: “... Cheney was invoking the precautionary principle.” For a fuller discussion, see Jessica Stern and Jonathan Wiener, “Precaution Against Terrorism, ” a paper issued by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University.
: “... will ‘set off a bomb that contains nuclear or biological material.’ ” The portrayal of WMDs as doomsday weapons, and the obsessive focus on them that follows, can lead even the most sophisticated thinkers to some truly bad conclusions. In November 2007, the esteemed professor of Near Eastern studies Bernard Lewis cast the fight against terrorism as the third great fight against totalitarianism, after the struggles against Naziism and Communism. But there is an important difference, Lewis wrote. The Nazis “had no weapons of mass destruction. The Soviets had them, but were deterred from using them by what came to be known as ‘mutually assured destruction.’ Our present adversaries either have or will soon have weapons of mass destruction, but for them, with their apocalyptic mind-set, mutual assured destruction would not be a deterrent; it would be an inducement. ” Thus, according to Lewis, neither a genocidal maniac who came within a hair of conquering Europe and dominating the planet nor a superpower capable of snuffing out civilization on 15 minutes notice were as dangerous as scattered bands of fanatics who may, someday, get their hands on a WMD or two.
: “... of death or 9/11 increased support for the president.” See Sheldon Solomon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski, Fatal Attraction, Psychological Science 17:10.
: “... war on terrorism is ‘the defining conflict of our time,’ Giuliani proclaimed. ” Giuliani’s obsessive focus on 9/11 never wavered as the months went by, prompting Democratic Senator Joe Biden to joke that every sentence uttered by the former mayor of New York contains three things: “A noun, a verb and 9/11.”
: “... worldwide economic depression and martial law in America.” Clarke’s disaster scenario is a little more detailed and extravagant than most but otherwise it’s typical of the genre. In Whose War Is It? (HarperCollins Canada, Scarborough, Ontario, 2007), Canadian historian and security pundit Jack Granatstein opens with a graphic description of an earthquake devastating Vancouver on the morning of February 12, 2008. Seizing the moment, Islamist terrorists detonate a bomb in Montreal and release anthrax in Toronto. “It did not take long before mobs were roughing up anyone who appeared to be of Middle East origin, and women in burkas were punched and kicked.” The Canadian military, its meager resources committed wholly in Afghanistan, is incapable of intervening. Chaos looms. Appalled American politicians close the border. The Toronto Stock Exchange plunges. The economy reels. If it’s not already apparent, the central argument of Whose War Is It? is that the Canadian military and security services desperately need more funding—and if they don’t get it, well, just imagine what could happen.
: “... that this terrible threat is far more likely to happen than logic suggests. ” One reasonable way to tackle potentially catastrophic scenarios would be to look to real experience of the threats under discussion. But that rarely happened. For all the talk of killer viruses, for example, few mentioned that the last smallpox outbreak in Europe (Yugoslavia, 1972) resulted in only 35 deaths. Nor was much attention given to what happened when an unknown killer virus suddenly appeared in the heart of Europe: It was 1967 and laboratory staff working with African monkeys in the German town of Marburg became infected with what was to be dubbed “Marburg virus,” a close relative of Ebola. In the imaginations of journalists or terrorism experts, this incident would undoubtedly end with horrific loss of life, but the reality was considerably less dramatic: There were 32 infections and seven deaths.
: “... got a tiny fraction of the initial, misleading coverage.” Many other cases followed the same trajectory. Most notoriously, when Jose Padilla, an American citizen and Muslim convert, was arrested in May 2002, the Bush administration triumphantly proclaimed that Padilla had been part of a plot to explode a so-called dirty bomb. It was huge news all over the world. Held incommunicado, Padilla sat in limbo. Then, two years later, the Justice Department quietly acknowledged that Padilla had not been planning to explode a dirty bomb. The plot was to turn on the gas in an apartment and ignite it, the department alleged. What had been waved about as proof of terrorists on the cusp of deploying weapons of mass destruction turned out to be nothing more than allegations of a minor, bumbling plot that came to nothing. More time passed. Finally Padilla went to trial and the allegations shrank further: Padilla was alleged to have trained with terrorists in Afghanistan but was not accused of planning any specific attack. And the media? As the allegations got smaller, so did the coverage. By the time Padilla stood trial, he and his case were largely forgotten—leaving intact the impression made years before that the government had narrowly averted a major assault by terrorists armed with a weapon of mass destruction.pattern of gross official exaggeration was obvious but still the media didn’t hesitate to trumpet new announcements of catastrophes averted. In June 2006, simultaneous press conference in Washington and Miami were called to announce the arrest of a group of men in Florida who were conspiring to, as the indictment put it, “levy war in the United States”—a phrase echoed by the U.S. attorney general, who said the men intended to launch a “full ground war.” Among their plans was the destruction of the Sears Tower in Chicago, reporters were told. Soon, however, it became clear that the men were not quite the highly trained and tenacious terror cell they had been made out to be. In fact, they had no connections with al-Qaeda, no training, no weapons, no equipment, and no plans. An undercover government agent pretending to be with al-Qaeda bought them boots. They were, in short, nothing more than a handful of thuggish malcontents playing “international terrorist”—a realitythat, once revealed, did not get a fraction of the media attention garnered by the original press conferences.
: “In Cohen’s mind, there simply is no Door Number 3.” It sometimes seems that, in media coverage of terrorism, frightening statements and skeptical scrutiny are inversely correlated. Consider that in September 2007, Ron Kessler, an investigative reporter and author of several books on terrorism, told a reporter with the Ottawa Citizen that “it’s fairly easy for them [al-Qaeda] to get nuclear devices either out of Russia or from their own scientists.” On its face, this is a dubious statement. If it’s “fairly easy,” why haven’t they already done so? But Kessler was not asked this rather self-evident question. It was simply passed along unchallenged by the wide-eyed reporter. In 2006, CNN.com even managed to turn literally nothing into a threatening story by noting that al-Qaeda had “gone quiet”—the top leaders had not released video- or audiotapes for some time—and speculating on what the silence could mean. In May 2007, USA Today found it alarming that al-Qaeda had not struck the U.S.: “Intelligence analysts say the lack of an al-Qaeda led strike here may signal that the group is waiting until it can mount an attack that will equal the 9/11 strikes in casualties and publicity value.”
: “... the politics had changed and so had Rich’s standards about what constituted reliable proof.” Similarly, Mother Jones—the venerable magazine of the American left—declared terrorism to be a growing menace in March 2007. “The Iraq Effect: War Has Increased Terrorism Sevenfold Worldwide” read the headline about a study commissioned by the magazine that had found a huge spike in “fatal jihadist attacks worldwide.” Britain’s The Independent newspaper, reporting with evident delight on the same study, ran the headline: “How the War on Terror Made the World a More Terrifying Place.” Buried deep within both stories was the critical fact that the surge in terrorism was happening almost exclusively in the Middle East and South Asia. The fact that the infinitesimal risk to any one person in America or Europe had not budged was left unmentioned.
: “... in order to make the generals race there....” In a September 2007 video, bin Laden also boasted that “19 young men” were able to radically change American policy and “the subject of mujahedeen has become an inseparable part of the speech of your leader.”
: “... recognize that terrorism is a psychological tactic.” As novelist William Gibson put it in an interview, “terrorism is a con game. It doesn’t always work. It depends on the society you are playing it on. It certainly has worked in the United States.”
: “... is much lower than it is commonly portrayed, it, too, is real.” Oddly, one can plausibly argue that too little money has been spent mitigating the risk of nuclear terrorism—which may be an improbable form of terrorism but is nonetheless the greatest terrorist threat simply by virtue of the number of lives it endangers. At least half the Russian facilities with nuclear materials still have not received security upgrades because American funding for the program that does this work is so limited. Similarly, huge quantities of plutonium that the Russians agreed to destroy were simply put in storage because there was no money to do the job. The UN’s International Atomic Energy Agency—the world’s nuclear watchdog—has a budget of only $130 million and its director often has to go begging for cash. “The agency constantly risks lagging behind in the technology race because we are forced to make do on a shoestring budget,” Mohamed El Baradei told the Associated Press in 2007. Ted Turner and Warren Buffett became major funders of nuclear security initiatives after the billionaires discovered how the work was being shortchanged by the world’s governments.I2
: “... started inching up. In 1900, it stood at forty-eight years.” See Robert Fogel, The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death: 1700-2100.
: “... died before they were five years old....” See Samuel H. Preston and Michael Haines, Fatal Years: Child Mortality in Late Nineteenth-Century America, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1991. The authors show that the toll was distributed throughout American society. Losing children was a common experience even for the very wealthy.
: “... life expectancy will rise in every region of the world.” See Colin Mather and Dejan Loncar Projections of Global Mortality and Burdens of Disease from 2002 to 2030, Public Library of Science Medicine 3, no. 11 (November 2006).
: “... to err is human, but, happily for us, we are not human.” In a series of experiments, psychologists Emily Pronin, Daniel Lin and Lee Ross gave Stanford University students booklets describing eight biases identified by psychologists. They then asked how susceptible the “average American”is to each of these biases. The average student at Stanford? You? In every case, the students said the average student is quite susceptible, but they are much less so. The researchers got the same results when they ran a version of the test in the San Francisco International airport. In more elaborate experiments, Pronin, Lin, and Ross sat people down in pairs and had them take what they said was a “social intelligence” test. The test was bogus. One of the two test-takers—chosen randomly—was given a high score. The other was given a low score. Then they were asked whether they thought the test was an accurate measure of social intelligence. In most cases, the person who got the high score said it was, while the poor guy who got the low score insisted it was not. That’s a standard bias at work—psychologists call it the “self-serving bias.” But then things got interesting. The researchers explained what the “self-serving bias” is and then they asked whether that bias might have had any influence on their judgment. Why, yes, most said. It did influence the other guy’s judgment. But me? Not really.
: “... much more confident of those outcomes than the Thomas Friedman of 1985 really was.” In 2005, four out of five Canadians agreed that “the world is not as safe a place today as it was when I was growing up.” Particularly extraordinary is that 85 percent of Canadians born during or prior to the Second World War agreed with this statement: Thus, almost everyone who grew up in an era characterized by the rise of totalitarian nightmares, economic collapse, and world war agreed that the world today is more dangerous than that. (See Reginald Bibby, The Boomer Factor, Bastian Books, Toronto, Canada, 2006.)
: “... they tend to focus on the negative side of things, for some reason....” Just as it is possible to look into the future and imagine horrible things happening, it is possible to dream up wondrous changes. Vaccines for malaria and AIDS would save the lives of hundreds of millions of people. Genetically engineered crops could bring an abundance of cheap food to the world’s masses. Hyperefficient forms of alternative energy may make fossil fuels obsolete and radically mitigate climate change. In combination, they may usher in an unparalleled Golden Age—which is as likely as some of the more outlandish scenarios in Catastrophist writing.
: “... satisfied and they changed ‘century’ to ‘hour.’” The full, terrifying title is Our Final Hour: A Scientist’s Warning: How Terror, Error and Environmental Disaster Threaten Humankind’s Future in This Century—On Earth and Beyond. Much of the book is purely speculative. Rees notes, for example, that if nanotechnology got out of control and became self-replicating it could turn the world into “gray goo.” This is far beyond any technology humanity has invented or will invent for the foreseeable future, Rees acknowledges, and the only thing making it even a theoretical possibility is the fact that it doesn’t violate any laws of physics. As British science writer Oliver Morton wrote in reviewing Rees’s book, “if we’re to take the risk seriously, we need something more to gnaw on than the fact that it breaks no laws of physics. Neither do invisible rabbits.”READING, Thomas, Dale Griffin, and Daniel Kahneman (eds.), Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002., Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky (eds.), Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1982., Sarah, and Paul Slovic (eds.), The Construction of Preference, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006., Paul, The Perception of Risk, Earthscan, London, UK, 2000., Cass R., Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2005., Cass R., Risk and Reason: Safety, Law, and the Environment, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002., Arthur, Vaccine: The Controversial Story of Medicine’s Greatest Lifesaver, Norton, New York, 2007., Max, and Michael D. Watkins, Predictable Surprises: The Disasters You Should Have Seen Coming and How to Prevent Them, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 2004., Joel, Damned Lies and Statistics: Untangling Numbers from the Media, Politicians, and Activists, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2001., Peter, and Hans Rickman, Comet/Asteroid Impacts and Human Society, Springer, New York, 2007., Joanna, Fear: A Cultural History, Virago Press, London, 2005., David M. (ed.), The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, 2005., Rachel, Silent Spring, Mariner Books, Boston, MA, 2002., Lee, Worst Cases: Terror and Catastrophe in the Popular Imagination, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 2006., Richard A., Against All Enemies: Inside America’s War on Terror, Free Press, New York, 2004., Mary, and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection of Technological and Environmental Dangers, University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 1983., Robin, Louise Barrett, and John Lycett, Evolutionary Psychology, One-world Publications, Oxford, UK, 2005., James, Paul Slovic, and Howard Kunreuther (eds.), Risk, Media and Stigma: Understanding Public Challenges to Modern Science and Technology, Earthscan, London, UK, 2001., Robert William, The Escape from Hunger and Premature Death, 1700- 2100, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004., Frank, Culture of Fear, Continuum, London, 1997., Malcolm, Blink: The Power of Thinking Without Thinking, Little, Brown & Company, Boston, MA, 2005., Barry, The Culture of Fear, Basic Books, New York, 1999., Indur M., The Improving State of the World, Cato Institute, Washington, DC, 2007., Arthur, The Idea of Decline in Western History, Free Press, New York, 1997., Brian Michael, Unconquerable Nation: Knowing Our Enemy, Strengthening Ourselves, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, CA, 2006., Lawrence H., War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful Savage, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996., Thomas, Don’t Believe Everything You Think: The Six Basic Mistakes We Make in Thinking, Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY, 2006., S. Robert, and Stanley Rothman, Environmental Cancer—A Political Disease? Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1999., Bjorn (ed.), How to Spend $50 Billion to Make the World a Better Place, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006., Deborah (ed.), Risk and Sociocultural Theory, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1999., Ian S., Trapped in the War on Terror, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, PA, 2006., Bill, Global Catastrophes: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, New York, 2002., Howard, Dealing with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental Issues, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1996., John, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them, Free Press, New York, 2006., David, Joel Schwartz, and S. Robert Lichter, It Ain’t Necessarily So: How the Media Make and Unmake the Scientific Picture of Reality, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD, 2001., Gabe, Ulrich Beck: A Critical Introduction to the Risk Society, Pluto Press, London, 2004., John Allen, A Mathematician Reads the Newspaper, Anchor Books, New York, 1995.
———, Innumeracy: Mathematical Illiteracy and Its Consequences, Hill and Wang, New York, 1988.Palmarini, Massimo, Wiley, Inevitable Illusions: How Mistakes of Mind Rule Our Minds, Hoboken, NJ, 1994., Nick, Roger E. Kasperson, and Paul Slovic (eds.), The Social Amplification of Risk, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003., Steven, The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature, Viking, New York, 2002., Richard A., Catastrophe: Risk and Response, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004., Louise, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat, Random House, New York, 2006., Julian V., and Mike Hough, Understanding Public Attitudes to Criminal Justice, Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK, 2005., Julian V., and Loretta J. Stalans, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 2000., Corey, Fear: The History of a Political Idea, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004., David, and George Gray, Risk: A Practical Guide for Deciding What’s Really Safe and What’s Really Dangerous in the World Around You, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 2002., Jeffrey S., Struck by Lightning: The Curious World of Probabilities, HarperCollins, New York, 2005., Daniel L., The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers, Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA, 2001., Bernard W., and Paul Kleihues (eds.),World Cancer Report, International Agency for Research on Cancer Press, Lyon, France, 2003., Jacob, Saying Yes: In Defense of Drug Use, Jeremy P. Tarcher, New York, 2003., Nassim Nicholas, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House, New York, 2007., Carol, and Elliot Aronson, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts, Harcourt, San Diego, CA, 2007., Philip E., Expert Political Judgment, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2005., John, The Poison Paradox: Chemicals as Friends and Foes, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005., Aaron, But Is It True? A Citizen’s Guide to Environmental Health and Safety Issues, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1995., Lance, and Will Reader, Evolutionary Psychology, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004., Gerald, How Customers Think: Essential Insights Into the Mind of the Market, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, 2003., Franklin E., The Great American Crime Decline, Oxford University Press, New York, 2007.first met the psychologist Paul Slovic at the Instituto de Astrofisica in the Canary Islands and so it was amid models of the solar system and other astrophysical phantasmagoria that I first discovered the psychology of risk perception. The universe is interesting, I concluded. But the mind is fascinating.is to Paul Slovic’s patience and generosity that I most owe this book. Many thanks. I am similarly indebted to Susan Renouf at McClelland and Stewart, and Stephen Morrow at Dutton for his steady hand and cheerful words. Peter Bobrowsky, Rudyard Griffiths, Dr. Barry Dworkin, Ron Melchers, and Carl Phillips all contributed mightily.special note to my editors at the Ottawa Citizen, who have given me freedom and opportunities the like of which most journalists can only dream. Thanks to Neil Reynolds, Scott Anderson, Tina Spencer, Lynn McAuley, and Leonard Stern.lastly, I must thank my children, Victoria and Winston, for pulling down my books, scattering my papers, smashing my laptop, shrieking at the most inopportune moments, banging relentlessly on my door, and infecting me with every virus bred in that Petri dish known as junior kindergarten. I have realized that if I can write a book under that onslaught, I can do anything, and so I shall go forward with new confidence. Bless you, darlings.travel, AliMobruk, Sala AbdelQaedaCancer Society, Bruce, MartinRule, Marcia, Kofi, Jessie, Joseph, Shoko, Solomon, Johnand meteors, MargaretShinrikyo, Francis, Robert, UlrichLaden, Osamaweapons, Linda, Alan, Tony, Michael, K. T., Alan, Joannaspongiform encephalopathy (BSE), Tedphysiologyimplants, David, David, Bethany, Wylie, George H. W., George W.agecancerchemical exposurethe Good-Bad Rule-marketing of fearmedia coveragethe precautionary principleradonofcanceron, Johnny, Rachel, Jimmyfor Disease Control (CDC), Clark, Jessica, Dickdisaster, Michaelchemical exposurepredatorsdiseasesratesrisk perception, Robert, Lee, Richardchange, Bill, Hillary, David, Roger, Steve, SeanHigh School shootingbias, Roger, Anderson, Irwin, John, Sue, Jim, JaneJakob disease. See also bovine spongiform(BSE)and violence. See also terrorism; specific crimes and events, Richard, Chris, George, Marlene, Charles, Gray, Stanislas, René, Michael, William, Sam, Mary, William O., Maureen, Aaron, Michael, Robin, Denis, Paul, Dwight, Manueldisruptor hypothesis, Nicholas, SamRulecrimecultureemotion in risk perceptionentertainment mediaexcessive informationgroup polarizationhabituationimagerymarketing of fearnuclear powerscientific informationterrorismtobacco marketing, JulianBureau of Investigation (FBI), Ivan, Melissa, Baruch, Robert, Gerald, Mark, Benjamin, Shane, Thomas, Dominick, David, Michael, Garyfamily, David, Michaelmodified organisms-, Rhonda, Gerd, DanielCommittee, Thomas, Rudy, James Buchanan, Malcolmwarming, Lois Swirsky, Barry, Alberto, JaneBad Rulechemical exposurecrimeculturedisease awarenessemotional imageryemotion in risk perceptionentertainment mediahabituationhealth risksimageryjusticelanguage usemarketing fearmedia coverageprobability blindnessrisk assessmentscientific informationstatistics, Mikhail, Al, Stephen Jay, John, Juddpolarization, Slava, Chris, Stephen, Russell, Stephen, Chip, Iona, Heinrich, David, John, Joel Henry/AIDS, Stephen, J. Edgar, Shawn, Willie, Michael, Christopher, Rock, William, Howard, Bobgatherers, IanKatrina, Saddam, MichaelWarbowel syndrome, Brian Michael, Eric, Stephen, E.., Dan, Daniel, Gary, Jerome, Robert, Lawrence, John F., Robert, Montague, John, DavidJong. J., Jack, Uwe, Daboula. Everett, Barry, Daniel, James Howard, Ken, Anthony, Jill, Richard, Irwin, Steven, Douglas, Monica, Jeffrey, Leonard, Sarah, Robert, Ken, George, Bjorn, Jessica, Frank, Timothy, Daniel, Ken, Andrew, Iancow disease. See bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)resonance imaging (MRI)Buller, Eliza, Howardfear, Monty, Jane, Roslynn, David, John, Madeleine, Cormac, Carol, Barbara, John, Timothy, H.., Wendy, Barbara, Michel de, Roy, John, Robert, Paul, Etienne, Marc, Thomas, Richard, RalphCenter for Missing and Exploited ChildrenIncidence Studies of Missing, Abducted, Runaway, and Throwaway Children (NISMART), Carol, Richardorganizations (NGOs)powerweapons’Connor, DianaCity bombing, Keithbias’Reilly, Bill, Ben, Paul, William, Alexander Mitchell, Blaise, EllenResearch Centerindustry, Stevencrimethe Good-Bad Rulegroup consensushistorical trendsmarketing fearadvertisingrisk managementthe road rage panicterrorism, Richard, Dick, Colinprinciple, Richardblindness, JonathangasMIPT terrorism database, Dan, RonaldBrigades, Martin, Robert, Larry, Jr.legs syndrome, Kim, Frank, Louise, Cokie, Julian, John, Eleanor, Franklin Delano, Jeffrey, Alexander, Stanley, Yuval, Paulof Typical Things, Gilbert, Jeffrey, Carlgas, Nicolas, Daniel, Michael, Stephenshootings, Lisa, Tony, Donna, Norbertindustry, Danielattacks, Richard, Stevencell anemia, MichaelSpring (Carson), Herbert, Marwan, Paulbreast implant risksthe Good-Bad Rulehealth risk researchimpact of culturemedia influencenumeracyperception researchthe Tenerife conferencethe tobacco lawsuit, Deborah, Elizabeth, Anna Nicole, Michael, Leslie, Josephthe breast implant scarewith storiescrime riskshealth risksissuesblindness, Fritz, Bob, Cass, Simon, David, Georgeof Calcutta (Mother Teresa)the Bush administrationcatastrophist writingcost-benefit analysisglobal communicationsthe Good-Bad Ruleprobability/high-consequence eventmarketing fearmedia coveragereaction toimpactrisk perceptionweapons of mass destruction, Philip, Henry David, Caesarevent, Amosfever.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), Robert, JosephWarnerve agent, George, John, Brian, Peterpurification, Henryof mass destruction (WMDs), John, Holly, DrewNile virus, Paul, Barbara, Aaron, George, Robb, Ian, Robyn, Oprah, Piotr, Naomi, StevenHealth Organization (WHO)InstituteWildlife Fund, Herbert, Robert, Gerald, Dolf, Peterthe AuthorGardner is a columnist and senior writer with the Ottawa Citizen. Trained in history and law, Gardner worked as a policy adviser in government before turning to journalism in 1997. His writing has received numerous awards, including the National Newspaper Award, Amnesty International’s Media Award, and others. He lives in Ottawa with his wife and two children.
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