University of Florida

By James F. Gregg

For Submission to the Faculty of International Relations at the Saint Petersburg State University,

MA in International Relations application.

As Napoleon stood upon the banks of the Neman River, preparing for the invasion of the Russian Empire in the summer of 1812, Tolstoy, in his prolific tome War and Peace, examines the causes of international conflict, and all international relations through the lens of historical fatalism. “The combination of causes of phenomena is beyond the grasp of human intellect. But the impulse to seek causes is innate in the soul of man. And the human intellect, with no inkling of the immense variety and complexity of circumstances conditioning a phenomenon, any one of which may be separately conceived of as the cause of it, snatches at the first and most easily understood approximation, and says here is the cause.” (Tolstoy, 1123) The fate of the Russian Empire and the beginning of this war is compared simply to the falling of an apple from a tree. The breezes, the aging of the tree, the maturity of the apple, and the intense desire of a hungry child, all are equally responsible and simultaneously not responsible for its falling. So quickly people assume the fate of the world lies in the hands of great leader such as Napoleon and Katuzov. Yet analysis according to one’s expertise will find substantial claims and reasons for the falling of the apple according to their own field of study. Economists will find the answer in economics, politicians will find their answer in politics, and poets will find their answer in destiny. It is in this regard that international relations are examined by political scientists, who attempt to apply scientific and philosophical principles of economics, power and politics to the innumerable accumulation of human interactions that drive the course of history. (Tolstoy, 690)

Of course, over the past six months, the balance of power has brought the world to a dramatic crossroads, more familiar to the generation of the late Soviet Union. The geopolitical influence of the Russian Federation and her determination on the international stage has been noted by Western powers, and they currently face challenges in their reaction to a very nuanced and complex question. The focal point of this development, of course, has been the EvroMaidan revolution, the ouster of President Viktor Yanykovich and the Russian annexation of Crimea. Upon analysis of the historical, cultural, economic, geopolitical, and leadership factors in play in the push and pull of Ukraine between the EU and the Russian Federation, much as Tolstoy would agree, it is determined that all traits are participatory and equally responsible- the products of historical inertia. To frame the issue, the history of Ukraine and divisive social demographics will briefly be examined, but the focus of the work will be the economic and cultural forces pushing and pulling Ukraine between the Russian sphere of influence and the EU.

According to the Russian narrative, Ukraine’s origins are in their Cossack roots. Cossacks are former serfs in Imperial Russia, who fled their estate to live in freedom according to their faith and traditions on the frontier. The hostile nature of the frontier made them fierce warriors and horsemen who defended Russia from encroaching enemies and marauders of Polish Latvian communities on the borderlands (Encyclopedia of Ukraine). In reality, large areas of Ancient Ukraine were generally uninhabited, and controlled in different eras by Poland, the Austrian, and the Russian Empires. Ukraine as whole is not homogenous and instead is a nation of Poles, Jews, Tartars, Russians, Ukrainians, Bulgarians, and Cossacks with a historical cultural union with Russia and the Soviet Union (Darden).

Despite not being a homogenous society Ukraine has distinct modern nationalism with roots in the division of territory from imperial interests. With the annexation of Western Ukraine by the Austrian-Hapsburg Empire in the late 19th century, a clear and definitive effort was made to develop the Ukrainian identity as something separate from the Russian identity. Many Ukrainians in the frontier regions of Volyn’, Eastern Halychnya, Transcarpathia self-identified and spoke Russian, not Ukrainian. It was in the Austrian Empire’s political interest to foster the development of Ukrainian nationalism as something separate from the neighboring Russian Empire. The teaching of Ukrainian folk culture, language, and identity was therefore reinforced in Austrian schools built in these western regions to create this cultural (Darden). Both in history and in modernity, the relationship of Ukrainian and Russia is ambiguous and not mutually exclusive. A person can be both Russian and Ukrainian, by blood and by citizenship. Ukrainian culture is real and present since Carpathian antiquity, despite being highlighted by the Austrian Empire’s interest. However it does have a lasting legacy in the political landscape of the nation. (D’Anieri)

The nationalistic division influences Ukraine’s political culture as well. This is probably best exemplified in the clear division between east and west with usage of the phrase «В Украине» or «На Украине», spoken in the East and West respectively. Na signifies the association of the Ukraine as a same Narod and part of a greater ethnic and cultural identity in Union with the Russian peoples. Contrastingly, “V Ukraine”, denotes Ukraine as something separate, new borders and anew culture and blood. “Na” literally refers to Ukraine as a territory of land congruous and contiguous to the greater Slavic territory of the region (Wladyka). However, consistently since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the number of citizens who consider themselves Ukrainian and not Russian has risen. Since 1989, Ethnic Ukrainians rose from 72.7% to 77.8% of the total population, and ethnic Russians fell from 22.1% to 17.3%. Nonetheless, 29.6% of the population of Ukraine speaks Russian as their mother language. Russian language is pervasive in aspects of Ukrainian media and popular culture, “In 2009, two-thirds of newspapers print runs and 90% of magazines appeared in Russian. Over half of the television broadcasts also used Russian. 17.6 % of schoolchildren received instruction in Russian, and if we add those who study Russian as a “foreign language,” then the figure rises to 46.6 percent.” (Oxiley)

Despite the intermingling of Russian and Ukrainian languages in popular culture, the Ukrainian nationalist West disproportionately controls the operations of parliament. Western Ukraine only represents 12% of the overall Ukrainian population but has 14 out of 23 seats in the Ukrainian parliament. The result made evident with the EvroMaidan revolution, which was not supported by the majority of Ukrainians, is highly a highly divided populace on political interest. With a European supporting West, and a Pro-Russian East. This division was a concern previously to the annexation of Crimea from Russia which has emboldened Ukrainian nationalism and independence from the Russian sphere of influence in other areas previously supportive of the CIS (D’Anieri). The invasion in March 1st for the protection of Russians in Crimea from Ukrainian nationalistic violence was viewed as a cruel opportunistic move from a brother nation, in the eyes of many Ukrainians who formerly supported relations with Russia (D’Anieri). In the eyes of the international community, the invasion was viewed as an infringement on the sovereignty of the Ukrainian government despite the popular referendum on March 16th. Others, however, see Crimea as legitimately a part of Russia that was lost in 1954. The annexation of Crimea may possible unify fragmented Eastern Ukraine, not in support of the EvroMaidan, revolution, but in support of an independent Ukraine, with its own economic interests. While the European Union and the West would prefer the strategic geopolitical position of Ukraine within the EU, the issue is complicated in that most scholars agree that Ukraine is not nearly ready for any accession into the European Union, or NATO, and it would be unlikely, and irrational to break a relationship with the Russian Federation (Darden).

Positioned between the East and West, in the post-soviet era Ukraine has been subject to drastic economic influences from both regions. Russia’s superior control of natural gas and gasoline to Ukraine is an extremely important form of economic entanglement. It also gives Russia influence on the European Union. This is one reason why the EU is reluctant to bring into effect harsher sanctions on the Russian Federation suggested by the United States. (Kottasova) “While maintaining a united stance in public, the individual responses of Britain, France and Germany are all conditioned by the degree to which their economies are vulnerable to possible Kremlin retaliatory measures. Britain is keen to minimize damage to the City of London, Germany frets about Russia cutting off gas supplies and France has valuable Kremlin defense contracts.” (Kottasova) Germany, for example receives 40% of its gasoline from the Russian federation. Therefore, an overly strong hand, could be devastating to the economies of the European Union, should Russia feel the need to restrict that supply of energy.(Kottasova) It is in the economic interest of the European Union, not to overly criticize or punish the Russian Federation.

Though lacking in economic benefits for the EU, EU accession, could possible benefit Ukraine itself. No realistic movement toward EU accession would occur until several fundamental changes happen to the political culture of the Ukraine. However, post-soviet states- such as Poland, Czech Republic, and Slovakia have had fantastic economic reformation, democratic participation, and increase in standard of living with successful transition from Communism (Stokes).The EU has not brought all it promised to other nations, such as Romania and Bulgaria, which have not met their post-communist economic projections, due to capital flight, corruption, and economic captivity from oligarchs and cronyism, preventing cashflow and economic competition. (Stokes) Ukrainian political culture has little in union with the EU Acquis Communtaire. Democracy, internal market competition, and protection of minorities are not the primary concern of President Yanykovich. However, a relationship with the EU is an important maneuver against Russia, in order to lure Russia into lowering the price of fuel and natural gas. Conversely a further relationship with Russia, pressures the European Union to support the Ukrainian economy in an effort to pull it away from Russia. Last year in March 2012, the International Monetary fund gave Ukraine the sum of $800,000 (Economic Intelligence Unit-EU/Ukraine). Political brinksmanship in its relationship between Russia and the EU could be manipulated for the benefit of the Ukrainian economy if controlled with a clever hand.

This duality between the European Union and the Russian Federation is also reflected in the political interests of the Ukrainian population itself. “A poll by Ukraine's non-governmental Research and Branding group released earlier this month shows 46 percent of Ukrainians favoring the EU trade pact. Thirty-six percent were shown favoring a rival trade bloc of former Soviet republics and satellite countries that is being pushed by Moscow” (Asia News Monitor) Ukraine acts as both a trade partner and competitor with the Russian economy. It sells Slavic cultural products to the world in competition with Russian goods, but is still a major trader partner of the Russian Federation, exporting into Russia heavy metals with such firms such as International Aviation Motors', Salyut, AO Motor-Sin. Many Russian industries are intertwined with Ukrainian capital production. Forty percent and the greatest component of Ukrainian exports are non-precious heavy metals used in industry mostly in the CIS (Economic Intelligence Unit). It is for this reason that it is Ukraine’s economic advantage to continue the unified tariff and tax policies, with coordinated currency exchange rates in all areas of economic cross-border production (Oxford Analytical Economic Report). Russia and Ukraine are also economically intertwined in military development as well. The majority of the Ukrainian military is equipped with weapon systems produced in Tula and Izhvesk, produced both currently and during the Soviet Union. Both Russia and Ukraine work jointly in military technologies that are vital to Russian and Ukrainian interests (Oxford Analytical Economic Report). The Russian and Ukrainian militaries are so intertwined, many Ukrainian soldiers in Crimea actually joined gladly into the Russian occupation, viewing themselves as de facto Russian military units (Darden).

The most critical advantage to the economic between Russia and Ukraine relationship is energy prices. Energy companies EES Rossiia and Gazprom have major interests in supplying Ukraine and Europe. Energy sales make up over half of all market exports from Russia, and thirty percent of its GDP. As a whole, energy from Russia takes up thirty percent of the EU’s energy consumption. Russia is the world’s largest supplier of oil, surpassing even Saudi Arabia. (National Center for Political Analysis). As a whole, Russia sold $292 billion dollars in products to the European Union, purchasing $169 billion from the European Union. This contrasts greatly to the mere $27 billion sold, and $11 billion bought from the Russian Federation to the United States. This economic entanglement is clearly evident with the political responses of Western Nations. France, which only imports 18% of its energy from Russia, is more supportive of American led sanctions against Russian than Germany, which imports 40% of its energy needs from Russia. The resulting crisis makes all European powers vulnerable to Russian influence. (Kottasova)

Along with economic integration with the CIS, Ukraine has debts to Russia in the billions of dollars. Each year, Russia sells energy at negotiated prices to accommodate the weak Ukrainian economy, despite the IMF request to raise a tariff on Russia imports of energies in order to promote Ukrainian home nuclear and energy institutions.(Oxford Analytical Economic Report). The market for energy from Russia makes up 32.2% of Ukrainian imports, and a tariff would only further harm the Ukrainian people who enjoy cheap energy prices. Ukraine currently is completely synchronized with Russia in energy dispersement infrastructure, since 2002. However, furthering the continuity of the conflict, President Yanykovich proposed to fully integrate in the European UCTE electronic grip further complicates the model of Ukrainian energy needs. This is response to the one tenant of integration of the European Union, where all electricity should be privatized in a competitive market, where transmission and distribution of energy cannot be a single entity controlled by the government, or monopoly (Oxford Analytical Economic Report). Energy and debt restructuring, economic integration, and military compatibility remain Russia’s greatest geopolitical influence over Ukraine.

The EU has much less economic and geopolitical influence over Ukraine. However, the track record of successful post-communist nations who have broken away from Russia’s sphere of influence has allure to Ukraine. Their increased GDPs, and higher quality of life, and life expectancy are a testament to the economic benefits of democratic transition and European economic transition. Most nations, however experience initial economic decline in the difficulties of economic restructuring and reform cost in 1989 (Stokes). Ukraine currently may not be ready to realistically endure further costs and austerity, necessary for accession to the European Union. However, if accession were to take place, the European monetary integration would help suppress the 10% increase per year of inflation rate over the World average (Economic Intelligence Unit). The road to EU accession would be very difficult for Ukraine and also further isolate the Russian Federation, which historically has enjoyed a generous buffer zone of satellite states apart from NATO and the European Union. In sum, stabilization of government deficient spending, inflation rate, anti-corruption reform, and cultural learning would be both costly, and currently unrealistic (Darden) The earliest steps would be economic entanglement with Europe in competition with Russian economic influence, as was expected in the European Association agreement under review by Yanykovich in November of 2013. The results were socially catastrophic.

Following the withdrawal from tentative economic entanglement with the European Union, citizens of Kiev began initially peaceful protests in November of 2013. The protests eventually turned into full scale riots with flame and death completely covering Maidan Square in Kiev. Other support for the EU was demonstrated in other regions of Ukraine with the majority of Ukrainians not supporting the movement. Following the ouster of President Yanykovich, the West is reluctant to offer complete backing to the new government as it very possible that the new leaders will be as corrupt as the previous leaders and institute harm against minorities (Darden). Many Pro Russian journalists have already faced acts of violence and many have gone missing, resulting from anger following the Russian annexation of Crimea (Vesti). Many Ukrainians feel emboldened by the Russian invasion, when previously felt apathetic and reluctant to support the EvroMaidan protests and the Ukrainian Fire Revolution. In response to the invasion, Russia Today reported on March 20th, 2014 that the Ukrainian parliament has requested the US and British forces to participate in military maneuvers in Ukrainian, a gesture of dedication to NATO, and appeal for defense from further Russian incursion. The past few weeks have shown no such activity, but plans for NATO operations with former Soviet States, in the Baltic region, Bulgaria, and Poland are being discussed, simultaneously efforts for de-escalation coincide with joint NATO maneuvers in the Black Sea and Eastern Bulgaria. (Russia Today) (Associated Press),

Further incursion is a legitimate concern for Ukraine in regions to the east such as NovoRossiya. Russia had been supplying passports to citizens of Ukraine in Crimea since the 1990s. Ukraine, in response made it illegal to be a dual citizen of Ukraine in Russia in their 1996 constitution. Ukrainian lawmakers feared that Russia was deliberately creating a population of Russian citizens in Eastern Ukraine, and were suspicious that Russia would use this population as “pretext for intervention in Ukraine’s internal affairs. Ukrainian officials were further suspicious of this practice, after many residents of Abkhazia and South Ossetia received Russian citizenship in 2007, before Russian intervention and annexation took place in 2008. The practice of issuing passports is not unique nor entirely sinister for this region of the world. Both Romania and Hungary offer passports to ethnic citizens in the regions of Bukovina, and Transcarpathia respectively. Citizens do not report their dual citizenship and therefore this category of persons has arisen (Oxiley). Naturally, Russia is in the position to offer citizenship to its advantage. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the much of the Russian population was suddenly lost into the sovereignty of former Soviet Republics. The legitimacy of their citizenship is not a question for Russia. Crimea, in particular has always had a large Russian population since Catherine the Great captured Crimea on April 19, 1783 and the expulsion of the Tartars after their support of the fascist invader in the Great Patriotic War in 1945 (Tayaglyy). An indicator of further Russian intervention would be the analysis of Russian passport activity in Eastern Ukraine.

For the majority of the relationship between Ukraine and Russia, only soft power was necessary to maintain influence. Economic and cultural integration was insurmountable and remains insurmountable today in order to completely disassociate Ukraine from Russian. The hard power, and power politics of the invasion of Crimea was a shock to both Ukraine and the world. Equally, the European Union had only soft power influence over Ukraine with promises of economic progress and IMF support (Associated Press). In response to the request for NATO displays of force in Ukraine, the United States and England have hesitated, as such power politics would further exacerbate the situation. Obama also stated that currently, Ukraine is not slated for NATO unification, thusly assuring Russia a defensive barrier from the West as a gesture of de-escalation, however, the escalated United States Naval presence in the Black Sea shows clearly that the United States has observed the Russian incursion and while military intervention is not the intention, the option is omnipresent (USNAVY). The United States has the luxury to flex both hard and soft power over the situation in Ukraine, because it is not economically dependent on Russia. Russia, conversely has completely taken strong social opposition to the United States. This contest of economic and geopolitical competition over Ukraine from the EU and Russian Federation, instead interpreted on Russian media and Vkontakte, as an ideological competition over Ukraine. The wolf, the United States stalks the bear cub of the Russian mother. This analysis conveniently ignores the European Union as the competitor, and ignores the economic push and pull between Russian and the EU, instead selecting an easily understandable enemy in the United States that the Russian people can oppose to further garner support for Russian intervention. As photos will show, in Maidan square there were no American flags, but instead a sea of blue EU flags alongside Ukrainian flags. The United States people are equally ignorant of the situation in Crimea, and often lack the understanding of Russia and Ukraine’s deep cultural, economic and historical roots. Misunderstanding and ignorance has harmed international relations between Russia and the United States, and sanctions have already affected the economies of Russia and the European Union.

Currently, Ukraine needs economic support from both the European Union and the Russian Federation. To select influence of one side or the other is impossible. The Ukrainian government currently lacks legitimacy, and political participation of all minorities should be implemented and protected. The direction of Ukraine should be directed at the economic interests of Ukraine itself, and not the interests of Russia or either the EU. Above all, Ukraine needs a strong and recognized central government that will give rights and voice to pro-Russian Eastern Ukraine without risking further referendum. Russia, should also remember its relationship to its sister, Ukraine. It should support her and not incite further division. A concern that instability in Ukraine will be used by Russia to further ideas of authoritarian governance, and further division, partition and failure of Ukraine is in the interest of the Russian Government. In the opposing sphere of influence, others believe that the West views Ukraine merely as an opportunity to further isolate the Russian Federation. Ideological pressures, while present consistently fall to realities of economic influence. The economic push and pull of the European Union and the Russian Federation, along with the innumerable variables of history and cultural demographics has brought the Ukraine to this weak and dramatic transition. Instead of division, Russia and the West should work in support of Ukraine, bolstering its economy, legitimizing its government, respecting its sovereignty. The Russian identity is integral to the Ukrainian identity, and that cannot change even with EU accession. Ukraine cannot recover without support from its family in Russia and its friends in the West. Ukraine has not yet died.

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