, and renew the search for a lasting peace settlement. Even in his message of congratulation on her victory, Reagan stated firmly that ‘A just war requires a just peace. We look forward to consulting with you and to assisting in the building of such a peace.’43 An invitation to her to visit Washington a few days later was couched explicitly as an opportunity to consider how to achieve this goal.44Mrs Thatcher was not interested in a just peace. So far as she was concerned, she had defeated the aggressor, at great risk and considerable sacrifice, and she was not now willing to negotiate away what her forces had won. As she defiantly put it: ‘We have not sent British troops and treasure 8,000 miles to establish a UN trusteeship.’45first test of her flexibility came that autumn, when several Latin American countries sponsored a UN resolution calling for renewed negotiations to end what they called ‘the colonial situation’ in the Falklands. Mrs Thatcher immediately cabled Reagan asking that the US should oppose the resolution. But George Shultz and others in the administration – not least Jeane Kirkpatrick, still the American Ambassador at the UN – believed that the US should support it, since the whole purpose of the UN was to promote the peaceful resolution of disputes. Shultz initially feared that Reagan would take Mrs Thatcher’s side. ‘But I found that he too was getting a little fed up with her imperious attitude in the matter.’46 The President ticked his agreement to Mrs Kirkpatrick backing the resolution, and wrote a delicate letter – in reply to what his staff called ‘Mrs Thatcher’s latest blast’ – to explain why. Nevertheless the sting was that he was still going to support the UN resolution, which was duly carried by a large majority, with only a dozen Commonwealth countries joining Britain in opposing it.Thatcher continued adamantly to reject any possibility of negotiations on the question of sovereignty. A year later, however, with a democratically elected government now installed in Buenos Aires, the State Department took a further step towards normalising relations by ‘certifying’ Argentina as eligible for a resumption of American arms sales. This, Reagan assured Mrs Thatcher, merely ended the embargo imposed in 1982. ‘Certification does not mean arms sales.’47 The announcement was tactfully postponed for a day to spare her embarrassment in the House of Commons; Vice-President George Bush thanked her for her understanding response.48 For the next three years Reagan deferred to her sensitivity, and no arms were sold; but by 1986 the pressure from the Pentagon was becoming irresistible. Once again Mrs Thatcher went straight to the top. ‘You should expect a typical Thatcher barrage,’ John Poindexter briefed Reagan before their meeting at Camp David following the Reagan – Gorbachev summit at Reykjavik. ‘You will want to tell Mrs Thatcher that we cannot continually put off how best to nurture Argentina’s democracy.’49 But this time she was more subtle, waiting until almost the last minute before dropping a final item almost casually into the conversation, as Geoffrey Smith described. ‘“Oh, arms to Argentina,” she said, for all the world like a housewife checking that she had not forgotten some last piece of shopping. “You won’t, will you?”’To the horror of his officials, Reagan fell for it. ‘“No,” he replied. “We won’t.” So in one short sentence he killed weeks of careful preparation within his administration.’50most serious public disagreement of their whole eight-year partnership came in October 1983, when the Americans sent troops to the tiny Caribbean island of Grenada to put down a coup by a gang of left-wing thugs against the elected – but already Marxist – government led by Maurice Bishop. The Americans were always concerned about any left-wing takeover on their Caribbean doorstep and, fearful of another Cuba, had already been doing their best to destabilise Bishop’s regime ever since 1979. But Grenada was a member of the Commonwealth, whose head of state was the Queen. The Foreign Office was alarmed at events on the island, but believed there was nothing to be done, since Grenada was a sovereign country. Several neighbouring Caribbean states, however, concerned for their own security, did want something done, and appealed to Washington for help. The Americans responded by diverting ships to the island, ostensibly to evacuate several hundred American students, but in fact to mount a counter-coup. They did so without consulting or even informing Mrs Thatcher until it was too late to halt the action. As a result she was humiliated by the revelation that her vaunted relationship with Washington was rather less close than she pretended.story of her reaction to the news of the American invasion has been vividly told from both sides of the Atlantic. According to Carol’s life of Denis, Reagan telephoned while her mother was attending a dinner – ironically at the US Embassy. As soon as she got back to Downing Street she phoned Reagan back and railed at him for several minutes: some versions say a quarter of an hour. ‘She didn’t half tick him off,’ Denis told Carol. ‘“You have invaded the Queen’s territory and you didn’t even say a word to me,” she said to him, very upset. I think that Reagan was a bit shocked. There was nothing gentle about her tone, and not much diplomacy either.’51diplomatic exchanges tell a slightly different story. Washington received the call for help from the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), led by the formidable Mrs Eugenia Charles, Prime Minister of Dominica, on Sunday 23 October. The same day a suicide attack in Beirut killed some 300 American soldiers serving in the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon. There was no logical connection, but there was no doubt in British minds that the American resolve to act quickly in Grenada was fuelled by the outrage in Beirut: it was easier to hit back in Grenada than in Lebanon. Reagan and his military advisers decided almost immediately to accede to the OECS request and began planning the operation in the greatest secrecy. At four o’clock on Monday afternoon, in reply to a question from Denis Healey about the possibility of American intervention in Grenada, Howe told the Commons in good faith that he knew of no such intention: American ships were in the area solely to take off US citizens if it should become necessary, just as Britain had HMS Antrim in the area for the same purpose. Pressed further by a Labour MP, he assured the House that ‘we are keeping in the closest possible touch with the United States Government… I have no reason to think that American military intervention is likely.’52than three hours later, however, at 6.47 p.m., while Mrs Thatcher was still in Downing Street hosting a reception, there came a cable from Reagan telling her that he was giving ‘serious consideration’ to the OECS request. He assured her that if an invasion did go ahead, the British Governor-General would be the key figure in appointing a provisional government as soon as the troops had landed. He also promised categorically: ‘I will… undertake to inform you in advance should our forces take part in the proposed collective security force, or of whatever political or diplomatic efforts we plan to pursue. It is of some assurance to know I can count on your support and advice on this important issue.’53Thatcher received this message before she went out to dinner but, in view of the promise of further consultation, did not think it required an immediate reply. Only three hours later, however, at ten o’clock, there came a second, much shorter cable, in which the President informed her curtly: ‘I have decided to respond positively to this request.’forces will establish themselves in Grenada. The collective Caribbean security force will disembark on Grenada shortly thereafter… We will inform you of further developments as they occur. Other allies will be apprised of our actions after they are begun.expect that a new provisional government will be formed in Grenada shortly after the collective security force arrives. We hope that Her Majesty’s government will join us by extending support to Grenada’s new leaders.54these two cables clearly show is that the Americans were perfectly well aware of Britain’s primary responsibility in Grenada, but had decided that Mrs Thatcher’s support for unilateral US action could be taken for granted. As a robust Cold Warrior, they assumed, the Iron Lady would applaud the suppression of a Communist coup anywhere in the world. But if they thought she would be gratified to be informed a few hours before the other allies, they were badly mistaken. She was outraged, first that the Americans should think of invading the Queen’s territory, which touched in her the same patriotic trigger as the Argentine invasion of the Falklands; worse still that they should do it without telling her. There is no doubt that she felt personally let down. But she did not get on the telephone immediately. First she held a midnight meeting with Howe and Michael Heseltine. They agreed a reply setting out Britain’s objections to military action and urging the Americans to hold their hand. In addition, Mrs Thatcher worried that America intervening militarily in the Caribbean would be used by the Russians to legitimise their invasion of Afghanistan. She told her staff that she remembered seeing newspaper placards in 1956 reading ‘Britain Invades Egypt’ and knew instantly that it was wrong.55after sending Britain’s reasoned objection did she telephone Reagan, at about two o’clock in the morning, London time. Unfortunately no transcript of her call was made. But both Howe, in his memoirs, and Mrs Thatcher at the time, contradict the story that she gave the President an earful. All she did was to ask him to consider carefully the advice in her cabled message. So much for her giving Reagan ‘a prime ticking off’.few hours later – just before 7.00 a.m. in London, just before 2.00 a.m. in Washington and only three hours before the troops landed – came Reagan’s reply, diplomatic but uncompromising. He thanked Mrs Thatcher for her ‘thoughtful message’, claimed to have ‘weighed very carefully’ the issues she had raised, but insisted that while he appreciated the dangers inherent in a military operation, ‘on balance, I see this as the lesser of two risks’. He stressed the danger of Soviet influence in Grenada, felt that he had no choice but to intervene, and repeated his hope that ‘as we proceed, in cooperation with the OECS countries, we would have the active cooperation of Her Majesty’s Government’ and the support of the Governor-General in establishing an interim government.56afternoon Howe had to explain to the Commons why he had inadvertently misled the House the day before. He still claimed to have kept ‘closely in touch’ with the American Government over the weekend, and confirmed that he and Mrs Thatcher had opposed military intervention; but he could not deny that their advice had not been asked until it was too late and had been ignored when given. He could not endorse the American action, but neither could he condemn it, leaving himself open to the mockery of Denis Healey, who savaged the Government’s ‘impression of pitiable impotence’. Not for the first time, he charged, Mrs Thatcher had allowed ‘President Reagan to walk all over her’.57day – during an uncomfortable Commons debate – Reagan rang to apologise for the embarrassment he had caused her. This time the transcript shows Mrs Thatcher to have been uncharacteristically monosyllabic. But the action was under way now and she hoped it would be successful.her turn came to face questions in the Commons, Mrs Thatcher was obliged to put the best face possible on her humiliation. Needled by Labour glee at the breach of her special relationship, she made the best case she could for the American action, recalling that they had intervened to restore democracy in Dominica in exactly the same way in 1965.58 Nevertheless, she was still seething. ‘That man!’, she railed. ‘After all I’ve done for him, he didn’t even consult me.’59 On a late-night BBC World Service phone-in, she vented her fury on an American caller who accused her of failing to stand alongside the Americans in fighting Communism:in the Western countries, the Western democracies, use our force to defend our way of life. We do not use it to walk into other people’s countries, independent sovereign territories… If you are pronouncing a new law that wherever Communism reigns against the will of the people… there the United States shall enter, we are going to have really terrible wars in the world.60Americans were bewildered by Mrs Thatcher’s attitude. They did not understand her sensitivity about the Commonwealth and could not see that their action was any different from what she herself had done in the Falklands. Senior members of the administration were angry that Britain did not give them the same support they had given Britain in the South Atlantic. Reagan regretted the dispute, but was unrepentant because he thought she was ‘just plain wrong’.61 And in due course, as it became clear that the invasion – unlike some other American military interventions – had been wholly successful in its limited objectives, Mrs Thatcher herself came to feel that she had been wrong to oppose it. At any rate she quickly put the episode behind her and set herself to making sure that there was no lasting damage to her most important international relationship.tension passed. Nevertheless Mrs Thatcher’s initial reaction to Grenada was a telling glimpse of her ultimate priority. Disposed as she was to defer to American leadership, her instinct was to repel any infringement of what she saw as British – or in this case Commonwealth – sovereignty. Had she been consulted she might well have agreed to a joint operation to restore democracy. She wanted to be America’s partner, not its poodle. She was deeply hurt by Reagan’s failure to consult her, but the lesson she learned was that next time the Americans needed her she must not let them down.test came in April 1986, when Washington was provoked by a spate of terrorist attacks on American tourists and servicemen in Europe, presumed to be the work of Libyan agents. Libya’s eccentric President, Colonel Gaddafi, had been a particular bête noire of Reagan’s from the moment he entered the White House, and by 1986 Reagan was itching to punish him. When a TWA plane was sabotaged over Greece on 2 April, and five servicemen were killed by a bomb in a Berlin nightclub three days later, the President determined to bomb Tripoli in retaliation. The US plan involved using F-111s based in Britain, partly for accuracy, but also deliberately to involve the European allies in the action. But Reagan’s request put Mrs Thatcher on the spot at a time when her authority was weakened by the Westland crisis. France and Spain refused the Americans permission to overfly their territory; and Mrs Thatcher knew she would invite a political storm if she agreed to let the American mission fly from British bases.too had suffered from Libyan terrorism – notably the shooting of a London policewoman in 1984. MI5 had no doubt of Libya’s responsibility for the latest attacks. But again Mrs Thatcher worried about the legality of the proposed action. Just three months earlier, speaking to American journalists in London, she had explicitly condemned retaliatory action against terrorism. ‘I must warn you that I do not believe in retaliatory strikes that are against international law,’ she declared. ‘Once you start going across borders then I do not see an end to it… I uphold international law very firmly.’62 Some time earlier she had refused to endorse an Israeli attack on the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in Tunis, asking Garret FitzGerald to imagine what the Americans would say if Britain ‘bombed the Provos in Dundalk’.63 She had also refused to follow a unilateral American embargo on Libyan oil.when Reagan asked her permission, late in the evening of 8 April, she felt that she had no choice but to agree. Particularly after Grenada, she could not afford to deny the Americans the payback to which they felt they were entitled after the Falklands. In her view – and theirs – this was what the Alliance was all about. ‘The cost to Britain of not backing American action,’ she wrote in her memoirs, ‘was unthinkable.’64 Her only escape was to try to convince the Americans that retaliation would be counterproductive. After hasty consultation she sent back a holding reply asking for more detail about intended targets, warning of the risk of civilian casualties and spelling out the danger that the United States would be seen to be in breach of international law unless the action could plausibly be justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter as ‘self-defence’.next day she held more ad hoc meetings with relevant ministers, including the Attorney-General, Michael Havers. All were unhappy, but their doubts only hardened Mrs Thatcher’s resolve, as Charles Powell recalled:Foreign Office were whole-heartedly against it, believing it would lead to all our embassies in the Middle East being burned, all our interests there ruined. But she knew it was the right thing to do and she just said, ‘This is what allies are for… If one wants help, they get help.’ It just seemed so simple to her.65the event, when the television news showed pictures of the dead and injured in the streets of Tripoli, the opposition parties once again condemned her slavish subservience to American wishes, asserting that British complicity in the bombing would expose British travellers to retaliation. Opinion polls showed 70 per cent opposition to the American action – ‘even worse than I had feared’, Mrs Thatcher wrote in her memoirs.66 But in public she was defiant. ‘It was inconceivable to me,’ she told the House of Commons, ‘that we should refuse United States aircraft and personnel the opportunity to defend their people.’67opponent who backed her was the SDP leader David Owen. In his view Mrs Thatcher not only displayed courage and loyalty, but demonstrated ‘one of the distinguishing features of great leadership – the ability to turn a blind eye to… legal niceties’. In the event, he believed, ‘the bombing did deter Libya… even though it was, by any legal standard, retaliation not self-defence and therefore outside the terms of the UN Charter’.68 In her memoirs Lady Thatcher too defended the bombing as having been justified by results. ‘It turned out to be a more decisive blow against Libyan-sponsored terrorism than I could ever have imagined… The much-vaunted Libyan counter-attack did not… take place… There was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years.’69 There is a problem, here, however. The Thatcher – Owen defence is contradicted by the verdict of the Scottish court in the Netherlands which convicted a Libyan agent of the bombing of the US airliner over Lockerbie in 1989 which killed 289 people, the most serious terrorist outrage of the whole decade. Oddly, Mrs Thatcher fails to mention Lockerbie in her memoirs. This might be because it dents her justification of the American action in 1986. Alternatively it could be because she knew that the attribution of guilt to Libya – rather than Syria or the PLO – was false.[j]her principal reason at the time for backing the American raid was to show herself – by contrast with the feeble Europeans – a reliable ally; and in this she was triumphantly successful. Doubts raised in Washington by her reaction to Grenada were drowned in an outpouring of praise and gratitude. ‘The fact that so few had stuck by America in her time of trial,’ she wrote, ‘strengthened the “special relationship”.’71 She got her payback later that summer when Congress – after years of Irish-American obstruction – approved a new extradition treaty, closing the loophole which had allowed IRA terrorists to evade extradition by claiming that their murders were ‘political’. The Senate only ratified the new treaty after pressure from Reagan explicitly linking it to Britain’s support for the US action in April. Here was one clear benefit from the special relationship.the Cold Warthese were side shows. The central purpose of the Atlantic alliance was to combat the Soviet Union; and it was here that the eight years of the Reagan – Thatcher partnership saw the most dramatic movement. The sudden breach of the Berlin Wall in 1989, followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union itself a couple of years later, were totally unpredicted and, even as the events unfolded, unexpected.Yet both Reagan and Mrs Thatcher had been working for exactly that result; and with hindsight it can be seen that their dual-track strategy in the mid-1980s was staggeringly successful in bringing it about.Mrs Thatcher had always been unrestrained in condemning the Soviet Union as a tyrannical force for evil in the world, she also believed – just because it was so repressive – that it must eventually collapse from lack of popular support and economic failure. She wanted to win the Cold War by helping it to do so: to encourage the Russian people and their subject populations in Eastern Europe to throw off the shackles by their own efforts and find freedom for themselves. She was very excited by the Solidarity movement in Poland, and disappointed when it seemed to peter out under the initial impact of General Jaruzelski’s martial law. Beneath her hatred of Communism she even retained traces of a wartime schoolgirl’s admiration for the heroic sacrifices of the Russian people in the struggle against Hitler. She never lost sight of the ordinary people behind the Iron Curtain.this time the Cold War appeared to be at its bleakest. NATO was in the process of stationing cruise missiles in Europe in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20s. Reagan – widely portrayed in Europe as a trigger-happy cowboy – had embarked on an expensive programme of modernising America’s nuclear arsenal, and in March 1983 made his famous speech in Orlando, Florida, labelling the Soviet Union an ‘evil empire… the focus of evil in the modern world’.72 The Russians had a propaganda field day denouncing his warmongering provocation; but just six months later they furnished graphic evidence of what he meant by shooting down a South Korean airliner which strayed accidentally into Soviet air space, with the loss of 269 lives.it was at this very moment that Mrs Thatcher started making overtures to the Soviet Union. Leonid Brezhnev had died in November 1982 and she was keen to establish early contact with the new General-Secretary, the younger but still stone-faced Yuri Andropov. She began to look seriously for openings after June 1983.8 September she held an all-day seminar at Chequers with academic experts on the Soviet Union to look at the possibilities. An urgent consideration was the recognition that defence spending could not go on rising indefinitely.73 Britain (5.2 per cent) already spent a substantially higher proportion of GDP on defence than either France (4.2 per cent) or West Germany (3.4 per cent).74 Reagan might reckon that the US could always outspend the Soviets, but Mrs Thatcher did not have the same resources. She needed a fresh approach. In Washington three weeks later, therefore, and in her party conference speech a fortnight after that, she surprised her hearers by sounding a new note of peaceful coexistence based on realism: ‘We have to deal with the Soviet Union,’ she asserted. ‘We live on the same planet and we have to go on sharing it.’75next step was to make her first trip as Prime Minister behind the Iron Curtain. In February 1984 she visited Hungary, selected as one part of the Soviet empire that was marginally freer than the rest, and had a long talk with the veteran leader, János Kádár, who welcomed her new concern for East – West cooperation and filled her in on the personalities to watch in the Kremlin. As usual, she passed on her impressions to the White House. ‘I am becoming convinced,’ she wrote to Reagan, ‘that we are more likely to make progress on the detailed arms control negotiations if we can establish a broader basis of understanding between East and West… It will be a slow and gradual process, during which we must never lower our guard. However, I believe that the effort has to be made.’76few days after she returned from Hungary, Andropov died. Mrs Thatcher immediately decided to attend his funeral. There she met not only his successor, the elderly and ailing Konstantin Chernenko; but also Mikhail Gorbachev, who was clearly the coming man. ‘I spotted him’, she claims in her memoirs, ‘because I was looking for someone like him.’77 In fact the Canadians had already spotted him – Trudeau had told her about Gorbachev the previous September; and nearer home Peter Walker had also met him and drawn attention to him before she went to Moscow.78 Even so, she did well to seize the initiative by inviting Gorbachev – at that time the youngest member of the Soviet politburo – to visit Britain. ‘Our record at picking winners had not been good,’ Percy Cradock reflected. But in Gorbachev’s case ‘we drew the right card’.79came to Britain the following December. He was not yet Soviet leader, and Mrs Thatcher was accompanied by several of her colleagues; but over lunch at Chequers the two champions quickly dropped their agendas and simply argued, so freely that their interpreters struggled to keep up. Gorbachev was ‘an unusual Russian’, Mrs Thatcher told Reagan at Camp David the following week, ‘in that he was much less constrained, more charming, open to discussion and debate, and did not stick to prepared notes’.80
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